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International Court of Justice

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(Translation) T C 2

No. 1

CONVENTION FOR THE PACIFIC SETTLEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL DISPUTES. -

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His Majesty the German Emperor, King of Prussia; the President of the United States of America; the President of the Argentine Republic; His Majesty the Emperor of Austria, King of Bohemia, etc., and Apostolic King of Hungary; His Majesty the King of the Belgians; the President of the Republic of Bolivia; the President of the Republic of the United States of Brazil; His Royal Highness the Prince of Bulgaria; the President of the Republic of Chile; His Majesty the Emperor of China; the President of the Republic of Colombia; the Provisional Governor of the Republic of Cuba; His Majesty the King of Denmark; the President of the Dominican Republic; the President of the Republic of Ecuador; His Majesty the King of Spain; the President of the French Republic; His Majesty the King of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland and of the British Dominions beyond the Seas, Emperor of India; His Majesty the King of the Hellenes; the President of the Republic of Guatemala; the President of the Republic of Haiti; His Majesty the King of Italy; His Majesty the Emperor of Japan; His Royal Highness the Grand Duke of Luxemburg, Duke of Nassau; the President of the United States of Mexico; His Royal Highness the Prince of Montenegro; the President of the Republic of Nicaragua; His Majesty the King of Norway; the President of the Republic of Panama; the President of the Republic of Paraguay; Her Majesty the Queen of the Netherlands; the President of the Republic of Peru; His Imperial Majesty the Shah of Persia; His Majesty the King of Portugal and of the Algarves, etc.; His Majesty the King of Roumania; His Majesty the Emperor of All the Russias; the President of the Republic of Salvador; His Majesty the King of Servia; His Majesty the King of Siam; His Majesty the King of Sweden; the Swiss Federal Council; His Majesty the Emperor of the Ottomans; the President of the Oriental Republic of Uruguay; the President of the United States of Venezuela;

Animated by a strong desire to concert for the maintenance of general peace;

Resolved to promote by their best efforts the friendly settlement of international disputes;

Recognizing the solidarity uniting the members of the society of civilized nations;

Desirous of extending the empire of law and of strengthening the appreciation of international justice;

Convinced that the permanent institution of a Tribunal of Arbitration accessible to all, in the midst of independent Powers, will contribute effectively to this result;

Having regard to the advantage of th general and regular organization of the procedure of arbitration;

Sharing the opinion of the august initiator of the International Peace Conference that it is expedient to record in an International Agreement the principles of equity and right on which are based the security of States and the welfare

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of peoples; and

Being desirous, with this object, of insuring and improving the working in practice of Commissions of Inquiry and Tribunals of Arbitration and of facilitating recourse to arbitration in cases which allow a summary procedure;

Have deemed it necessary to revise in certain particulars and to complete the work of the First Peace Conference for the pacific settlement of international disputes;

The High Contracting Parties have resolved to conclude a new Convention for this purpose, and have appointed as their Plenipotentiaries, that is to say:

(Names of Plenipotentiaries)

Who, after having deposited their full powers, found to be in good and due form, have agreed upon the following:-

Part I.

THE MAINTENANCE OF GENERAL PEACE

Article 1.

With a view of obviating as far as possible recourse to force in the relations between States, the Contracting Powers agree to use their best efforts to ensure the pacific settlement of international differences.

Part II.

GOOD OFFICES AND MEDIATION

Article 2.

In case of serious disagreement or dispute, before an appeal to arms, the Contracting Powers agree to have recourse, as far as circumstances allow, to the good offices or mediation of one or more friendly Powers.

Article 3.

Independently of this recourse, the Contracting Powers deem it expedient and desirable that one or more Powers, strangers to the dispute, should, on their own initiative and as far as circumstances allow, offer their good offices or mediation to the States at variance.

Powers strangers to the dispute have the right to offer good offices or mediation even during the course of hostilities.

The exercise of this right can never been regarded by either of the contending parties as an unfriendly act.

Article 4.

The part of the mediator consists in reconciling the opposing claims and appeasing the feelings of resentment which may have arisen between the States at variance.

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Article 5.

The duties of the mediator are at an end when once it is declared, either by one of the contending parties or by the mediator himself, that the means of reconciliation proposed by him are not accepted.

Article 6.

Good offices and mediation undertaken either at the request of the contending parties or on the iniative of Powers strangers to the dispute have exclusively the character of advice, and never have binding force.

Article 7.

The acceptance of mediation cannot, in default of agreement to the contrary, have the effect of interrupting, delaying, or hindering mobilization or other measures of preparation for war.

If mediation takes place after the commencement of hostilities, the military operations in progress are not interrupted, in default of agreement to the contrary.

Article 8.

The Contracting Powers are agreed in recommending the application, when circumstances allow, of special mediation in the following form:-

In case of a serious difference endangering peace, the States at variance choose respectively a Power, to which they intrust the mission of entering into direct communication with the Power chosen on the other side, with the object of preventing the rupture of pacific relations.

For the period of this mandate, the term of which, in default of agreement to the contrary, may not exceed thirty days, the contending States cease from all direct communication on the subject of the dispute, which is regarded as referred exclusively to the mediating Powers. These Powers shall use their best efforts to settle the dispute.

In case of a definite rupture of pacific relations, these Powers remain jointly charged with the task of taking advantage of any opportunity to restore peace.

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(Translation) T C 3

CONVENTION RELATIVE TO THE OPENING OF HOSTILITIES

HIS Majesty the German Emperor, King of Prussia; the President of the United States of America; the President of the Argentine Republic; His Majesty the Emperor of Austria, King of Bohemia, etc., and Apostolic King of Hungary; His Majesty the King of the Belgians; the President of the Republic of Bolivia; the President of the Republic of the United States of Brazil; His Royal Highness the Prince of Bulgaria; the President of the Republic of Chile; His Majesty the Emperor of China; the President of the Republic of Colombia; the Provisional Governor of the Republic of Cuba; His Majesty the King of Denmark; the President of the Dominican Republic; the President of the Republic of Ecuador; His Majesty the King of Spain; the President of the French Republic; His Majesty the King of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland and of the British Dominions beyond the Seas, Emperor of India; His Majesty the King of the Hellenes; the President of the Republic of Guatemala; the President of the Republic of Haiti; His Majesty the King of Italy; His Majesty the Emperor of Japan; His Royal Highness the Grand Duke of Luxemburg, Duke of Nassau; the President of the United States of Mexico; His Royal Highness the Prince of Montenegro; the President of the Republic of Nicaragua; His Majesty the King of Norway; the President of the Republic of Panama; the President of the Republic of Paraguay; Her Majesty the Queen of the Netherlands; the President of the Republic of Peru; His Imperial Majesty the Shah of Persia; His Majesty the King of Portugal and of the Algarves, etc., His Majesty the King of Roumania; His Majesty the Emperor of All the Russias; the President of the Republic of Salvador; His Majesty the King of Servia; His Majesty the King of Siam; His Majesty the King of Sweden; the Swiss Federal Council; His Majesty the Emperor of the Ottomans; the President of the Oriental Republic of Uruguay; the President of the United States of Venezuela:

Considering that it is important, in order to ensure the maintenance of pacific relations, that hostilities should not commence without previous warning.

That it is equally important that the existence of a state of war should be notified without delay to neutral Powers; and

Being desirous of concluding a Convention to this effect, have appointed the following as their Plenipotentiaries:

(Names of Plenipotentiaries.)

Who, after having deposited their full powers, found to be in good and due form, have agreed upon the following provisions:

Article 1.

The Contracting Powers recognize that hostilities between them must not commence without a previous and explicit warning, in the form of either a declaration of war, giving reasons, or an ultimatum with a conditional declaration of war.

Article 2.

The existence of a state of war must be notified to the neutral Powers without delay, and shall not be held to affect them until after the receipt of a notification, which may however, be given by telegraph. Nevertheless, neutral Powers may not

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T C 3
(Cont'd)

rely on the absence of notification if it be established beyond doubt that they were in fact aware of the existence of a state of war.

Article 3.

Article 1 of the present Convention shall take effect in case of war between two or more of the Contracting Powers.

Article 2 applies as between a belligerent Power which is a party to the Convention and neutral Powers which are also parties to the Convention.

Article 4.

The present Convention shall be ratified as soon as possible.

The ratifications shall be deposited at The Hague.

The first deposit of ratifications shall be recorded in a Protocol signed by the Representatives of the Powers which take part therein and by the Netherland Minister for Foreign Affairs.

The subsequent deposits of ratifications shall be made by means of a written notification, addressed to the Netherland Government and accompanied by the instrument of ratification.

A duly certified copy of the Protocol relating to the first deposit of ratifications, of the notifications mentioned in the preceding paragraph, and of the instruments of ratification, shall be immediately sent by the Netherland Government through the diplomatic channel to the Powers invited to the Second Peace Conference, as well as to the other Powers which have acceded to the Convention. The said Government shall, in the cases contemplated in the preceding paragraph, inform them at the same time of the date on which it received the notification.

Article 5.

Non-Signatory Powers may accede to the present Convention.

A Power which desires to accede notifies its intention in writing to the Netherland Government, forwarding to it the act of accession, which shall be deposited in the archives of the said Government.

The said Government shall immediately forward to all the other Powers a duly certified copy of the notification as well as of the act of accession, mentioning the date on which it received the notification.

Article 6.

The present Convention shall take effect, in the case of the Powers which were parties to the first deposit of ramifications, sixty days after the date of the Protocol recording such deposit, and, in the case of the Powers which shall ratify subsequently or which shall accede, sixty days after the notification of their ratification or of their accession has been received by the Netherland Government.

Article 7.

In the event of one of the High Contracting Parties wishing to denounce the present Convention, the denunciation shall be notified in writing to the Netherland Government, which shall immediately communicate a duly certified copy of the notification to all the other Powers, informing them of the date on which it was received.

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T C 3
(Cont'd)

The denunciation shall only operate in respect of the denouncing Power, and only on the expiry of one year after the notification has reached the Netherland Government.

Article 8.

A register kept by the Netherland Ministry for Foreign Affairs shall record the date of the deposit of ratifications effected in virtue of Article 4, paragraphs 3 and 4, as well as the date on which the notifications of accession (Article 5, paragraph 2) or of denunciation (Article 7, paragraph 1) have been received.

Each Contracting Power is entitled to have access to this register and to be supplied with duly certified extracts from it.

In faith whereof the Plenipotentiaries have appended their signatures to the present Convention.

Done at The Hague, the 18th October, 1907, in a single original, which shall remain deposited in the archives of the Netherland Government, and of which duly certified copies shall be sent, through the diplomatic channel, to the Powers invited to the Second Peace Conference.

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THE TREATY OF VERSAILLES, JUNE 28th, 1919.

SECTION XI.

FREE CITY OF DANZIG.

Article 100.

Germany renounces in favour of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers all rights and title over the territory comprised within the following limits:

from the Baltic Sea southwards to the point where the principal channels of navigation of the Nogat and the Vistula (Weichsel) meet:

the boundary of East Prussia as described in Article 28 of Part II (Boundaris of Germany) of the present Treaty;

thence the principal channel of navigation of the Vistula downstream to a point about 6½ kilometres north of the bridge of Dirschau;

thence north-west to point 5, 1½ kilometres south-east of the church of Güttland:

a line to be fixed on the ground;

thence in a general westerly direction to the salient made by the boundary of the Kreis of Berent 8½ kilometres north-east of Schöneck :

a line to be fixed on the ground passing between Mühlbanz on the south and Rambeltsch on the north;

thence the boundary of the Kreis of Berent westwards to the re-entrant which it forms 6 kilometres north-north-west of Schöneck;

thence to a point on the median line of Lonkener See:

a line to be fixed on the ground passing north of Neu Fietz and Schatarpi and south of Barenhütte and Lonken;

thence the median line of Lonkener See to its northernmost point;

thence to the southern end of Pollenziner See:

a line to be fixed on the ground;

thence the median line of Pollenziner See to its northernmost point;

thence in a north-easterly direction to a point about 1 kilometre south of Koliebken church, where the Danzig-Neustadt railway crosses a stream:

a line to be fixed on the ground passing south-east of Kamehlen, Krissau, Fidlin, Sulmin (Richthof), Mattern, Schäferei, and to the north-east of Neuendorf, Marschau, Czapielken, Hoch- and Klein-Kelpin, Pulvermühl, Renneberg and the towns of Oliva and Zoppot;

thence the course of the stream mentioned above to the Baltic Sea.

The boundaries described above are drawn on a German map, scale 1/100,000, attached to the present Treaty (Map No. 3).

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TC 19.

REICHSGESETZBLATT 1929, Part II.

No. 9 (pp 97-101).

The Kellog-Briand Pact

The President of the German Reich, the President of the United States of America, His Majesty the King of the Belgians, the President of the French Republic, His Majesty the King of Great Britain, Ireland and the British Dominions beyond the Seas, Emperor of India, His Majesty the King of Italy, His Majesty the Emperor of Japan, the President of the Republic of Poland, and President of the Czechoslovak Republic,

Deeply sensible of their solemn duty to promote the welfare of manking;

Persuaded that the time has come when a frank renunciation of war as an instrument of national policy should be made to the end that the peaceful and friendly relations now existing between their peoples may be perpetuated;

Convinced that all changes in their relations with one another should be sought only by pacific means and be the result of a peaceful and orderly process, and that any signatory Power which shall hereafter seek to promote its national interests by resort to war should be denied the benefits furnished by this Treaty;

Hopeful that, encourages by their example, all the other nations of the world will join in this humane endeavour and by adhering to the present Treaty as soon as it comes into force bring their peoples within the scope of its beneficient provisions, thus uniting the civilized nations of the world in a common renunciation of war as an instrument of their national policy;

Have decided to conclude a Treaty and for that purpose have appointed as their respective Plenipotentiaries:

The President of the German Reich:

Dr. Gustav Stresemann, Minister for Foreign Affairs;

The President of the United States of America:

The Honorable Frank B Kellogg, Secretary of State;

His Majesty the King of the Belgians:

Mr. Paul Hymans, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Minister of State;

The President of the French Republic:

Mr. Aristide Briand, Minister for Foreign Affairs;

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His Majesty the King of Great Britain, Ireland and the British Dominions beyond the Seas, Emperor of India:

For Great Britain and Northern Ireland and all parts of the British Empire which are not separate Members of the League of Nations:

The Right Honourable Lord Cushendun, Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, Acting Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs;

For the Dominion of Canada:

The Right Honourable William Lyon Mackenzie King, Prime Minister and Minister for External Affairs;

For the Commonwealth of Australia:

The Honourable Alexander John McLachlan, Member of the Executive Federal Council;

For the Dominion of New Zealand:

The Honourable Sir Christopher James Parr, High Commissioner for New Zealand in Great Britain;

For the Union of South Africa:

The Honourable Jacobus Stephanus Smit, High Commissioner for the Union of South Africa in Great Britain;

For the Irish Free State:

Mr. William Thomas Cosgrave, President of the Executive Council;

For India:

The Right Honourable Lord Cushendun, Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, acting Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs;

His Majesty the King of Italy:

Count Gaetano Manzoni, his Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary at Paris.

His Majesty the Emperor of Japan:

Count Uchida, Privy Councillor;

The President of the Republic of Poland:

Mr. A. Zaleski, Minister for Foreign Affairs;

The President of the Czechoslovak Republic:

Dr. Eduard Benès, Minister for Foreign Affairs;

who, having communicated to one another their full powers found in good and due form have agreed upon the following articles.

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Article I.

The High Contracting Parties solemnly declare in the names of their respective peoples that they condemn recourse to war for the solution of international controversies, and renounce it as an instrument of national policy in their relations with one another.

Article II.

The High Contracting Parties agree that the settlement or solution of all disputes or conflicts of whatever nature or of whatever origin they may be, which may arise among them, shall never be sought except by pacific means.

Article III.

The present Treaty shall be ratified by the High Contracting Parties named in the Preamble in accordance with their respective constitutional requirements, and shall take effect as between them as soon as all their several instruments of ratification shall have been deposited at Washington.

This Treaty shall, when it has come into effect as prescribed in the preceding paragraph, remain open as long as may be necessary for adherence by all the other Powers of the world. Every instrument evidencing the adherence of a Power shall be deposited at Washington and the Treaty shall immediately upon such deposit become effective as between the Power thus adhering and the other Powers parties hereto.

It shall be the duty of the Government of the United States to furnish each Government named in the Preamble and every Government subsequently adhering to this Treaty with a certified copy of the Treaty and of every instrument of ratification or adherence. It shall also be the duty of the Government of the United States telegraphically to notify such Governments immediately upon the deposit with it of each instrument of ratification or adherence.

In faith whereof the respective Plenipotentiaries have signed this Treaty in the French and English languages both texts having equal force, and hereunto affix their seals.

Done at Paris, the twenty-seventh day of August in the year one thousand nine hundred and twenty-eight.

(Seal) Gustav Stresemann
(Seal Frank B. Kellogg
(Seal) Paul Hymans
(Seal) Ari Briand
(Seal) Cushenden
(Seal) W. L. Mackenzie King
(Seal) A. J. McLachlan
(Seal) C. J. Parr
(Seal) J. S. Snit
(Seal) Liam T. MacCosgair
(Seal) Cushenden
(Seal) G. Manzoni
(Seal) Uchida
(Seal) August Zaleski
(Seal) Dr. Eduard Benes

Exhibit GB 16
Filed Dec 5, 1945
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TC 15

[1]Traduction - Translation.

No. 1295 - Arbitration Treaty[2] between Germany and Poland, Done at Locarno, October 16, 1925.

Official text in French. This Treaty was registered with the Secretariat, in accordance with its Article 22, on September 14, 1926, the date of its entry into force.

THE PRESIDENT OF THE GERMAN EMPIRE and THE PRESIDENT OF THE POLISH REPUBLIC;

Equally resolved to maintain peace between Germany and Poland by assuring the peaceful settlement of differences which might arise between the two countries;

Declaring that respect for the rights established by treaty or resulting from the law of nations is obligatory for international tribunals;

Agreeing to recognise that the rights of a State cannot be modified save with its consent;

And considering that sincere observance of the methods of peaceful settlement of international disputes permits of resolving, without recourse to force, questions which may become the cause of division between States;

Have decided to embody in a treaty their common intentions in this respect, and have named as their Plenipotentiaries the following :

THE PRESIDENT OF THE GERMAN EMPIRE :
Dr. Gustav STRESEMANN, Minister for Foreign Affairs;

THE PRESIDENT OF THE POLISH REPUBLIC :
M. Alexandre SKRZYNSKI, Prime Minister, Minister for Foreign Affairs;

Who, having exchanged their full powers, found in good and due form, are agreed upon the following Articles :

Part I.

Article 1.

All disputes of every kind between Germany and Poland with regard to which the Parties are in conflict as to their respective rights, and which it may not be possible to settle amicably by the normal methods of diplomacy, shall be submitted for decision either to an arbitral tribunal

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[1]Communiquee par le Ministere des Affaires etrangeres de Sa Majeste britannique.

[1]Communicated by His Britannic Majesty's Foreign Office.

[2]The ratifications were deposited at Geneva, September 14, 1926.

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or to the Permanent Court of International Justice[1], as laid down hereafter. It is agreed that the disputes referred to above include in particular those mentioned in Article 13 of the Covenant of the League of Nations.

This provision does not apply to disputes arising out of events prior to the present treaty and belonging to the past.

Disputes for the settlement of which a special procedure is laid down in other conventions in force between the High Contracting Parties shall be settled in conformity with the provisions of those conventions.

Article 2.

Before any resort is made to arbitral procedure before the Permanent Court of International Justice, the dispute may, by agreement between the Parties, be submitted, with a view to amicable settlement, to a permanent international commission, styled the Permanent Conciliation Commission, constituted in accordance with the present Treaty.

Article 3.

In the case of a dispute the occasion of which, according to the municipal law of one of the Parties, falls within the competence of the national courts of such Party, the matter in dispute shall not be submitted to the procedure laid down in the present treaty until a judgment with final effect has been pronounced, within a reasonable time, by the competent national judicial authority.

Article 4.

The Permanent Conciliation Commission mentioned in Article 2 shall be composed of five members, who shall be appointed as follows, that is to say : the High Contracting Parties shall each nominate a commissioner chosen from among their respective nationals, and shall appoint, by common agreement, the three other commissioners from among the nationals of third Powers; those three commissioners must be of different nationalities. The High Contracting Parties shall appoint the president of the commission from among them.

The commissioners are appointed for three years, and their mandate is renewable. Their appointment shall continue until their replacement, and in any case until the termination of the work in hand at the moment of the expiry of their mandate.

Vacancies which may occur as a result of death, resignation or any other cause shall be filled within the shortest possible time in the manner fixed for the nominations.

Article 5.

The Permanent Conciliation Commission shall be constituted within three months from the entry into force of the present Treaty.

If the nomination of the commissioners to be appointed by common agreement should not have taken place within the said period, or, in the case of the filling of a vacancy, within three months from the time when the seat falls vacant, the President of the Swiss Confederation shall, in the absence of other agreement, be requested to make the necessary appointments.

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[1]Vol. VI, page 379; Vol. XI, page 406; Vol. XV, page 304; Vol. XXIV, page 152; Vol. XXVII, page 414; Vol. XXXIX, page 405; Vol. XIV, page 96; and Vol. L, page 159, of this Series.

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Article 6.

The Permanent Conciliation Commission shall be informed by means of a request addressed to the president by the two Parties acting in agreement, or, in the absence of such agreement, by one or other of the Parties.

The request, after having given a summary account of the subject of the dispute, shall contain the invitation to the commission to take all necessary measures with a view to arriving at an amicable settlement.

If the request emanates from only one of the Parties, notification thereof shall be made without delay to the other Party.

Article 7.

Within fifteen days from the date when one of the High Contracting Parties shall be brought a dispute before the Permanent Conciliation Commission, either Party may, for the examination of the particular dispute, replace its commissioner by a person possessing special competence in the matter.

The Party making use of this right shall immediately inform the other Party; the latter shall in that case be entitled to take similar action within fifteen days from the date when the notification reaches it.

Article 8.

The task of the Permanent Conciliation Commission shall be to elucidate questions in dispute, to collect with that object all necessary information by means of enquiry or otherwise, and to endeavour to bring the Parties to an agreement. It may, after the case has been examined, inform the Parties of the terms of settlement which seem suitable to it, and lay down a period within which they are to make their decision.

At the close of its labours the commission shall draw up a report stating, as the case may be, either that the Parties have come to an agreement and, if need arises, the terms of the agreement, or that it has been impossible to effect a settlement.

The labours of the commission must, unless the Parties otherwise agree, be terminated within six months from the day on which the commission shall have been notified of the dispute.

Article 9.

Failing any special provision to the contrary, the Permanent Conciliation Commission shall lay down its own procedure, which in any case must provide for both Parties being heard. In regard to enquiries, the commission, unless it decides unanimously to the contrary, shall act in accordance with the provisions of Chapter III (International Commissions of Enquiry) of the Hague Convention[1] of the 18th October 1907, for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes.

Article 10.

The Permanent Conciliation Commission shall meet, in the absence of agreement by the Parties to the contrary, at a place selected by its president.

Article 11.

The labours of the Permanent Conciliation Commission are not public except when a decision to that effect has been taken by the commission with the consent of the Parties.

Article 12.

The Parties shall be represented before the Permanent Conciliation Commission by agents, whose duty it shall be to act as intermediaries between them and the commission; they may moreover be assisted by counsel and experts appointed by them for that purpose, and may request that all persons whose evidence appears to them useful should be heard.

[1] British and Foreign State Papers, Vol. 100, page 298.

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The commission on its side shall be entitled to request oral explanations from the agents, counsel and experts of the two Parties, as well as from all persons it may think useful to summon with the consent of their Government.

Article 13.

Unless otherwise provided in the present treaty the decisions of the Permanent Conciliation Commission shall be taken by a majority.

Article 14.

The High Contracting Parties undertake to facilitate the labours of the Permanent Conciliation Commission, and particularly to supply it to the greatest possible extent with all relevant documents and information, as well as to use the means at their disposal to allow it to proceed in their territory and in accordance with their law to the summoning and hearing of witnesses or experts, and to visit the localities in question.

Article 15.

During the labours of the Permanent Conciliation Commission each commissioner shall receive salary, the amount of which shall be fixed by agreement between the High Contracting Parties, each of which shall contribute an equal share.

Article 16.

In the event of no amicable agreement being reached before the Permanent Conciliation Commission the dispute shall be submitted by means of a special agreement either to the Permanent Court of International Justice under the conditions and according to the procedure laid down by its statute or to an arbitral tribunal under the conditions and according to the procedure laid down by the Hague Convention of the 18th October 1907, for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes.

If the Parties cannot agree on the terms of the special agreement after a month's notice one or other of them may bring the dispute before the Permanent Court of International Justice by means of an application.

PART II.

Article 17.

All questions on which the German and Polish Governments shall differ without being able to reach an amicable solution by means of the normal methods of diplomacy, the settlement of which cannot be attained by means of a judicial decision as provided in Article I of the present Treaty, and for the settlement of which no procedure has been laid down by other conventions in force between the Parties, shall be submitted to the Permanent Conciliation Commission, whose duty it shall be to propose to the Parties an acceptable solution and in any case to present a report.

The procedure laid down in Articles 6-15 of the present Treaty shall be applicable.

Article 18.

If the two parties have not reached an agreement within a month from the termination of the labours of the Permanent Conciliation Commission the question shall, at the request of either Party, be brought before the Council of the League of Nations, which shall deal with it in accordance with Article 15 of the Covenant of the League.

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GENERAL PROVISIONS.

Article 19.

In any case, and particularly if the question on which the Parties differ arises out of acts already committed or on the point of commission, the Conciliation Commission or, if the latter has not been notified thereof, the arbitral tribunal or the Permanent Court of International Justice, acting in accordance with Article 41 of its statute, shall lay down within the shortest possible time the provisional measures to be adopted. It shall similarly be the duty of the Council of the League of Nations, if the question is brought before it, to ensure that suitable provisional measures are taken. The High Contracting Parties undertake respectively to accept such measures, to abstain from all measures likely to have a repercussion prejudicial to the execution of the decision or to the arrangements proposed by the Conciliation Commission or by the Council of the League of Nations, and, in general, to abstain from any sort of action whatsoever which may aggravate or extend the dispute.

Article 20.

The present Treaty continues applicable as between the High Contracting Parties even when other Powers are also interested in the dispute.

Article 21.

The present Treaty, which is in conformity with the Covenant of the League of Nations, shall not in any way affect the rights and obligations of the High Contracting Parties as Members of the League of Nations and shall not be interpreted as restricting the duty of the League to take whatever action may be deemed wise and effectual to safeguard the peace of the world.

Article 22.

The present Treaty shall be ratified. Ratifications shall be deposited at Geneva with the League of Nations at the same time as the ratifications of the treaty concluded this day between Germany, Belgium, France, Great Britain and Italy.

It shall enter into and remain in force under the same conditions as the said treaty.

The present Treaty, done in a single copy, shall be deposited in the archives of the League of Nations, the Secretary-General of which shall be requested to transmit certified copies to each of the High Contracting Parties.

In faith whereof the above-mentioned Plenipotentiaries have signed the present Treaty.

Done at Locarno, the sixteenth October, nineteen hundred and twenty-five.

(L.S.) (Signed) Gustav STRESEMANN.

(L.S.) (Signed) Alexandre SKRZYNSKI.

Exhibit #13 24
Filed Dec. 5, 1945

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TC.21.

GERMAN-POLISH DECLARATION, JANUARY 26th, 1934.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Central Translating Division

[TRANSLATION]

TC No. 15514

Declaration

The German Government and the Polish Government consider that the time has come to introduce a new era in the political relations between Germany and Poland, by a direct understanding between the States. They have therefore decided to establish by the present declaration a basis for the future shaping of those relations.

The two Governments assume that the maintenance and assurance of a permanent peace between their countries is an essential condition for general peace in Europe. They have therefore decided to base their mutual relations on the principles contained in the Pact of Paris of August 17, 1928, and they wish to define the application of these principles more exactly, in so far as the relations between Germany and Poland are concerned.

At the same time, each of the two Governments declares that the international obligations already undertaken by it toward other parties do not impede the peaceful development of their mutual relations, do not contradict the present declaration, and are not affected by this declaration. They further declare that this declaration does not extend to such questions as under international law are to be considered exclusively as domestic affairs of one of the two States.

The two Governments declare their intention of reaching an agreement directly on questions affecting their mutual relations, of whatever kind they may be. Should any dispute arise between them and should it not be possible to reach an agreement thereon by direct negotiations, in each individual case they will seek a settlement through other peaceful means, on the basis of mutual agreement, without prejudice to the possibility of applying those methods of procedure, in case of necessity, which are provided for such a case in the other agreements between them that are in force. Under no circumstances, however, will they proceed to use force for the purpose of settling such disputes.

The guarantee of peace created by these principles will make easier for the two Governments the great task of finding for problems of political, economic and cultural nature solutions based on a just and fair reconciliation of the interests of both parties.

The two Governments are convinced that in this way the relations between their countries will develope fruitfully and will lead to the establishment of good neighbourly relations, which will provide blessings not only for their two countries, but also for the other nations of Europe.

The present declaration is to be ratified and the instruments of ratification exchanged at Warsaw as soon as possible. The declaration shall remain in effect for a period of 10 years, counting from the day of the exchange of instruments of ratification. In case it is not denounced by one of the two Governments 6 months before the expiration of that period of time, it shall continue in effect, but can then be denounced by either Government, at any time, 6 months in advance.

Prepared in two originals in the German and the Polish languages.

Berlin, January 26, 1934.

For the German Government:
C. Freiherr von Neurath

For the Polish Government:
Jozef Lipski

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BRITISH DOCUMENT BOOK NO. 2.

P A R T II

EVIDENCE OF GERMAN INTENTIONS PRIOR TO MARCH 1939

TC 70	30 Jan 34	Extract Hitler's Reichstag Speech	V.B. 31 Jan
PS 2368	30 Jan 37	Extract Hitler's Reichstag Speech	D.P.VI.2.42
C 175	24 Jun 37	OKW Directive for Unified Preparation for War	
PS 386 US 25	5 Nov 37	Hitler's Conference (Hosbach)	
TC 7[illegible]73 No. 33	5 Nov 37	German-Polish Communique	
TC 75	2 Jan 38	Note for Fuehrer	
L 43	22 Jan 38	Air Force "Organisational Study 1950"	
PS 2357	20 Feb 38	Extracts Hitler's Speech	D.P.VI.1.p5[illegible]
TC 76	22 Aug 38	Note for Reichsminister	
C 23 US 50	Sep 38	Admiral Carls' letter	
TC 28/29	26 Sep 38 E. 32	Extracts Hitler's Speech	D.P.VI.1.3[illegible]
PS 388 US 26		Fall Green	

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Filed Dec. 5, 1945

TC70

HITLER'S SPEECH OF 30 JANUARY 1934 RE AGREEMENT WITH POLAND

For this reason and with these intentions the German Government has endeavoured in its first year to secure a new and better relationship with the Polish State.

When I took over the government on 30 January, the relations between the two countries seemed to me more than unsatisfactory. There was a danger that the existing differences, which were due to the territorial clauses of the Treaty of Versailles and the mutual tension resulting therefrom, would gradually crystallize into a state of hostility which if persisted in might only too easily acquire the character of a dangerous traditional enmity.

Apart from its latent dangers such a development would constitute a permanent obstacle to the profitable co-operation of the two peoples. Germans and Poles will have to learn to accept the fact of each other's existence. Hence it is more sensible to regulate this state of affairs which the last thousand years has not been able to remove and the next thousand will not be able to remove either, in such a way that the highest possible profit will accrue from it for both nations.

It seemed to me further necessary to show from a concrete example that admittedly existing differences cannot be allowed to interfere with a form of mutual intercourse which shall promote the peace and prosperity of both nations, in contrast to the political and economic paralysis which must inevitably result from a permanent state of mutual distrust.

Further, it seemed to me right in such a case to attempt to deal with the problems affecting both countries by means of a frank and open exchange of views between the two parties rather than to go on entrusting third and fourth parties with this task. Moreover, whatever the differences between the two countries in the future may be, the catastrophic effects of the attempt to remove them through warlike actions would far outweigh any possible advantage gained.

Thus the German Government was fortunate in finding the same generous attitude in the leader of the present Polish State. Marshal Pilsudski, and in being able to incorporate this mutual recognition of the situation in a treaty which will not only be of equal advantage to the Polish and German peoples, but which also represents an important contribution to the maintenance of world peace.

In the spirit of this treaty the German Government is willing and prepared to cultivate economic relations with Poland in such a way that here too the state of unprofitable suspicion can be succeeded by a period of useful co-operation.

It is a matter of particular satisfaction to us that in this same year the National Socialist Government of Danzig has been enabled to effect a similar clarification of its relations with its Polish neighbour.

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Filed Dec. 5, 1945

PS 2368

EXTRACTS FROM SPEECH BY HITLER BEFORE REICHSTAG

30 January 1937

"By a series of agreements we have eliminated existing tensions and thereby contributed considerably to an improvement in the European atmosphere. I merely recall an agreement with Poland, which has worked out to the advantage of both sides.....

"True statesmanship will not overlook realities, but consider them. The Italian nation and the new Italian State are realities. The German nation and the German Reich are equally realities. And to my own fellow-citizens, I would say that the Polish nation and the Polish State have also become a reality.....

"The German Reich with its strong Army will protect her own security and her own honor. But, fully convinced that there is for Europe no greater good than peace, the German Reich will always be a responsible and conscious promoter of the European peace idea....."

(2136)

(2136)

TRANSLATOR'S NOTE:
Words or sentences in square brackets in the translation appear in similar pencilled brackets in the original, and are sometimes scored through in pencil as well.

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SEC-24.10/C-175. C. 175.

S.O. Top Secret.

Berlin, 24.6.1937.
S.O. only
(Stamp) Access only by an officer)

The Reich Minister for War
and Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces.

Nr. 55/37 g. K. S.O. only L Ia. 4 copies
2nd Copy.

Subject : "Directive 1937/38"

Reference : W.A. 36/36 S.O. only LIa of 26.6.36.

(Remark in ink)
AI op. 34/37. Gkdos Chefs.
Received 25.6.

Written by an officer.

Outgoing documents in connection with this matter, and dealing with it in principle, are to be written by an officer.

Enclosed "Directive for Unified Preparation for War of the Armed Forces" comes into force on 1. 7. 1937. At the same time the "Directives for the unified preparation of a possible war by W.A.,+ Army, Navy and Air Force" (W.A. 36/36 S.O. only LIa of 26.6.36) will be cancelled and is to be returned to W.A. (L.Ia) with covering letter by 10. 7. 37.

I request the forwarding to me of the results of the considerations to be made, according to part 3. of the Directive by 1. 9. 37.

(Signed) v Blomberg

Ob.d.H. (C,in C. Army) 1 Covering letter (Copy 1), 1 Directive (Copy 1
Ob.d.M. (C. in C.Navy) 1 " " (Copy 2), 1 " (Copy 2
R.d.L. and Ob.d.L. (Reich Minister for Air and C. in C Air Force)
1 Covering letter (Copy 3), 1 Directive (Copy 3
W.A. (L) 1 Covering letter (Copy 4), 2 Directives(Copies

+ W.A. = Branches of the Armed Forces.

(Remark in ink) MI op. 34/37 Gkdos Chefs.

H1151 - 0032

The Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces,
55/37 g K. Chefsache L Ia

Berlin 24 June 37.

H1151-0033

5 Copies
Copy No.2.
Top Secret
Only through an officer

Written by an officer.

AI op 34/37 Gkds Chefs

Directive

For the unified preparation for war of the Armed Forces

(Valid from 1. 7. 37 until presumably 30.9.1938)

Contents

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Part 1.	General Fuiding Principles	3 to 8
Part 2.	Likely Warlike Eventualities (Concentrations)	9 to 17
Part 3.	Special Preparations	18 to 22

Part 1.

General Guiding Principles

1) The general political position justifies the supposition that Germany need not consider an attack from any side. Chief grounds for this are, in addition to the lack of desire for war in almost all nations, particularly the Western Powers, the deficiencies in the preparedness for war of a number of States and of Russia in particular.

The intention to unleash a European War is held just as little by Germany. Nevertheless the politically fluid world situation, which does not preclude surprising incidents, demands a continuous preparedness for war of the German Armed Forces.

a). to counter attacks at any time.

b). To enable the military exploitation of politically favourable opportunities should they occur.

Preparations of the Armed Forces for a possible war in the Mobilisation Period 1937/38 must be made with this in mind. They must therefore cover various possibilities and will be divided up in the following directive according to :

a). General Preparations (vide Para 2)

b). Work on warlike eventualities which, owing to their probability, top the list, in the shape of concentration plans with the co-operation of subordinate departments (vide Para 3).

c). Special preparations in the shape of studies and considerations, generally however only within the High Command (Special preparations vide Para 4).

2) To the general preparations, belong :

a). The permanent preparedness for mobilisation of the German Armed Forces, even before the completion of rearmament and full preparedness for war.

b). The further working on "Mobilisation without public announcement" in order to put the Armed Forces in a position to begin a war suddenly and by surprise both as regards strength and time.

c). The working on the transport of the bulk of the regular army from East Prussia to the Reich.

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d). Preparatory measures in case German territory is violated suddenly by a foreign power with hostile intention.

In that event armed resistance will be offered without special orders.

The services will therefore empower the competant frontier or coastal territory commanders to take, in such cases, all necessary for countermeasures against hostile attacks, irrespective of whether a legal basis exists for any individual measure or not (Executive decree to the Reich's Defence law).

Under no circumstance however may the German frontier be crossed or flown over or foreign territory be violated without my approval.

German territory is not deemed to be violated (see first sentence, para 2d above) in the case of individual sentries or patrols crossing our frontiers accidentally or not deliberately or as a result of the excessive zeal of a junior commander; nor is territory deemed to be violated if flown over owing to faulty navigation or if German territorial waters are entered by warships with obviously non-hostile intentions.

3). Among the probable warlike eventualities for which concentration plans will be drafted are:

I) War on two fronts with the focal point in the West (Concentration "Red")

II) War on two fronts with the focal point in the South East (Concentration "Green")

for details see part 2 /of the Directive/.

4). Special preparations are to be made for the following eventualities:

I) Armed intervention against Austria (Special case Otto) (pencil note: settled).

II) Warlike entanglements with Red Spain (Special case Richard)

III) England, Poland, Lithuania take part in a war against us. (Special case "Enlargement Red/Green")

For details see part 3 /of the Directive/

While working out in detail or planning these special preparations the following will have to be considered:

Though we can in all probability reckon as things lie at present on one or more allies in particular individual circumstances, all elaborations and plans are to be based on the fundamental assumption that we stand alone for the time being.

5). /The present directive refers only to the unified preparations for war and to the general strategical points, which have to be observed in case of the opening of hostilities/.

In virtue of this directive The branches of the Armed forces must complete their deployment etc., plans or make new ones, and must communicate with evil other while doing this, in order to eliminate all discrepancies before the issue of the directives, asking if necessary for a decision by me.

(+ crossed out in pencil in original)

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5)

/The Directive for the conduct of the war itself and the definition of the objects of the war, depend on the general political as well as military and economic situation at the beginning of a war will be given /through me/ by the Fuehrer and Supreme Commander/.

(signed v. Blomberg.

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Part 2.

Probable warlike eventualities.
(Concentrations)

The following suppositions, aims and tasks will be made the basis for the treatment of the probable warlike eventualities (concentrations).

I) War on two fronts with focal point in the West.
(Concentration "Red")

1.) Suppositions.

In the West, France is the opponent. Belgium may side with France either at once, or later, or not at all. It is also possible that France may violate Belgium's neutrality if the latter is neutral; she will certainly violate that of Luxemburg.

In the East we shall in all probability have to reckon with the hostile attitude of Russia /and Czechoslovakia/. One can assume that Poland and Lithuania will remain neutral for the time being.

From /Austria/, Italy, Hungary and Yugoslavia at least benevolent neutrality is expected. England's attitude will be uncertain /see Part 3 of the directive/.

The outbreak of war will presumably take the form of a surprise attack by the French army and air force against Germany, with the participation of the French fleet. /In the east, Czechoslovakia can be counted upon to stay out for the time being, as long as political pressure by Russia does not force her to act prematurely - mainly with her air force reinforced by Russia-/ Operations by Russian naval forces are probable.

2.) It is the task of the German armed forces to make their preparations in such a manner that the bulk of the armed forces can be employed against France, and that our action in the east is at first limited to defence - and that with the employment of the smallest possible forces.

3.) Within this general intention the branches of the armed forces will havethe following tasks allotted to them:

a.) Army.

The focal point of the war on land lies in the west.

It will be the first task of the army, by commencing the battle as near as possible to the frontier, to prevent the enemy advancing towards and across the Rhine and the Black Forest, and to defend the area to the west of the Rhine and the north of the Moselle for as long as possible.

If Belgium is neutral it is particularly important to hold the Eifel as a position in the flank of and a base for questions against the northern French wing.

Every favourable opportunity for effective minor blows against the French army is to be made use of.

The defence of the eastern and southern frontiers of the Reich can be left to the frontier-guards and reserve divisions for the time being.

East Prussia is to be defended. But according to the political situation, the transport of a part or of all the active forces to the Reich by sea must be allowed for.

b. Navy.

The focal point of the war at sea is to be expected either in the Baltic or in the North Sea, according to the naval situation. The strategic task of the navy is to secure our sea communications in the Baltic, the North sea and the oceans of the world; in particular the communications with East Prussia are to be safeguarded. The operational execution of this task

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depends on the ratio of strength at sea and it is to be striven for through eliminating the enemy's naval forces.

At the same time as defending and guiding our own sea communications, enemy traffic in the North Sea and Baltic is to be made impossible and that in the Atlantic, Mediterranean and, as the occasion arises, in other seas, is to be interfered with by suitable naval forces. Prevention and delay of French troop transports from Africa can considerably ease our own war on land.

In all these preparations the political necessity is to be taken into account that at the beginning of a war we ensure for ourselves the neutrality of non-belligerent countries by a painstaking consideration of their rights.

c. Air Force.

The focal point of the war in the air is also in the West.

The first tasks of the air force here will in all probability be:

The battle against the air force of the western enemies and their ground orgainisation, as well as against the main armament centres of the enemies' aircraft industry.

Participation in the battles on land, and at a later date possibly also the delaying of the enemy's deployment, if that is the only way to prevent largish initial successes by the enemy army, which it might not, under certain circumstances, be possible to catch up with later.

Protection of the German sources of production, and in particular of Berlin, the Ruhr area and the Central German industrial area.

The attacking of targets of mainly political importance (such as Paris) needs my special consent in every case.

- - - - - - - - - - - -

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II "War on two fronts with focal point, South East. (Concentration "Green")

1.) Suppositions.

To parry the imminent attack of a superior enemy coalition, the war in the East can begin with a German surprise operation against Czechoslavakia. The conditions for such a stroke in the field of politics and international law must be created beforehand.

It is to be expected, that Poland and Lithuania will probably take a neutral or at least a temporising attitude, while Austria, Italy and Yugoslavia will be at least benevolent neutrals. Hungary will sooner or later perhaps join Germany in her action against Czechoslovakia, France and Russia will most probably open hostilities against Germany, Russia at first with her naval and air forces only. The leaders of German policy will endeavour with all possible means to assure the neutrality of England, which is to be regarded as an absolutely essential pre-condition for the case "Green", and also of all the other Countries not so far mentioned, but capable of conducting military operations against Germany.

2.) The task of the German Armed Forces is to prepare in such a way that the main body of all forces can break into Czechoslovakia quickly, by surprise and with the greatest possible weight, while in the West the smallest possible force is provided to cover the rear of this attack.

The aim and object of thissurprise attack by the German Armed Forces should be to destroy the hostile Armed Forces and to occupy Bohemia and Moravia and thus to eliminate completely, for the duration of the war, the threat by Czechoslovakia to the rear of the operations in the West, and to take from the Russian Air Force the most substantial portion of its operational base in Czechoslovakia.

3) Within the framework of this proposition, the Services will have the following tasks:

a). The Army.

The largest part of the Army will be used for an attack on Czechoslovakia.

The short-term planning of this operation will depend on the strength and operational readiness of the German Army at the time on the state of preparations, and also on the attitude of Poland. The possibility that German troops will be able to be deployed on Austrian territory should be taken into consideration in the long-term preparations, since it can be supposed that the necessary conditions for this will be created by the political leaders.

The beginning of military operations must be fully synchronized with Air Force operations and I therefore reserve to myself the right to determine the exact time for the attack. (see under "Air Force" sub-para b) below).

The aim is a strategic pounce on Czechoslovakia, systematically planned in peace time, which, will overrun her fortifications by a surprise attack pin down and destroy her Armed Forces whilst still being mobilized and conquer Czechoslovakia in a short time by making use of her racial disintegration. The military pre-condition for this surprise attack can only be attained if the tank formations are fully equipped and completely ready for employment.

The troops covering the rear in the West must be reduced both in number and in quality to the utmost degree having regard to the state of fortifications existing at that time. The limit of this reduction is to be determined only by the necessity to hold the industrial areas in the Rhineland and Westphalia and to maintain communications between Northern and Southern Germany.

East Prussia will be defended but according to the political situation, the transport away of some or all of the operational forces by the sea route to the Reich must be reckoned with.

b). The Airforce.

Practically the whole Airforce is to be employed against Czechoslovakia only the minimum strength to be provided for the West.

The first tasks of the airforce will be:

The paralysation of the Czech mobilisation, especially the combatting of the Czech air force and its ground organisations, also of the mobilisation centres and the most important communication centres. The intention is effectively to disintegrate the Czech State and thus to facilitate the army's task of taking possession. With regard to the assignment of battles tasks, all industries and plants to be used by us later on should nevertheless be preserved in our own future interest as far as military considerations permit.

Protection of the sources if German production, with special reference to Berlin, the Central-German industrial area and the Ruhr area.

The beginning of operations of the Air force against Czechoslovakia must be completely harmonized with the beginning of operations by the Army. I therefore reserve to myself the fixing of the zero hour. (compare army chapt.a)

c). The Navy.

The Navy's tasks remain the same as in concentration "Red".

The shifting of the focal point to the Baltic will have to be provided for.

(Translators note: All the above part 2,I, is scored through and bears a pencil note "Superseded by the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces letter 94/37 dated 7 Dec 37)

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Part. 3.

Special Preparations.

The following special cases are to be considered inside the High Commands, in general without participation by outside authorities.

I). Special Case "Otto".

"Armed intervention in Austria in the event of her restoring the Monarchy".

The object of this operation will be to compel Austria by armed force to renounce a restoration.

Making use of the domestic political divisions of the Austrian people the march in will be made in the general direction of Vienna and all resistance will be broken.

Parts of the German Air Force are to be employed in direct support of the Army. Any further employment of Air Force units will be decided on by me.

The question, whether formations of the National-Socialist Party will be employed over and above the Armed Forces, rests with the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces.

Special case "OTTO" will be planned:

a). As an isolated action without simultaneous concentration on other fronts.

b). As part of concentration "Red".

Special case "Otto" will not be planned as simultaneous operation with concentration "Green". Should the political pre-conditions for both cases arise simultaneously, special case "Otto" will be deferred until conclusion of concentration "Green".

The possibility of concentratration "Green" developing out of speci case "Otto" must be taken into account, this possibility must be included in the planning.

(Translators note: All the above part 3I is scored through and bears a pencil note "Superseded")

II) Special Case "Richard".

"Warlike entanglements with Red Spain".

The Spanish Civil War contains the danger that, through accidental or provoked incidents, conflict may arise between Germany and Red Spain which can lead to a state of war between the two governments.

For this case preparatory plans are to be made only by the Navy. For the Army and Air Force it will remain a matter of assistance to White Spain with material and personnel, as has been the previous procedure. Subordination of parts of the Air Force under command of the Navy may come into question.

III) Special Case "Extension Red/Green".

The military-political starting point used as a basis for concentrations plans "Red and Green" can be aggravated if either England, Poland or Lithuania, or all three of these countries, join the side of our opponents from the beginning of the war.

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Thereupon our military position would be worsened to an unbearable, even hopeless, extent. The political leaders will therefore do everything to keep these countries neutral, above all England and Poland.

Nevertheless supplements are to be considered to concentration plan "Red and Green" for the eventuality of the failure of this aim of the political leadership.

The following conditions are to be the basis for the discussions: -

a) England.

England will employ all her available economic and military means against us. She will at first support France with Naval and Air Forces and for the latter she will try to win Belgium and eventually Holland as bases.

b) Poland.

That Poland should take part in an opening of hostilities against us, where possible at the side of Russia, is, in the present political situation, more than improbable. Should it nevertheless come to this, then Poland's concentration on land against Germany would take place in a form which is, in its essence, known to us, in order to gain first East Prussia and then, in co-operation with Czechoslovakia, Silesia.
With her Air Force, apart from using parts against East Prussia, she will take part in a Czech-Russian attack against the Reich, and at sea she will co-operate with the Russian Fleet to interrupt the connection between East Prussia and the Reich.

c) Lithuania.

Lithuania will, above all, serve the Russian Air Force as an advanced base. An attack on land need only be reckoned with in combination with Poland or after the arrival of Russian Army forces in Lithuania.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION. 27 November 1945.

We, Joyce Leonard, Junior Commander A.T.S., and Leslie A. Hill M.C. Major, Northumberland Hussars, hereby certify that we are thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages, and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document No. C.175.

Joyce Leonard,
J/Cmdr. A.T.S.

Leslie A. Hill,
Major.
Northumberland Hussars.

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P.S. 386.

Berlin, 10 Nov 1937.

NOTES on the Conference in the Reichskanzlei
on 5 Nov 37 from 1615 - 2030 Hours

PRESENT : The Fuhrer and Reich Chancellor
The Reichsminister for War, Generalfeldmarschall v. BLOMBERG
The C-in-C Army, Generaloberst Freiherr von FRITSCH
The C-in-C Navy, Generaladmiral Dr. h.c. RAEDER
The C-in-C Luftwaffe, Generaloberst GOERING
The Reichsminister for Foreign Affairs Freiherr v. NEURATH
Oberst HOSZBACH

The Fuhrer stated initially that the subject matter of to-day's conference was of such high importance, that its further detailed discussion would probably take place in Cabinet sessions. However, he, the Fuhrer, had decided NOT to discuss this matter in the larger circle of the Reich Cabinet, because of its importance. His subsequent statements were the result of detailed deliberations and of the experiences of his 4½ years in Government; he desired to explain to those present his fundamental ideas on the possibilities and necessities of expanding our foreign policy and in the interests of a far-sighted policy he requested that his statements be looked upon in the case of his death as his last will and testament.

The Fuhrer then stated :

The aim of German policy is the security and the preservation of the nation and its propagation. This is consequently a problem of space.

The German nation disposes of 85 million people, which, because of the number of individuals and the compactness of habitation, form of homogeneous European racial body, which cannot be found in any other country. On the other hand it justifies the demand for larger living space more than for any other nation. If no political body exists in space, corresponding to the German racial body, then that is the consequence of several centuries of historical development, and should this political condition continue to exist, it will represent the greatest danger to the preservation of the German nation (Volkstum) as its present high level. An arrest of the deterioration of the German element in AUSTRIA and in CZECHOSLOVAKIA is just as little a possible as the preservation of the present state in GERMANY itself. Instead of growth, sterility will be introduced, and as a consequence tensions of a social nature will appear after a number of years, because political and philosophical ideas are of a permanent nature only as long as they are able to produce the basis for the realization of the actual claim of existence of a nation. The German future is therefore dependent exclusively on the solution of the need for living space. Such a solution can be sought naturally only for a limited period, about 1 - 3 generations.

Before touching upon the question of solving the need for living space, it must be decided whether a solution of the German position with a good future can be attained, either by way of an autarchy or by way of an increased share in universal commerce and industry.

Autarchy : Execution will be possible only with strict National-Socialist State policy, which is the basis; assuming this can be achieved the results are as follows :

A. In the sphere of raw materials, only limited, but NOT total autarchy can be attained :

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1. Wherever coal can be used for the extraction of raw materials autarchy is feasible.

2. In the case of ores the position is much more difficult. Requirements in iron and light metals can be covered by ourselves. Copper and tin, however, can NOT.

3. Cellular materials can be covered by ourselves as long as sufficient wood supplies exist. A permanent solution is not possible.

4. Edible fats - possible.

B. In the case of foods, the question of an autarchy must be answered with a definite "NO".

The general increase of living standards, compared with 30 - 40 years ago, brought about a simultaneous increase of the demand and increase of personal consumption even among the producers, the farmers, themselves. The proceeds from the production increase in agriculture have been used for covering the increase in demands, therefore they represent no absolute increase in production. A further increase in production by making greater demands on the soil is not possible because it already shows signs of deterioration due to the use of artificial fertilisers, and it is therefore certain that, even with the greatest possible increase in production, participation in the world market could NOT be avoided.

The considerable expenditure of foreign currency to secure food by important, even in periods when harvests are good, increases catestrophically when the harvest is really poor. The possibility of this catastrophe increase correspondingly to the increase in population, and the annual 560,000 excess in births would bring about an increasedconsumption in bread, because the child is a greater bread eater than the adult.

Permanently to counter the difficulties of food supplies by lowering the standard of living and by rationalization is impossible in a continent which had developed an approximately equivalent standard of living. As the solving of the unemployment problem has brought into effect the complete power of consumption, some small corrections in our agricultural home production will be possible, but NOT a wholesale alteration of the standard of food consumption. Consequently autarchy becomes impossible, specifically in the sphere of food supplies as well as generally.

Participation in World Economy. There are limits to this which we are unable to transgress. The market fluctuations would be an obstacle to a secure foundation of the German position; international commercial agreements do NOT offer any guarantee for practical execution. It must be considered on principle that since the World War (1914-18) an industrialization has taken place in countries which formerly exported food. We live in a period of economic empires, in which the tendency to colonize again approaches the condition which originally motivated colonization; in JAPAN and ITALY economic motives are the basis of their will to expand, the economic need will also drive GERMANY to it. Countries outside the great economic empires have special difficulties in expanding economically.

The upward tendency, which has been caused in world economy, due to armament competition, can never form a permanent basis for an economic settlement, and this latter is also hampered by the economic disruption caused by Bolshevism. It is a pronounced military weakness of those States who base their existence on export. As our exports and imports are carried out over those sea lanes which are ruled by BRITAIN, it is more a question of security of transport rather than one of foreign currency, and this explains the great weakness in our food situation in wartime. The only way out, and one which may appear imaginary, is the securing of greater living space, an endeavour which at

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all times has been the cause of the formation of states and of movements of nations. It is explicable that this tendency finds no interest in GENEVA and in satisfied States. Should the security of our food position be our foremost thought, then the space required for this can be our foremost thought, then the space required for this can only be sought in Europe, but we will not copy liberal capitalist policies which rely on exploiting colonies. It is NOT a case of conquering people, but of conquering agriculturally useful space. It would also be more to the purpose to seek raw material producing territory in Europe directly adjoining the Reich and not overseas, and this solution would have to be brought into effect in one or two generations. What would be required at a later date over and above this must be left to subsequent generations. The development of great world-wide national bodies is naturally a slow process and the German people, with its strong racial root, has for this purpose the most favourable foundations in the heart of the European Continent. The history of all times - Roman Empire, British Empire - has proved that every space expansion can only be effected by breaking resistance and taking risks. Even setbacks are unavoidable; neither formerly nor today has space been found without an owner; the attacker always comes up against the proprietor.

The question for GERMANY is where the greatesy possible conquest could be made at lowest cost.

German politics must reckon with its two hateful enemies, ENGLAND and FRANCE, to whom a strong German colossus in the centre of EUROPE would be intolerable. Both these states would oppose a further reinforcement of GERMANY, both in EUROPE and overseas, and in this opposition they would have the support of all parties. Both countries would view the building of German military strongpoints overseas as a threat to their overseas communications, as a security measure for German commerce, and retrospectively a strengthening of the German position in Europe

ENGLAND is NOT in a position to cede any of her colonial possessions to us owing to the resistance which she experiences in the Dominions. After the loss of prestige which ENGLAND HAS suffered owing to the transfer of ABYSSINIA to Italian ownership, a return of EAST AFRICA can no longer be expected. Any resistance on ENGLAND'S part would at best consist in the readiness to satisfy our colonial claims by taking away colonies which at the present moment are NOT in British hands, e.g. ANGOLA. French favors would probably be of the same nature.

A serious discussion regarding the return of colonies to us could be considered only at a time when ENGLAND is ina state of emergency and the German Reich is strong and well armed. The Fuhrer does not share the opinion that the Empire is unshakeable. Resistance against the Empire is to be found less in conquered territories than amongst its competitors. The British Empire and the Roman Empire cannot be compared with one another in regard to durability; since the Punic Wars the latter did not have a serious political enemy. Only the dissolving effects which originated in Christendom, and the signs of age which creep into all states, made it possible for the Ancient Germans to subjugate Ancient ROME.

Alongside the British Empire to-day a number of States exist which are stronger than it. The British Mother Country is able to defend its colonial possessions only allied with other States and NOT by its own power. How could ENGLAND alone, for example, defend CANADA

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against an attack by AMERICA or its Far Eastern interests against an attack by JAPAN.

The singling out of the British Crown as the bearer of Empire unity is in itself an admission that the universal empire cannot be maintained permanently by power politics. The following are significant pointers in this respect :

a) IRELAND'S tendency for independence.

b) Constitutional disputes in INDIA where ENGLAND, by her half-measures, left the door open for Indians at a later date to utilise the nonfulfilment of constitutional promises as a weapon against BRITAIN.

c) The weakening of the British position in the FAR EAST by JAPAN.

d) The opposition in the MEDITERRANEAN to Italy which - by virtue of its history, driven by necessity and led by a genius - expands its power position and must consequently infringe British interests to an increasing extent. The outcome of the ABYSSINIAN War is a loss of prestige for Britian which Italy is endeavouring to increase by stirring up discontent in the MOHAMMEDAN world.

It must be established in conclusion that the Empire cannot be held permanently by power politics by 45 million Britons, in spite of all the solidity of her ideals. The proportion of the populations in the Empire, compared with that of the Motherland is 9:1, and it should act as a warning to us that if we expand in space, we must NOT allow the level of our population to become too low.

France's position is more favourable than that of ENGLAND. The French Empire is better placed geographically, the population of its colonial possessions represents a potential military increase. But FRANCE is faced with difficulties of internal politics. At the present time only 10 per cent approximately of the nations have parliamentary governments whereas 90 per cent of them have totalitarian governments. Nevertheless we have to take the following into our political considerations as power factors:

BRITAIN, FRANCE, RUSSIA and the adjoining smaller States.

The German question can be solved only by way of force and this is never without risk. The battles of FREDERICK THE GREAT for SILECIA, and BISMARCK'S wars against AUSTRIA and FRANCE had been a tremendous risk and the speed of PRUSSIAN action in 1870 had prevented AUSTRIA from participating in the war. If we place the decision to apply force with risk at the head of the following expositions then we are left to reply to the questions "when" and "how". In this regard we have to decide upon three different cases.

Case 1. Period 1943 - 45. After this we can only expect a change for the worse. The re-arming of the Army, the Navy and the Air Force, as well as the formation of the Officers' Corps, are practically concluded. Our material equipment and armaments are modern, with further delay the danger of their becoming out-of-date will increase. In particular the secrecy of "special weapons" cannot always be safeguarded. Enlistment of reserves would be limited to the current recruiting age groups and an addition from older untrained groups would be no longer available.

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In comparison with the re-armament, which will have been carried out at that time by the other nations, we shall decrease in relative power. Should we not act until 1943/45, then, dependent on the absence of reserves, any year could bring about the food crisis, for the countering of which we do NOT possess the necessary foreign currency. This must be considered as a "point of weakness in the regime". Over and above that, the world will anticipate our action and will increase counter-measures yearly. Whilst other nations isolate themselves we should be forced on the offensive.

What the actual position would be in the years 1943-45 no one knows to-day. It is certain, however, that we can wait no longer.

On the one side the large armed forces, with the necessity for securing their upkeep, the ageing of the Nazi movement and of its leaders, and on the other side the prospect of a lowering of the standard of living and a drop in the birth rate, leaves us no other choice than to act. If the Fuhrer is still living, then it will be his irrevocable decision to solve the German space problem no later than 1943-45. The necessity for action before 1943-45 will come under consideration in cases 2 and 3.

Case 2. Should the social tensions in FRANCE lead to an internal political crisis of such dimensions that it absorbs the French Army and thus renders it incapable for employment in war against GERMANY, then the time for action against CZECHOSLOVAKIA has come.

Case 3. It would be equally possible to act against CZECHOSLOVAKIA if FRANCE should be so tied up by a war against another State, that it cannot "proceed" against Germany.

For the improvement of our military political position it must be our first aim, in every case of entanglement by war, to conquer CZECHOSLOVAKIA and AUSTRIA simultaneously, in order to remove any threat from the flanks in case of a possible advance Westwards. In the case of a conflict with FRANCE it would hardly be necessary to assume that CZECHOSLOVAKIA would declare war on the same day as FRANCE. However, CZECHOSLOVAKIA'S desire to participate in the war will increase proportionally to the degree to which we are being weakened. Its actual participation could make itself felt by an attack on SILESIA, either towards the North or the West.

Once CZECHOSLOVAKIA is conquered - and a mutual frontier, GERMANY-HUNGARY is obtained - then a neutral attitude by POLAND in a German-French conflict could more easily be relied upon. Our agreements with POLAND remain valid only as long as GERMANY'S strength remains unshakeable; should GERMANY have any setbacks then an attack by POLAND against EAST PRUSSIA, perhaps also against POMERANIA, and SILESIA, must be taken into account.

Assuming a development of the situation, which would lead to a planned attack on our part in the years 1943-45 then the behavior of FRANCE, ENGLAND, POLAND and RUSSIA would probably have to be judged in the following manner :

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The Fuhrer believes personally that in all probability ENGLAND and perhaps also FRANCE have already silently written off CZECHOSLOVAKIA, and that they have got used to the idea that this question would one day be cleaned up by GERMANY. The difficulties in the British Empire and the prospect of being entangled in another long-drawn-out European War, were decisive factors in the non-participation of ENGLAND in a war against GERMANY. The British attitude would certainly NOT remain without influence on FRANCE'S attitude. An attack by FRANCE without British support is hardly probable assuming that its offensive would stagnate along our Western fortifications. Without England's support, it would also NOT be necessary to take into consideration a march by France through Belgium and Holland, and this would also not have to be reckoned with by us in case of a conflict with France, as in every case it would have as consequence the enmity of Great Britain. Naturally, we should in every case have to bar our frontier during the operation of our attacks against Czechoslovakia and Austria. It must be taken into consideration here that Czechoslovakia's defence measures will increase in strength from year to year, and that a consolidation of the inside values of the Austrian army will also be effected in the course of years. Although the population of Czechoslovakia in the first place is not a thin one, the embodiment of Czechoslovakia and Austria would nevertheless constitute the conquest of food for 5-6 million people, on the basis that a compulsory emigration of 2 million from Czechoslovakia and of 1 million from Austria could be carried out. The annexation of the two States to Germany militarily, and politically would constitute a considerable relief, owing to shorter and better frontiers, the freeing of fighting personnel for other purposes and the possibility of re-constituting new armies up to a strength of about 12 Divisions, representing a new division per 1 million population.

No opposition to the removal of Czechoslovakia is expected on the part of Italy; however, it cannot be judged to-day what would be her attitude in the Austrian question since it would depend largely on whether the Duce were alive at the time or not.

The measure and speed of our action would decide Poland's attitude. Poland will have little inclination to enter the war against a victorious Germany, with Russia in its rear.

Military participation by Russia must be countered by the speed of our operations; it is a question whether this need be taken into consideration at all in view of Japan's attitude.

Should Case 2 occur - paralyzation of France by a Civil War - then the situation should be utilised at any time for operations against Czechoslovakia, as Germany's most dangerous enemy would be eliminated.

The Fuhrer sees Case 3 looming nearer; it could develop from the existing tensions in the MEDITERRANEAN, and should it occur he has firmly decided to make use of it any time, perhaps even as early as 1938.

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Following recent experiences in the course of the events of the war in Spain, the Fuhrer does NOT see an early end to hostilities there. Taking into consideration the time required for past offensives by France, a further three years duration of war is within the bounds of possibility. On the other hand, from the German point of view a 100 per cent victory by France is not desirable; we are more interested in a continuation of the war and preservation of the tensions in the Mediterranean. Should Franco be in sole possession of the Spanish Peninsula it would mean the end of Italian intervention and the presence of Italy on the Balearic Isles. As our interests are directed towards continuing the war in Spain, it must be the task of our future policy to strengthen Italy in her fight to hold on to the Balearic Isles. However, a solidification of Italian positions on the Balearic Isles can NOT be tolerated either by France or by England and could lead to a war by France and England against Italy, in which case Spain, if entirely in white (i.e. Franco's) hands, could participate on the side of Italy's enemies. A subjugation of Italy in such a war appears very unlikely. Additional raw materials would be brought to Italy via Germany. The Fuhrer believes that Italy's military strategy would be to remain on the defensive against France on the Western frontier and carry out operations against France from Libya against North African French colonial possessions.

As a landing of French-British troops on the Italian coast can be discounted, and as a French offensive via the Alps to Upper Italy would be extremely difficult and would probably stagnate before the strong Italian fortifications, French lines of communication by the Italian fleet will to a great extent paralyze the transport of fighting personnel from North Africa to France, so that at its frontiers with Italy and Germany, France will have at its disposal solely the metropolitan fighting forces.

If Germany profits from this war by disposing of the Czechoslovakian and the Austrian questions, the probability must be assumed that England - being at war with Italy - would not decide to commence operations against Germany. Without British support a warlike action by France against Germany is not to be anticipated.

The date of our attack on Czechoslovakia and Austria must be made dependent on the course of the Italian-English-French war and would not be simultaneous with the commencement of military agreements with Italy, but of full independence and, by exploiting this unique favourable opportunity he wishes to begin to carry out operations against Czechoslovakia. The attack on Czechoslovakia would have to take place with the "speed of lightning" (blitzartig schnell).

Fieldmarshall von Blomberg and Generaloberst von Fritsch in giving their estimate on the situation, repeatedly pointed out that England and France must not appear as our enemies, and they stated that the war with Italy would NOT bind the French army to such an extent that it would NOT be in a position to commence operations on our Western frontier with superior forces. Generaloberst von Fritsch estimated the

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French forces which would presumably be employed on the Alpine frontier against Italy to be in the region of 20 divisions, so that a strong French superiority would still remain on our Western frontier. The French would, according to German reasoning, attempt to advance into the Rhineland. We should consider the lead which France has got in mobilization, and quite apart from the very small value of our then existing fortifications - which was pointed out particularly by Generalfeldmarschall von Blomberg - the four motorized divisions which had been laid down for the West would be more or less incapable of movement. With regard to our offensive in a South-Easterly direction, Feldmarschall von Blomberg drew special attention to the strength of the Czechoslovakian fortifications, the building of which had assumed the character of a Maginot line and which would present extreme difficulties to our attack.

Generaloberst von Fritsch mentioned that it was the purpose of a study which he had laid on for this winter to investigate the possibilities of carrying out operations against Czechoslovakia with special consideration of the conquest of the Czechoslovakian system of fortifications; the Generaloberst also stated that owing to the prevailing conditions he would have to relinquish his leave abroad, which was to begin on 10 November. This intention was countermanded by the Fuhrer who gave as a reason that the possibility of the conflict was not to be regarded as being so imminent. In reply to the remark by the Minister for Foreign Affairs, that an Italian-English-French conflict be not as near as the Fuhrer appeared to assume, the Fuhrer stated that the date which appeared to him to be a possibility was summer 1938. In reply to statements by Generalfeldmarschall von Blomberg and Generaloberst von Fritsch regarding England and France's attitude, the Fuhrer repeated his previous statements and said that he was convinced of Britain's non-participation and that consequently he did not believe in military action by France against Germany. Should the Mediterranean conflict already mentioned lead to a general mobilization in Europe, then we should have to commence operations against Czechoslovakia immediately. If, however, the powers who are not participating in the war should declare their disinterestedness, then Germany would, for the time being, have to side with this attitude.

In view of the information given by the Fuhrer, Generaloberst Goering considered it imperative to think of a reduction or abandonment of our military undertaking in Spain. The Fuhrer agreed to this in so far as he believed this decision should be postponed for a suitable date.

The second part of the discussion concerned material armament questions.

(SIGNED) HOSZBACH.

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Exhibit GB 27
Filed Dec. 5, 1945

TC 73, No.33

OFFICIAL COMMUNIQUE ON THE POLISH AMBASSADOR'S AUDIENCE WITH THE REICH CHANCELLOR

November 5, 1937.

The Reich Chancellor received the Polish Ambassador in Berlin, M.Lipski, today. In his conversation with the Ambassador the Fuehrer-Chancellor gave expression to his satisfaction that it had been possible to reach an understanding on a matter of special importance for Polish-German relations, i.e., the Minorities question. Thus it had been proved that the Polish-German Declaration of January 26, 1934, and the principle of direct negotiation therein provided for, was still demonstrating its value.

In the course of the conversation it was confirmed that Polish-German relations should not meet with difficulties because of the Danzig question.

(1961)

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(705)

Exhibit GB 28
Filed Dec. 5, 1945

GB/3

TC 75

VERY CONFIDENTIAL. PERSONAL ONLY.

Memo for the Fuhrer. BERLIN, 2nd January, 1938

Pages 1 to 3.

Deductions on the report "German Embassy London A5522" regarding the future form of Anglo-German relations.

With the realisation that Germany will not tie herself to a status quo in Central Europe and that sooner or later a military conflict in Europe is possible, the hope of an agreement will slowly disappear amongst Germaphile British politicians, insofar as they are not merely playing a part that has been given to them. Thus the fateful question arises - Will Germany and England eventually be forced to drift into separate camps and will they march against each other one day. To answer this question one must realise the following:

A change of the status quo in the East in the German sense can only be carried out by force. As long as France knows that England, which so to speak has taken on a guarantee to aid France against Germany, is on her sid e, France's fighting for her eastern allies is probable, in any case always possible and thus with it, was between Germany and England. This applies then even if England does not want [illegible] England believeing she must defend her borders on the Rhine would be dragged in automatically by France, in other words, peace or war between England and Germany rests solely in the hands of France, who could bring about such a war between Germany and England by way of a conflict between Germany and France. It follows therefore that war be tween Germany and England on account of France can be prevented only if France knows from the start that England's forces would not be sufficient to guarantee their common victory. Such a situation might force England and thereby France to accept a lot of things that a strong Anglo-French Coalition would never tolerate. This position would arise, for instance, if England, through insufficient armament or as a result of threats to her Empire by a superior coalition of powers, (e.g. Germany - Italy - Japan) t here by tying down her military forces in other places, would not be able to assure France of sufficient support

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in Europe. Regarding the question of the coalition of powers, this depends on further developments, on our policy of alliances and on the future position of British - American relations. It would be unfavourable to England, if she, not yet sufficiently armed, should stand opposed to the above mentioned coalition by herself. However, this coalition would have to be firmly welded and there must be no doubt in England and France about the fact that Italy and Japan are firmly on our side, and that if necessary the combined forces of the coalition would be employed at one stroke. Italy's and Japan's interest in a strong Germany is as great as ours in a strong Italy and Japan.

The existence of the new Germany has been of great advantage to both of them in their efforts to expand during the last few years. With reference to this and to common aims in the future it should be possible to get these two powers to announce their solidarity with us at the right time. Given such a situation it may be possible that England would prevent France from interfering in the event of a war by Germany against one of France's allies in the east, so as to localise the conflict and that England should not be forced through France's interfering to have to fight for her Empire under unfavourable conditions, possibly in three places, in the Far East, in the Mediteranean and in Europe. Even if it should mean a considerable strengthening of Germany, England, in my opinion, would not risk fighting for her Empire under unfavourable conditions for the sake of a local Central European conflict. In such a case France, without England, would hardly have the nerve to run against the German fortifications in the West by herself. The deciding factor which appears to me in this connection is the speed with which such a Central European war could be victoriously decided. In the event of a lightening success I am convinced that the West would not interfere. A lengthy campaign, however, might give our enemies the idea that they had over-rated Germany's strength and with this the moment of intervention by the western powers would have come decidedly near.

PAGES 8 and 9

In conclusion I should like to summarise my ideas with the following headings:-

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1. England is behindhand with her armaments and therefore is playing for time.

2. England believes that in a competition with Germany time is on English side - utilisation of her greater economic possibilities for her armaments - time for the extension of her treaties (e.g. U.S.A.)

3. The Halifax visit is therefore to be regarded as a reconnaissance and screening movement, also Germaphiles in England are for the most part only playing the parts they have been given.

4. In my opinion England and her Prime Minister do not see in Halifax's visit the possibility of the basis of an agreement with Germany - they have as much faith in National Socialist Germany as we have in England - therefore they fear one day they may be forced by a strong Germany to a solution which is not agreeable to them - to counter this England is preparing herself in any case militarily and politically for war with Germany.

5. Therefore conclusions to be drawn by us:

   i. Outwardly further understanding with England in regard to the protection of the interests of our friends.

   ii. Formation under great secrecy but with wholehearted tenacity of a coalition against England - i.e. a tightening of our friendship with Italy and Japan - also the winning over of all nations whose interests conform with ours directly or indirectly - close and confidential co-operation of the diplomats of the three great powers towards this purpose.

Only in this way can we confront England be it in a settlement or in war. England is going to be a hard and astute opponent in this game of diplomacy.

6. The particular question whether in the event of a war by Germany in CENTRAL EUROPE, France and thereby England would interfere depends on the circumstances and the time at which such a war commences and ceases and on military considerations which cannot be gone into here. I should like to give the Fuhrer some of these points of view verbally.

Exhibit USA 29
Filed Dec. 5, 1945

(1156)

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT
L-43
OFFICE OF U.S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL

The Chief of the Organizational Staff
in the General Staff of the Air Force

Berlin
2 May 1938

No. 50/38 Top Secret

3 copies
Copy No.1

To the

Chief of the General Staff of the Air Force.

In the following I submit the

"Organizational Study of 1950"

Purpose:

The task is to search, within a framework of very broadly conceived conditions, for the most suitable type of organization of the Air Force. The result gained is termed

"Distant Objective"

From this shall be deduced the goal to be reached in the second phase of the setting-up process in 1942; this will be called

"Final Objective 1942"

This in turn yields what is considered the most suitable proposal for the reorganization of the staffs of the Air Force Group Commands, Air Gaue, Air Divisions, etc. which is called

"Interim Solution as of 1 October 1938"

signed Kammhuber

Table of Contents

a. Text:

Section I : Assumptions
with it: Enclosure No. 1 (Map)

" II : Consideration of the Principles of organization on the basis of the assumptions for war and peace made in Section I.

" III : Consideration of further questions.

" IV : Conclusions drawn from the Study as to the "Distant Objective"
" with it: Enclosure No.2 (Distant Objective)

V : Conclusions drawn from the Study as to the organization of the Air Force according to hitherto accepted final objective 1942
with it: Enclosure No.3 (Final Objective 1942)

" VI : Conclusions drawn from the Study regarding the reorganization as of 1 October 1938
with it: Enclosure No.4 (Interim Solution as of 1 October 1938)

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PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT
L-43 Cont'd.

b. Special Enclosures:

Proposal for the setting-up of flight formations until 1942 (New Final Objective 1942)	Enclo. No.5
Proposal for dispersal of these formations	Enclo. No.6
Proposal for the setting-up of AA artillery until 1942 (New Final Objective 1942)	Enclo. No.7
Proposal for dispersal of these formations, including increase of mobilization	Enclo. No.8

The Chief of the Organizational Staff

Berlin
2 May 1938

No. 50/38 Top Secret

Organizational Study 1950

I. Assumption

1. Frontiers of Germany see Map, Enclosure No.1

2. Organization of Air Force in peacetime:
7 Group Commands:
(1 Berlin, 2 Brunswick, 3 Munich, 4 Vienna, 5 Budapest, 6 Warsaw, 7 Koenigsberg).
1 - 3 flight corps are subordinated to each Group Command. Each flight corps consists of 2 flight divisions, each of which comprises:
3 mixed combat Geschwader (2 combat groups, 1 dive bomber group)
1 heavy fighter Geschwader.

Total Strength: 18 flight corps = 36 flight divisions =
108 mixed Geschwader
36 heavy fighter Geschwader
25 reconnaissance groups (F) = 144 Geschwader

Minimum performance: Range: 6 - 8,000 km.
Speed: 5 - 600 km.

2-4 Air Gaue are subordinated to each Group Command.

(Foot note: In the study 32 Air Gaue are assumed (without sea))

The Air Gaue are Corps commands. They are in charge of:

1. Air defense (AA, light fighters)
2. The Air Gau signal units
3. The ground organization
4. Supply
5. Everything pertaining to replacements (also for flying troops and schools)
6. The administration
7. The civil aviation offices

II. Consideration of the principles of organization on the basis of the assumptions for war and peace made in Section I:

1. Attack Forces:
Principal adversaries: England, France, and Russia.

a) One Front war, for instance against England.

If all 144 Geschwader are employed against England, they must be concentrated in the Western half of the Reich, i.e. they must be deployed in such a way, that by making full use of their range they can reach all English territory down to the last corner and save them-

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PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT
L-43 (Cont'd.

selves unnecessarily long flight routes. 144 Geschwader require 432 operational airfields. Concentration in one Air Force Group, for instance, in Air Force Group 2, which is closest to England, is therefore impossible. There must be a deployment in depth, which must be distributed over Air Force Groups 2, 1 and 3 at least.

Regardless of whether or not Germany respects neutrality, i.e., whether or not planes fly to England via the German Bay, in any case the framework of one single Air Force Group will be split:

1. because it is impossible spatially, to accommodate so large an attack force in one Air Force Group,

2. because it is too much for one Command to have lead so large a number of formations (18 corps), even if it is given authority over all neighbouring Airfield Regional Commands occupied by the attack force.

Hence it follows, that the Supreme Commander of the Air Force himself must take over the leadership of the attack. A further, and not the least important reason for this is that otherwise he would be eliminated, for all practicable purposes, if he subordinated the entire attack force to a single Command.

It remains to be decided, whether he is to lead by giving direct orders to the Flight Corps, while the Air Force Group Commands would be responsible only for ground organization and supply, or whether the Group Commands are to be established as intermediate authorities also in regard to operations.

The decision is determined

a. by the numerical strength of the flight troops
b. by their dependence on ground organization and supply

Concerning a:

What has been said above a propos a single Air Force Group with regard to numerical limitation, also applies to the Supreme Commander of the Air Force himself. As a rule one Command should not be in charge of more than 6 larger tactical units. Since in the example chosen 18 flight corps are presumed to exist, these cannot possibly be all under the direct command of the Supreme Commander of the Air Force; it is necessary to establish higher commands on an intermediate level. These are the Air Force Group Commands; as the Air Force grows these automatically acquire an intermediate position as operational commands.

Concerning b:

Moreover, the dependence on ground organization and supply is an argument in favour of establishing the Air Force Group Commands as intermediate operational authorities, at the same time leaving them in operational charge of ground organization and supply in one form or another. Ground organization and supply are elements of operational command and cannot be separated from the latter without disadvantage. If, for instance, the Air Force Groups were established purely as operational commands for the purpose of leading the attack forces, the Supreme Commander of the Air Force himself would have to take charge of ground organization and supply and adjust them to the requirements of the troops. In view of the assumed extent of the German Reich with its 18 Flight Corps and its 22 large Air Gaue, this task is too large for one central authority to be able to handle it. Since preparations for attack are to be made for several fronts and for several possible contingencies, decentralization by means of

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intermediate command authorities is indispensable. These intermediate authorities can only be those, which are personally interested in leading the attack, i.e. (they must be) command authorities, which are in charge of attack forces in wartime and which must also be in charge of the respective ground organization and supply. How necessary this line of authority is, is shown by the fact that not a single Command is willing to rely on the Air Gaue concerned to "make its bed" "by order" of the Supreme Commander of the Air Force, and that each demands to be put in charge of the Air Gau or Airfield Regional Command concerned (see the subordination of the Airfield Regional Commands near the Bavarian Ostmark under Air Force Group 1 in the event of "Case Green" and the applications by Air Force Group 3 to be put in charge of Air Gaue XII, Giessen, in the event of "Case Red"). The channel for "applications via the Supreme Commander of the Air Force" simply is too long, there are too many day-to-day frictions and punctures. He who leads the attack will and must not be deprived of control, regardless of whether or not his formations on the ground are properly supplied. "Operational command" does not start in the air but on the ground, and preparation by the ground organization is part of the operation, just as much as the tactical preparation of the flight.

. . . . . .

Thus the above discussion leads to the result that the Air Force Group Commands must be commands in charge of the attack force and at the same time commands in charge of the ground organization and supplies for this force.

Furthermore, they must be locally bound, because this enables them to make the most of the advantage flying troops have over all other troops, i.e. that they can push forward the preparations for war already in peacetime to such an extent that the highest degree of preparedness for action is achieved.

If it is assumed, as in the present study, that in peacetime the existing 18 Flight Corps are distributed over the whole Reich, while in war they operate, for instance, from the three Air Force Group Commands Nos. 2, 1 and 3 to fight against England, it immediately becomes clear that these 18 Corps Commanders cannot be let loose independently on these three Air Force Groups in order to make their preparations there in peacetime. Since the same preparations must be made on the other fronts, the Corps Commanders would be travelling most of the time, without there being any guarantee that their preparations are sufficient, since they have no command authority in the deployment area and cannot obtain such authority. Therefore they can only submit "requests" to the Supreme Commander of the Air Force; the fulfilment of these requests can hardly be handled, still less controlled, centrally.

The more the Reich grows in area and the more the Air Force grows in strength, the more imperative it becomes, to have locally bound commands which prepare the air way on their fronts according to the orders and instructions of the Supreme Commander of the Air Force, and which during the war have a responsible share in the leadership.

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PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT L-43 Cont'd

V. Conclusions drawn from the Study as to the organization of the Air Force according to the hitherto accepted final objective 1942.

For this compare Enclosure No. 3 (Final objective 1942)

1. The following will exist in 1942 (without sea):

I. 3 Air Force Group Commands (Berlin, Brunswick, Munich)
1 Air Force Command East Prussia
1 Air Force Command Austria

II. 11 Air Gau Commands (Koenigsberg, Berlin, Dresden, Breslau, Hanover, Muenster, Wiesbaden, Nuremburg, Stuttgart, Munich, Vienna)

III. 18 Combat Geschwander
6 dive bomber Geschwader
6 heavy fighter Geschwader

. . . . . .

VI. Conclusions drawn from the Study regarding the reorganization as of 1 October 1938

For this compare Enclosure No. 4 (Interim Solution as of 1 October 1938)

1. The following will exist on 1 October 1938 (sea excepted)

I. 3 Air Force Commands (Berlin, Brunswick, Munich)
1 Air Force Command East Prussia
1 Air Force Command Austria

II. 11 Air Gau Commands (Koenigsberg, Berlin, Dresden, Breslau, Hanover, Muenster, Wiesbaden, Nuremburg, Stuttgart, Munich, Vienna)

III. 12 combat Geschwader
3 divebomber Geschwader
3 heavy fighter Geschwader (scheduled)
) (including the new units to be set up at the end of the year)

2. It will not yet be possible to form mixed combat Geschwader, since the insufficient ranges of the divebombers will not permit this. Nor, will it be possible yet to form flight divisions, composed as assumed for the Final Solution, since the heavy fighter plane is only now in production.

3. In view of the small number of defense forces and certain personnel reasons, it does not as yet seem justified to establish the Air Gau Commands at once as Corps Command Staffs (Commanding Generals and Commanders of the Air Gaue).

Therefore only an interim solution can be chosen on 1 October 1938. This, however, must be of such a nature that the Final Solution is not obstructed, but prepared and enabled to grow out of it slowly and organically.

This results in the following Proposal for the Interim Solution as of 1 October 1938.

. . . . . .

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PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT L-43 Cont'd.

d. The establishment of the flying formations will be carried out according to program, so far as their contents are concerned. For organizational reasons it is urgently desired that the establishment period be advanced to the time from 1 Nov. to 31 Dec. 1938, in order to achieve as soon as possible clear organizational and command relationships, which are the basis of any fruitful work. The disadvantage this entails from the point of view of training can be eliminated by letting the flying and part of the technical personnel continue its training at the parent units and schools as long as is necessary, and by not transferring it to the new formations until the middle of December.

This will make it possible to start the next mobilization year already on 1 Jan. 1939, and thus to cut short the extremely unpleasant period from October to the start of the new mobilization plan, whose foundations will be completely changed in all decisive points as of 1 October, 1938.

CERTIFICATE OF PARTIAL TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. L-43

21 November 1945

I, ERNST M. COHN, Pfc, 33925738, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages, and that the above is a true and correct partial translation of Document No. L-43.

ERNST M.COHN
Pfc, 33925738

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Exhibit GB 30
Filed Dec. 5, 1945

PS 2357

EXTRACTS FROM SPEECH BY HITLER BEFORE REICHSTAG

20 February 1938

"In the fifth year following the first great foreign political agreement of the Reich, it fills us with sincere gratification to be able to state that in our relations with the State with which we had had perhaps the greatest differences, not only has there been a detente, but in the course of these years there has been a constant improvement in relations ..... This good work, which was regarded with suspicion by so many at the time, has stood the test, and I may say that, since the League of Nations finally gave up its continual attempts to unsettle Danzig and appointed a man of great personal attainments as the new commissioner, the most dangerous spot from the point of view of European peace has entirely lost its menacing character. The Polish State respects the national conditions by this State, and both the city of Danzig and Germany respect Polish rights. And so the way to a friendly understanding has been successfully paved, an understanding which, beginning with Danzig, has today, in spite of the attemps of certain mischief- makers, succeeded in finally taking the poison out of the relations between Germany and Poland and transforming them into a sincere, friendly cooperation.

"Relying on her friendships, Germany will not leave a stone unturned to save that ideal which provides the foundation for the task which is ahead of us - peace."

Exhibit GB 31

G/19. Most Secret. Filed Dec. 5, 1945 TC 76

To the Reichminister
via the State Secretary.

Berlin 26th August 1938

F 12 311. (signed) Prufer.

II

4. The most pressing problem of German policy, the Czech problem, might easily, but must not lead to a conflict with the Entente. Neither France nor England are looking for trouble regarding Czechoslovakia. Both would perhaps leave Czechoslovakia to herself, if she should, without direct foreign interference and through internal signs of disintegration, due to her own faults, suffer the fate she deserves. This process, however, would have to take place step by step and would have to lead to a loss of power in the remaining territory by means of a plebiscite and an annexion of territory.

F 12 298.

The Czech problem is not yet politically acute enough for any immediate action, which the Entente would watch inactively, and not even if this action should come quickly and surprisingly. Germany cannot fix any definite time and this fruit could be plucked without too great a risk. She can only prepare the desired developments.

For this purpose the slogan emanating from England at present of the right for autonomy of the Sudetan - Germans, which we have intentionally not used up to now, is to be taken up gradually. The international conviction that the choice of nationality was being witheld from these Germans will do useful spadework, notwithstanding the fact that the chemical process of dissolution of the Czech form of states may or may not be finally speeded up by mechanical means as well. The fate of the actual body of Czechoslovakia, however, would not as yet be clearly decided by this: but would nevertheless be definitely sealed.

5. This method of approach towards Czechoslovakia is to be recommended because of our relationship with Poland. It is unavoidable that the German departure from the problems of boundaries in the south east and their transfer to the east and north east must make the Poles sit up. The fact that after the liquidation of the Czech question, it will be generally assumed that

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that Poland will be the next in turn.

But the later this assumption sinks in in international politics as a firm factor, the better. In this sense, however, it is important for the time being, to carry on the German policy, under the well known and proved slogans of "the right to autonomy" and "Racial unity". Anything else might be interpreted as pure imperialism on our part and create the resistance to our plan by the Entente at an earlier date and more energetically, than our forces could stand up to.

F 12 297.

H1151 - 0063

(Translation of an extract from an unnamed, unnumbered file containing notes year by year from 1927 - 1940 onthe reconstruction of the German Navy).

(SEC 24 - 3/C.23)

O.K.M.

A - 21 - 1

Questions of Type, Shipbuilding Plan.

C O P Y

Copy No. 2.

Berlin, 18. 2. 1938

M

to

Head of Office A

.....

The displacement of the battleships "Scharnhorst - Gneisenau" and "F/G" is in both cases greater than has been notified to the British.

. . . . . .

	Length.	Beam.	Displacement by Type actual	notified	Draught actual	notified
Scharnhorst	226. 0	30.0	- 31.300 ts	26,000 ts	8.55	7.50
"F"	241. 0	36.0	- 41.700 ts	35.000 ts	8.69	7.90
"HI"	254. 0	41.0	- 56.200 ts	46.850 ts	9.60	8.40
or "H II"	254. 0	41.0	- 56.200 ts	45.000 ts	9.60	8.15
or "H III"	254. 0	41.0	- 56.200 ts	43.000 ts	9.60	7.85

. . . . . .

In the opinion of A IV it would under no circumstances be right to notify a larger tonnage than that which for instance England, Russia or Japan will probably publish shortly, in order that we may not be held responsible for a race in armaments.

H1151 – 0064

SEC 24 - 3/C.23 (Translation of an extract from an unnamed, unnumbered file containing notes year by year from 1927 - 1940 on the reconstruction of the German Navy).

O.K.M.

Shipbuilding Plans. BZ 221 Vol. 5 S. 5

C O P Y Copy No. 2.

Berlin, 8. 3. 1938.

General Navy Office BB 6207/38

to M (Chief of Staff

with request to bring to the attention of the C - in - C Navy).

Subject : Address by C in C Navy to Directors of Shipbuilding Yards.

. . . . . It is proposed to make a statement something after the following style:

"In a very roughly outlined programme of new ship construction the Fuhrer and Reich Chancellor has set the Navy the task of providing him by a given time the means of power which he needs for the carrying out of his foreign policy . . . ."

(SEC 24 - 3/C.23) (Translation of an extract from an unnamed, unnumbered file containing notes year by year from 1927 - 1940 on the reconstruction of the German Navy).

R.W.M.

A 24 - 2 Planning Committee.

C O P Y Copy No. 2.

Carls
Admiral and C - in - C Fleet Tender "Hela" September 1938

Most Secret

Opinion on the "Draft Study of Naval Warfare against England".

A. There is full agreement with the main theme of the study.

H1151-0065

1. If according to the Führer's decision Germany is to acquire a position as a world power she needs not only sufficient colonial possessions but also secure naval communications and secure access to the ocean.

2. Both requirments can only be fulfilled in opposition to anglo - french interests and would limit their position as world powers. It is unlikely that they can be achieved by peaceful means. The decision to make Germany a world power therefore forces upon us the necessity of making the corresponding preparations for war.

3. War against England means at the same time war against the Empire, against France, probably against Russia as well and a large number of countries overseas, in fact against $\frac{1}{2}$ to $\frac{1}{3}$ of the whole world.

It can only be justified and have a chance of success if it is prepared economically as well as politically and militarily and waged with the aim of conquering for Germany an outlet to the ocean.

. . . . . .

H1151 – 0066

TC 28

(English Translation)

GERMAN ASSURANCE TO CZECHOSLOVAKIA

OF 26TH SEPTEMBER 1938

I have a little to explain. I am grateful to Mr. Chamberlain for all his efforts, and I have assured him that the German people want nothing but peace; but I have also told him that I cannot go back beyond the limits of our patience.

I assured him moreover, and I repeat it here, that when this problem is solved there will be no more territorial problems for Germany in Europe. And I further assured him that from the moment when Czechoslovakia solves its other problems, that is to say when the Czechs have come to an agreement with their other minorities peacefully and without oppression, I will no longer be interested in the Czech State. And that, as far as I am concerned, I will guarantee it. We don't want any Czechs! But I must also declare before the German people that in the Sudeten German problem my patience is now at an end. I made an offer to Herr Benes which was no more than the realisation of what he had already promised. He now has peace or war in his hands. Either he will accept this offer and at length give the Germans their freedom, or we will get this freedom for ourselves.

Exhibit GB 32
Filed Dec. 5, 1945

TC.29

GERMAN ASSURANCE TO POLAND, SEPT. 26TH 1938.

The most difficult problem with which I was confronted was that of our relations with Poland. There was a danger that Poles and Germans would regard each other as hereditary enemies. I wanted to prevent this. I know well enough that I should not have been successful if Poland had had a democratic Constitution. For these democracies which indulge in phrases about peace are the most bloodthirsty war agitators. In Poland there ruled no democracy but a man; and with him I succeeded in precisely twelve months, in coming to an agreement which, for ten years in the first instance, entirely removed the danger of a conflict. We are all convinced that this agreement will bring lasting pacification. We realize that here are two peoples which must live together and neither of which can do away with the other. A people of 33 millions will always strive for an outlet to the sea. A way for understanding, then, had to be found; it has been found, and it will be even further extended. Certainly things were hard in this area. +(The nationalities and small national groups frequently quarrelled among themselves). But the main fact is that the two Governments, and all reasonable and clear-sighted persons among the two peoples and in the two countries, possess the firm will and determination to improve their relations. It was a real work of peace, of more worth than all the chattering in the League of Nations Palace at Geneva.

I have attempted during this period gradually to bring about better and lasting relations with other nations as well. We have given guarantees for the States in the West. We have assured all our immediate neighbours of the integrity of their territory as far as Germany is concerned. That is no mere phrase. It is our sacred will. We have no interest whatever in a breach of the peace. We want nothing from these peoples. These offers of ours met with growing understanding. One by one the peoples are freeing themselves from the crass blindness of Geneva, which I would call a policy, not of the collective obligation for peace, but of the collective obligation for war. They are freeing themselves and beginning to see problems soberly; they are ready for understanding and desirous of peace.

+ Sentence omitted from German text.

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H1151 - 0068

BRITISH DOCUMENT BOOK NO.2.

P A R T III

PRELIMINARY GERMAN - POLISH DISCUSSIONS RE DANZIG PRIOR TO MARCH 1939

TC 73 No.44	24 Oct 38	Lipski Ribbentrop Luncheon	
" 45	31 Oct 38	Beck's instructions to Lipski	
C 137	24 Nov 38	Keitel's Appendix to Hitler Order of 21 Oct 38	
TC 73 No.48	5 Jan 39	Beck - Hitler Conversation	
" 49	6 Jan 39	Beck-Ribbentrop Conversation	
PS 2530	25 Jan 39	Ribbentrop's speech in Warsaw	V.B.1 Fe
TC 73 No.57	30 Jan 39	Hitler's Reichstag Speech	D.P.VI[illegible]

Exhibit G.B. 27a

TC 73. Offered Dec. 6, 1945

Vide GB Ex. 27

"POLISH WHITE BOOK".

No. 44.

M. Lipski to M. Beck.

Berlin, October 25, 1938.

In a conversation on October 24, over a luncheon at the Grand Hotel, Berchtesgaden, at which M. Hewel was present, M. von Ribbentrop put forward a proposal for a general settlement of issues (Gesamtlösung) between Poland and Germany. This included the reunion of Danzig with the Reich, while Poland would be assured the retention of railway and economic facilities there. Poland would agree to the building of an extra-territorial motor road and railway line across Pomorze. In exchange M. von Ribbentrop mentioned the possibility of an extension of the Polish-German Agreement by twenty-five years and a guarantee of Polish-German frontiers. As a possible sphere for future co-operation between the two countries, the German Foreign Minister specified joint action in colonial matters and the emigration of Jews from Poland, and a joint policy towards Russia on the basis of the Anti-Comintern Pact. M. von Ribbentrop asked me to communicate his suggestions to you. He would like to discuss these matters with you, with my participation.

In my reply I referred him to the Chancellor's declaration on the Danzig question, made to me on November 5, 1937, and repeated to you in Berlin on January 14, 1938.

I also pointed to the importance of Danzig as a port to Poland, and repeated the Polish Government's principle of non-interference in the internal life of the German population in the Free City, where complete self-government is established.

Finally, I said that I wished to warn M. von Ribbentrop that I could see no possibility of an agreement involving the reunion of the Free City with the Reich. I concluded by promising to communicate the substance of this conversation to you.

After the conversation M. von Ribbentrop invited me again to call on him and, mentioning the issue of the union of Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia with Hungary, put to me the question whether I was raising it with the German Government as a Polish postulate. He added that, if the Polish Government agreed to the German conception regarding Danzig and the Motor Road, the question of Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia could be solved in accordance with Poland's attitude to the matter. I answered that my only task was to inform the German Government of Poland's attitude in regard to Hungary's postulate in Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia, as Poland had also done to the Italian Government.

H1151-0069

Exhibit GB 27(b)
Offered Dec. 6, 1945
Nde G.B.E. 27

TC 73, No.45.

M.BECK'S INSTRUCTIONS TO M.LIPSKI.

Warsaw, October 31, 1938.

In connection with your indication of the Reich Government's desire to achieve a general agreement which would finally stabilize Polish-German relations in accordance with the principle of a good and friendly co-existence, as expressed by M. von Ribbentrop in his conversation at Berchtesgaden on the 24th inst., please inform the governing circles of the Reich of our following views:

(1) Although, to our sincere satisfaction, the last crisis did not lead to a general European military conflict, in the eyes of the Polish Government the value of good Polish-German relations in a general stabilization of peace is not only of undiminished importance, but, in face of the dominating general political chaos, has gained in weight and cogency.

(2) In the sphere of Polish-German neighbourly relations, in spite of local difficulties, great progress has been made, since it has not escaped our notice that the Reich Chancellor's declarations in regard to us, made in his public statements, contain increasingly precise and unequivocal formulas.

(3) The Polish-German Agreement of 1934 has stood the test of the greatest political upheaval post-war Europe has so far experienced. In these circumstances, it is only logical to emphasize this achievement, by impressing the publics of both countries with the fact that the said Agreement was not of a transient and tactical nature. On the contrary, it expresses the firm resolution to repair mistakes of past history, which has been so abundant in strife and conflict without advantage to either of our nations.

(4) In the opinion of the Polish Government the subject of any future understanding concluded with the object of permanently maintaining good neighbourly relations would have to be the following:

(a) A certain extension in the period and form of the 1934 Declaration, as the basis of relations between the two States.

(b) Such a settlement of the problem of the Danzig Free City as would prevent, in future, the continually recurring difficulties of a technical and psychological nature which arise from friction in this sphere. The question of the Free City is urgent because in the state of affairs hitherto prevailing, with the League of Nations reserving very far-reaching prerogatives to itself, but not able to fulfil its task in a manner beneficial to the Free City and to Polish interests, the need arises for the Polish and Reich Governments to approach the problem in a spirit of frankness.

(5) On the Polish side the fact will always remain that so important a State as Poland has access to the sea which is reduced to the minimum possible, and this at a time when the Republic's sea commerce and its mercantile marine are naturally developing on a very wide scale. The construction of Gdynia port considerably enlarged Poland's possibilities, but the position of the Free City at the mouth of the Vistula (which, especially since the creation of the Polish Central Industrial Area, is an increasingly important communication way) confers quite special importance on the Free City from the aspect of Polish maritime interests. A very large number of further basins can still be excavated at Gdynia, but it would be impossible to find any substitute for the natural port situated at the mouth of the main Polish waterway. On the other hand, the exploitation of any port under normal economic conditions is only possible when it is situated within the Customs area of the country which forms its hinterland. For this reason, in past ages the Free City of Danzig, while enjoying local autonomy because if the nature of its population, was even under Polish sovereignty. It should be added that the Danzig delegation to the

H1151 - 0070

H1151 - 0071

Congress of Vienna had, as its chief task, the maintenance of its connection with whatever type of Polish State might arise as the result of the deliberations of that Congress. These historical considerations are meant only as illustration and commentary. Present-day realities provide clear arguments for a definition of the bounds of Polish interests in relation to the Free City.

(6) In the circumstances, in the understanding of the Polish Government the Danzig question is governed by two factors: the right of the German population of the city and the surrounding villages to freedom of life and development; and the fact that in all matters appertaining to the Free City as a port it is connected with Poland. Apart from the national character of the majority of the population, everything in Danzig is definitely bound up with Poland. In the present state of affairs the existing Statute and agreements guarantee Poland:

(a) Unrestricted access to the sea by waterway and railway.
(b) The ownership of the railways serving the port at Danzig and the port at Gdynia.
(c) The inclusion of the Free City in the Polish Customs area.
(d) The rights of the Polish minority.

Other rights derive from these four cardinal conditions. The Statute contains yet another fifth condition which, despite several declarations of the Danzig Senate, the last being made in 1932, has never been fulfilled. The failure to fulfil this condition reacts most unfavourably upon the economic position of the Free City.

(7) Taking all the foregoing factors into consideration, and desiring to achieve the stabilization of relations by way of a friendly understanding with the Government of the German Reich, the Polish Government proposes the replacement of the League of Nations guarantee and its prerogatives by a bi-lateral Polish-German Agreement. This Agreement should guarantee the existence of the Free City of Danzig so as to assure freedom of national and cultural life to its German majority, and also should guarantee all Polish rights. Notwithstanding the complications involved in such a system, the Polish Government must state that any other solution, and in particular any attempt to incorporate the Free City into the Reich, must inevitably lead to a conflict. This would not only take the form of local difficulties, but also would suspend all possibility of Polish-German understanding in all its aspects. Even in 1933, after the conversations had been opened which led to the conclusion of the 1934 Declaration, Marshal Pilsudski raised the Danzig question as a sure criterion for estimaing the German Reich's intentions towards Poland. This was made known both through diplomatic channels and also, so far as I remember, in a conversation between Marshal Pilsudski and Dr.Goebbels. I expressly consider that this point of view is binding upon Poland.

(8) In face of the weight and cogency of these questions, I am ready to have final conversations personally with the governing circles of the Reich. I deem it necessary, however, that you should first present the principles to which we adhere, so that my eventual contact should not end in a breakdown, which would be dangerous for the future.

(1945)

Exhibit G.B. 33
Filed Dec. 6, 1945

C.137. C.137.

Translation.

Top Secret.

Typed by Officer

Supreme Command of the Armed Forces Berlin, 24/11/38.

No. 241/38 top secret important L Ia.

Re:- The Führer and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces OKW No. 236/38 top secret important matter L Ia of 21/10/38. 10 Copies 3rd Copy.

(Handwritten) to be placed before the C-in-C

Important Matter By hand of Officer Only.

1st Supplement to Instruction dated 21/10/38.

The Führer has ordered:-

1) Apart from the 3 contingencies mentioned in the instructions of the 21/10/38, preparations are also to be made to enable the Free State of Danzig to be occupied by German troops by surprise ("4). Occupation of Danzig").

The preparations will be made on the following basis:-

Condition is a quasi-revolutionary occupation of Danzig, exploiting a politically favourable situation, not a war against Poland.

No. 3 of the "instructions on the power to give orders in East Prussia in the case of becoming involved in war" (OKW No. 230/38 top secre t important matter L Ia, dated 27/9/38) will come into operation.

Occupation by the army has to take place from East Prussia. The troops to be employed for this purpose must not simultaneously be earmarked for the occupation of the Memelland, so that both operations can, if necessary, take place simultaneously.

The Navy will support the army's operations by attack from the sea, according to detailed orders from the C-in-C Navy. The forces participating are to be instructed to co-operate with the army. The details of the support to be given by the navy are to be agreed between the branches of the armed forces (Translator's Note:- i.e. OKH and OKM).

How far air force units can collaborate in the occupation is to be investigated by the Reich Marshal of the Air Force and the C-in-C Air Force and to be agreed in direct co-operation with the other two branches of the armed forces (Translator's Note:- i.e. OKH and OKM).

The plans of the branches of the armed forces (Translator's Note:- i.e. OKH, OKM and OKL) are to be submitted by the 10/1/1939.

2) No. 3 of the "instructions on the power to give orders in East Prussia in the case of becoming involved in war" (OKW No. 230/38 top secret important matter L Ia, dated 27/9/38) will also apply for the "occupation of the Memelland" (part 3 of the instructions dated 21/10/38).

The Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces.

K E I T E L.

Distribution:-
OKH = 1 (Copy No.1) OKM = 1 (Copy No.3)
OdL u. ObdL = 1 (" " 2) OKW = 7 (" No.4-10)

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H1151-0073

Exhibit G.B. 34
Offered ~~Filed~~ Dec. 6, 1945
vide G.B. E. 27

TC 73, No.48.

MINUTE OF M.BECK'S CONVERSATION WITH CHANCELLOR HITLER

Berchtesgaden, January 5, 1939.

The conversation took place in the presence of M. von Ribbentrop, M. von Moltke, M.Lipski and Count Michal Lubienski.

The Chancellor began by asking M.Beck whether he had any special questions to ask, as he was quite ready to be at his service with any explanations. In replying, M.Beck mentioned the Danzig situation and the Danube problem.

The Chancellor explained at length how the arbitration at Vienna had come about, laying the blame on the Hungarian Government's tactics for Budapest's failure to give effect to the postulate regarding Carpathian Ruthenia.

The Chancellor pointed out that in regard to Poland he always and invariably tried to follow the policy initiated by the Declaration of 1934. In his opinion the community of interests between Germany and Poland, so far as Russia was concerned, was complete. For the Reich, Russia, whether Tsarist or Bolshevist, was equally dangerous. The latter was perhaps a greater danger because of Communist propaganda, but the former was more dangerous in the military and even more the imperialistic sense. For these reasons, a strong Poland was an absolute necessity for Germany. At this point the Chancellor remarked that every Polish division engaged against Russia was a corresponding saving of a German division.

The Chancellor further declared that he was interested in the Ukraine from the economic viewpoint, but he had no interest in it politically.

The Chancellor then discussed the Danzig question, and emphasized that, as it was a German city, sooner or later it must return to the Reich. He stated that, in his opinion, by way of mutual agreement it would be possible to find some way out and achieve a form of guarantee to the legitimate interests of both Poland and Germany. If an agreement was reached on this question, all difficulties between the two States could quite definitely be settled and cleared out of the way. He emphasized that he was ready in that case to give an assurance, similar to that which he had given France with respect to Alsace and Lorraine, and to Italy with respect to the Brenner. Finally, he drew attention, without stressing the matter, to the necessity for greater freedom of communication between Germany and East Prussia.

M.Beck replied that the Danzig question was a very difficult problem. He added that in the Chancellor's suggestion he did not see any equivalent for Poland, and that the whole of Polish opinion, and not only people thinking politically but the widest spheres of Polish society, were particularly sensitive on this matter.

In answer to this the Chancellor stated that to solve this problem it would be necessary to try to find something quite new, some new form, for which he used the term "Körperschaft", which on the one hand would safeguard the interests of the German population, and on the other the Polish interests. In addition, the Chancellor declared that the Minister could be quite at ease, there would be no faits accomplis in Danzig and nothing would be done to render difficult the situation of the Polish Government.

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Exhibit G.B. 35
Offered ~~Filed~~ Dec. 6, 1945
vide G. 27

TC 73, No.49

EXTRACT FROM MINUTE OF M.BECK'S CONVERSATION WITH M. VON RIBBENTROP

M.Beck asked M. von Ribbentrop to inform the Chancellor that whereas previously, after all his conversations and contacts with German statesmen, he had been feeling optimistic, today for the first time he was in a pessimistic mood. Particularly in regard to the Danzig question, as it had been raised by the Chancellor, he saw no possibility whatever of agreement.

In answer M. von Ribbentrop once more emphasized that Germany was not seeking any violent solution. The basis of their policy towards Poland was still a desire for the further building up of friendly relations. It was necessary to seek such a method of clearing away the difficulties as would respect the rights and interests of the two parties concerned.

(1946)

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Exhibit U.S.A. 36
Filed Dec. 6, 1945

SPEECH BY RIBBENTROP IN WARSAW, 25 January, 1939. PS 2530

".....In accordance with the resolute will of the German National Leader, the continual progress and consolidation of friendly relations between Germany and Poland, based upon the existing Agreement between us, constitute an essential element in German foreign policy. The political foresight, and the principles worthy of true statesmanship, which induced both sides to take the momentous decision of 1934, provide a guarantee that all other problems arising in the course of the future evolution of events will also be solved in the same spirit, with due regard to the respect and understanding of the rightful interests of both sides. Thus Poland and Germany can look forward to the future with full confidence in the solid basis of their mutual relations....."

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Exhibit G.B. 37
Offered ~~Entered~~ Dec. 6, 1945
vide E. 37

TC 73 No.57

Extract from Chancellor Hitler's Reichstag Speech
January 30, 1939.

"We have just celebrated the fifth anniversary of the conclusion of our non-aggression pact with Poland. There can scarcely be any difference of opinion to-day among the true friends of peace as to the value of this agreement. One only needs to ask oneself what might have happened to Europe if this agreement, which brought such relief, had not been entered into five years ago. In signing it, the great Polish marshal and patriot rendered his people just as great a service as the leaders of the National-Socialist State rendered the German people. During the troubled months of the past year the friendship between Germany and Poland has been one of the reassuring factors in the political life of Europe."

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BRITISH DOCUMENT BOOK NO.2.

PART IV

15 MARCH 1939 - END MAY 1939

(a) ADVANTAGES OF OCCUPATION OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA

PS 386 US 25		Hosbach Note 5 Nov 1937
PS 789 US 23		Hitler's Speech to Commanders 23 Nov 1939
L 172 US 34		Jodl's Lecture 7 Nov 1943

(b) POLITICAL AND MILITARY PREPARATIONS MARCH - MAY 1939

TC 73 No 61	21 Mar 39	Ribbentrop - Lipski conversation
" 53A	22 Mar 39	Occupation of Memel
" 72 No 71	31 Mar 39	British P.M.'s statement in House of Commons
" 18	6 Apr 39	Anglo-Polish Declaration
C 120A	3 Apr 39	Keitel's Directive for the Uniform Preparation of War by the Armed Forces 1939/40
C 120B	11 Apr 39	Hitler's Directive for the Uniform Preparation of War by the Armed Forces 1939/40
C 120C	11 Apr 39	Annexe I "Legal Basis" to above Directive
C 120D	11 Apr 39	Annexe II "Fall Weiss" to above Directive
TC 72 No 14	28 Apr 39	German Memorandum renouncing 1934 Agreement

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TC 72 No.13	28 Apr 39	Extract Hitler's Reichstag Speech
" 16	5 May 39	Polish Government's Reply
C 120 K	10 May 39	Hitler's Directive for Uniform Preparation of War by Armed Forces 1939/40
C 120 L	10 May 39	Annexe VI "Economic Warfare" to above Directive.
L 79 US 27	23 May 39	Hitler's Conference (Schmundt Note)

P.S. 386.

Berlin, 10 Nov 1937.

NOTES on the Conference in the Reichskanzlei
on 5 Nov 37 from 1615 - 2030 Hours

PRESENT : The Fuhrer and Reich Chancellor
The Reichsminister for War, Generalfeldmarschall v. BLOMBERG
The C-in-C Army, Generaloberst Freiherr von FRITSCH
The C-in-C Navy, Generaladmiral Dr. h.c. RAEDER
The C-in-C Luftwaffe, Generaloberst GOERING
The Reichsminister for Foreign Affairs Freiherr v. NEURATH
Oberst HOSZBACH

The Fuhrer stated initially that the subject matter of to-day's conference was of such high importance, that its further detailed discussion would probably take place in Cabinet sessions. However, he, the Fuhrer, had decided NOT to discuss this matter in the larger circle of the Reich Cabinet, because of its importance. His subsequent statements were the result of detailed deliberations and of the experiences of his 4½ years in Government; he desired to explain to those present his fundamental ideas on the possibilities and necessities of expanding our foreign policy and in the interests of a far-sighted policy he requested that his statements be looked upon in the case of his death as his last will and testament.

The Fuhrer then stated :

The aim of German policy is the security and the preservation of the nation and its propagation. This is consequently a problem of space.

The German nation disposes of 85 million people, which, because of the number of individuals and the compactness of habitation, form of homogeneous European racial body, which cannot be found in any other country. On the other hand it justifies the demand for larger living space more than for any other nation. If no political body exists in space, corresponding to the German racial body, then that is the consequence of several centuries of historical development, and should this political condition continue to exist, it will represent the greatest danger to the preservation of the German nation (Volkstum) as its present high level. An arrest of the deterioration of the German element in AUSTRIA and in CZECHOSLOVAKIA is just as little possible as the preservation of the present state in GERMANY itself. Instead of growth, sterility will be introduced, and as a consequence tensions of a social nature will appear after a number of years, because political and philosophical ideas are of a permanent nature only as long as they are able to produce the basis for the realization of the actual claim of existence of a nation. The German future is therefore dependent exclusively on the solution of the need for living space. Such a solution can be sought naturally only for a limited period, about 1 - 3 generations.

Before touching upon the question of solving the need for living space, it must be decided whether a solution of the German position with a good future can be attained, either by way of an autarchy or by way of an increased share in universal commerce and industry.

Autarchy : Execution will be possible only with strict National-Socialist State policy, which is the basis; assuming this can be achieved the results are as follows :

A. In the sphere of raw materials, only limited, but NOT total autarchy can be attained :

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1. Wherever coal can be used for the extraction of raw materials autarchy is feasible.

2. In the case of ores the position is much more difficult. Requirements in iron and light metals can be covered by ourselves. Copper and tin, however, can NOT.

3. Cellular materials can be covered by ourselves as long as sufficient wood supplies exist. A permanent solution is not possible.

4. Edible fats - possible.

B. In the case of foods, the question of an autarchy must be answered with a definite "NO".

The general increase of living standards, compared with 30 - 40 years ago, broughtabout a simultaneous increase of the demand and increase of personal consumption even among the producers, the farmers, themselves. The proceeds from the production increase in agriculture have been used for covering the increase in demands, therefore they represent no absolute increase in production. A further increase in production by making greater demands on the soil is not possible because it already shows signs of deterioration due to the use of artificial fertilisers, and it is therefore certain that, even with the greatest possible increase in production, participation in the world market could NOT be avoided.

The considerable expenditure of foreign currency to secure food by important, even in periods when harvests are good, increases catastrophically when the harvest is really poor. The possibility of this catastrophe increase correspondingly to the increase in population, and the annual 560,000 excess in births would bring about an increasedconsumption in bread, because the child is a greater bread eater than the adult.

Permanently to counter the difficulties of food supplies by lowering the standard of living and by rationalization is impossible in a continent which had developed an approximately equivalent standard of living. As the solving of the unemployment problem has brought into effect the complete power of consumption, some small corrections in our agricultural home production will be possible, but NOT a wholesale alteration of the standard of food consumption. Consequently autarchy becomes impossible, specifically in the sphere of food supplies as well as generally.

Participation in World Economy. There are limits to this which we are unable to transgress. The market fluctuations would be an obstacle to a secure foundation of the German position; international commercial agreements do NOT offer any guarantee for practical execution. It must be considered on principle that since the World War (1914-18) an industrialization has taken place in countries which formerly exported food. We live in a period of economic empires, in which the tendency to colonize again approaches the condition which originally motivated colonization; in JAPAN and ITALY economic motives are the basis of their will to expand, the economic need will also drive GERMANY to it. Countries outside the great economic empires have special difficulties in expanding economically.

The upward tendency, which has been caused in world economy, due to armament competition, can never form a permanent basis for an economic settlement, and this latter is also hampered by the economic disruption caused by Bolshevism. It is a pronounced military weakness of those States who base their existence on export. As our exports and imports are carried out over those sea lanes which are ruled by BRITAIN, it is more a question of security of transport rather than one of foreign currency, and this explains the great weakness in our food situation in wartime. The only way out, and one which may appear imaginary, is the securing of greater living space, an endeavour which at

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all times has been the cause of the formation of states and of movements of nations. It is explicable that this tendency finds no interest in GENEVA and in satisfied States. Should the security of our food position be our foremost thought, then the space required for this can be our foremost thought, then the space required for this can only be sought in Europe, but we will not copy liberal capitalist policies which rely on exploiting colonies. It is NOT a case of conquering people, but of conquering agriculturally useful space. It would also be more to the purpose to seek raw material producing territory in Europe directly adjoining the Reich and not overseas, and this solution would have to be brought into effect in one or two generations. What would be required at a later date over and above this must be left to subsequent generations. The development of great world-wide national bodies is naturally a slow process and the German people, with its strong racial root, has for this purpose the most favourable foundations in the heart of the European Continent. The history of all times - Roman Empire, British Empire - has proved that every space expansion can only be effected by breaking resistance and taking risks. Even setbacks are unavoidable; neither formerly nor today has space been found without an owner; the attacker always comes up against the proprietor.

The question for GERMANY is where the greatesy possible conquest could be made at lowest cost.

German politics must reckon with its two hateful enemies, ENGLAND and FRANCE, to whom a strong German colossus in the centre of EUROPE would be intolerable. Both these states would oppose a further reinforcement of GERMANY, both in EUROPE and overseas, and in this opposition they would have the support of all parties. Both countries would view the building of German military strongpoints overseas as a threat to their overseas communications, as a security measure for German commerce, and retrospectively a strengthening of the German position in Europe

ENGLAND is NOT in a position to cede any of her colonial possessions to us owing to the resistance which she experiences in the Dominions. After the loss of prestige which ENGLAND HAS suffered owing to the transfer of ABYSSINIA to Italian ownership, a return of EAST AFRICA can no longer be expected. Any resistance on ENGLAND'S part would at best consist in the readiness to satisfy our colonial claims by taking away colonies which at the present moment are NOT in British hands, e.g. ANGOLA. French favors would probably be of the same nature.

A serious discussion regarding the return of colonies to us could be considered only at a time when ENGLAND is ina state of emergency and the German Reich is strong and well armed. The Fuhrer does not share the opinion that the Empire is unshakeable. Resistance against the Empire is to be found less in conquered territories than amongst its competitors. The British Empire and the Roman Empire cannot be compared with one another in regard to durability; since the Punic Wars the latter did not have a serious political enemy. Only the dissolving effects which originated in Christendom, and the signs of age which creep into all states, made it possible for the Ancient Germans to subjugate Ancient ROME.

Alongside the British Empire to-day a number of States exist which are stronger than it. The British Mother Country is able to defend its colonial possessions only allied with other States and NOT by its own power. How could ENGLAND alone, for example, defend CANADA

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against an attack by AMERICA or its Far Eastern interests against an attack by JAPAN.

The singling out of the British Crown as the bearer of Empire unity is in itself an admission that the universal empire cannot be maintained permanently by power politics. The following are significant pointers in this respect :

a) IRELAND'S tendency for independence.

b) Constitutional disputes in INDIA where ENGLAND, by her half-measures, left the door open for Indians at a later date to utilise the nonfulfilment of constitutional promises as a weapon against BRITAIN.

c) The weakening of the British position in the FAR EAST by JAPAN.

d) The opposition in the MEDITERRANEAN to Italy which - by virtue of its history, driven by necessity and led by a genius - expands its power position and must consequently infringe British interests to an increasing extent. The outcome of the ABYSSINIAN War is a loss of prestige for Britian which Italy is endeavouring to increase by stirring up discontent in the MOHAMMEDAN world.

It must be established in conclusion that the Empire cannot be held permanently by power politics by 45 million Britons, in spite of all the solidity of her ideals. The proportion of the populations in the Empire, compared with that of the Motherland is 9:1, and it should act as a warning to us that if we expand in space, we must NOT allow the level of our population to become too low.

France's position is more favourable than that of ENGLAND. The French Empire is better placed geographically, the population of its colonial possessions represents a potential military increase. But FRANCE is faced with difficulties of internal politics. At the present time only 10 per cent approximately of the nations have parliamentary governments whereas 90 per cent of them have totalitarian governments. Nevertheless we have to take the following into our political considerations as power factors:

BRITAIN, FRANCE, RUSSIA and the adjoining smaller States.

The German question can be solved only by way of force and this is never without risk. The battles of FREDERICK THE GREAT for SILECIA, and BISMARCK'S wars against AUSTRIA and FRANCE had been a tremendous risk and the speed of PRUSSIAN action in 1870 had prevented AUSTRIA from participating in the war. If we place the decision to apply force with risk at the head of the following expositions then we are left to reply to the questions "when" and "how". In this regard we have to decide upon three different cases.

Case 1. Period 1943 - 45. After this we can only expect a change for the worse. The re-arming of the Army, the Navy and the Air Force, as well as the formation of the Officers' Corps, are practically concluded. Our material equipment and armaments are modern, with further delay the danger of their becoming out-of-date will increase. In particular the secrecy of "special weapons" cannot always be safeguarded. Enlistment of reserves would be limited to the current recruiting age groups and an addition from older untrained groups would be no longer available.

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In comparison with the re-armament, which will have been carried out at that time by the other nations, we shall decrease in relative power. Should we not act until 1943/45, then, dependent on the absence of reserves, any year could bring about the food crisis, for the countering of which we do NOT possess the necessary foreign currency. This must be considered as a "point of weakness in the regime". Over and above that, the world will anticipate our action and will increase counter-measures yearly. Whilst other nations isolate themselves we should be forced on the offensive.

What the actual position would be in the years 1943-45 no one knows to-day. It is certain, however, that we can wait no longer.

On the one side the large armed forces, with the necessity for securing their upkeep, the ageing of the Nazi movement and of its leaders, and on the other side the prospect of a lowering of the standard of living and a drop in the birth rate, leaves us no other choice than to act. If the Fuhrer is still living, then it will be his irrevocable decision to solve the German space problem no later than 1943-45. The necessity for action before 1943-45 will come under consideration in cases 2 and 3.

Case 2. Should the social tensions in FRANCE lead to an internal political crisis of such dimensions that it absorbs the French Army and thus renders it incapable for employment in war against GERMANY, then the time for action against CZECHOSLOVAKIA has come.

Case 3. It would be equally possible to act against CZECHOSLOVAKIA if FRANCE should be so tied up by a war against another State, that it cannot "proceed" against Germany.

For the improvement of our military political position it must be our first aim, in every case of entanglement by war, to conquer CZECHOSLOVAKIA and AUSTRIA simultaneously, in order to remove any threat from the flanks in case of a possible advance Westwards. In the case of a conflict with FRANCE it would hardly be necessary to assume that CZECHOSLOVAKIA would declare war on the same day as FRANCE. However, CZECHOSLOVAKIA'S desire to participate in the war will increase proportionally to the degree to which we are being weakened. Its actual participation could make itself felt by an attack on SILESIA, either towards the North or the West.

Once CZECHOSLOVAKIA is conquered - and a mutual frontier, GERMANY-HUNGARY is obtained - then a neutral attitude by POLAND in a German-French conflict could more easily be relied upon. Our agreements with POLAND remain valid only as long as GERMANY'S strength remains unshakeable; should GERMANY have any setbacks then an attack by POLAND against EAST PRUSSIA, perhaps also against POMERANIA, and SILESIA, must be taken into account.

Assuming a development of the situation, which would lead to a planned attack on our part in the years 1943-45 then the behavior of FRANCE, ENGLAND, POLAND and RUSSIA would probably have to be judged in the following manner :

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The Fuhrer believes personally that in all probability ENGLAND and perhaps also FRANCE have already silently written off CZECHOSLOVAKIA, and that they have got used to the idea that this question would one day be cleaned up by GERMANY. The difficulties in the British Empire and the prospect of being entangled in another long-drawn-out European War, were decisive factors in the non-participation of ENGLAND in a war against GERMANY. The British attitude would certainly NOT remain without influence on FRANCE'S attitude. An attack by FRANCE without British support is hardly probable assuming that its offensive would stagnate along our Western fortifications. Without England's support, it would also NOT be necessary to take into consideration a march by France through Belgium and Holland, and this would also not have to be reckoned with by us in case of a conflict with France, as in every case it would have as consequence the enmity of Great Britain. Naturally, we should in every case have to bar our frontier during the operation of our attacks against Czechoslovakia and Austria. It must be taken into consideration here that Czechoslovakia's defence measures will increase in strength from year to year, and that a consolidation of the inside values of the Austrian army will also be effected in the course of years. Although the population of Czechoslovakia in the first place is not a thin one, the embodiment of Czechoslovakia and Austria would nevertheless constitute the conquest of food for 5-6 million people, on the basis that a compulsory emigration of 2 million from Czechoslovakia and of 1 million from Austria could be carried out. The annexation of the two States to Germany militarily, and politically would constitute a considerable relief, owing to shorter and better frontiers, the freeing of fighting personnel for other purposes and the possibility of re-constituting new armies up to a strength of about 12 Divisions, representing a new division per 1 million population.

No opposition to the removal of Czechoslovakia is expected on the part of Italy; however, it cannot be judged to-day what would be her attitude in the Austrian question since it would depend largely on whether the Duce were alive at the time or not.

The measure and speed of our action would decide Poland's attitude. Poland will have little inclination to enter the war against a victorious Germany, with Russia in its rear.

Military participation by Russia must be countered by the speed of our operations; it is a question whether this need be taken into consideration at all in view of Japan's attitude.

Should Case 2 occur - paralyzation of France by a Civil War - then the situation should be utilised at any time for operations against Czechoslovakia, as Germany's most dangerous enemy would be eliminated.

The Fuhrer sees Case 3 looming nearer; it could develop from the existing tensions in the MEDITERRANEAN, and should it occur he has firmly decided to make use of it any time, perhaps even as early as 1938.

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Following recent experiences in the course of the events of the war in Spain, the Fuhrer does NOT see an early end to hostilities there. Taking into consideration the time required for past offensives by France, a further three years duration of war is within the bounds of possibility. On the other hand, from the German point of view a 100 per cent victory by France is not desirable; we are more interested in a continuation of the war and preservation of the tensions in the Mediterranean. Should Franco be in sole possession of the Spanish Peninsula it would mean the end of Italian intervention and the presence of Italy on the Balearic Isles. As our interests are directed towards continuing the war in Spain, it must be the task of our future policy to strengthen Italy in her fight to hold on to the Balearic Isles. However, a solidification of Italian positions on the Balearic Isles can NOT be tolerated either by France or by England and could lead to a war by France and England against Italy, in which case Spain, if entirely in white (i.e. Franco's) hands, could participate on the side of Italy's enemies. A subjugation of Italy in such a war appears very unlikely. Additional raw materials would be brought to Italy via Germany. The Fuhrer believes that Italy's military strategy would be to remain on the defensive against France on the Western frontier and carry out operations against France from Libya against North African French colonial possessions.

As a landing of French-British troops on the Italian coast can be discounted, and as a French offensive via the Alps to Upper Italy would be extremely difficult and would probably stagnate before the strong Italian fortifications, French lines of communication by the Italian fleet will be a great/extent, paralyze the transport of fighting personnel from North Africa to France, so that at its frontiers with Italy and Germany, France will have at its disposal solely the metropolitan fighting forces.

If Germany profits from this war by disposing of the Czechoslovakian and the Austrian questions, the probability must be assumed that England - being at war with Italy - would not decide to commence operations against Germany. Without British support a warlike action by France against Germany is not to be anticipated.

The date of our attack on Czechoslovakia and Austria must be made dependent on the course of the Italian-English-French war and would not be simultaneous with the commencement of military agreements with Italy, but of full independence and, by exploiting this unique favourable opportunity he wishes to begin to carry out operations against Czechoslovakia. The attack on Czechoslovakia would have to take place with the "speed of lightning" (blitzartig schnell).

Fieldmarshall von Blomberg and Generaloberst von Fritsch in giving their estimate on the situation, repeatedly pointed out that England and France must not appear as our enemies, and they stated that the war with Italy would NOT bind the French army to such an extent that it would NOT be in a position to commence operations on our Western frontier with superior forces. Generaloberst von Fritsch estimated the

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French forces which would presumably be employed on the Alpine frontier against Italy to be in the region of 20 divisions, so that a strong French superiority would still remain on our Western frontier. The French would, according to German reasoning, attempt to advance into the Rhineland. We should consider the lead which France has got in mobilization, and quite apart from the very small value of our then existing fortifications - which was pointed out particularly by Generalfeldmarschall von Blomberg - the four motorized divisions which had been laid down for the West would be more or less incapable of movement. With regard to our offensive in a South-Easterly direction, Feldmarschall von Blomberg drew special attention to the strength of the Czechoslovakian fortifications, the building of which had assumed the character of a Maginot line and which would present extreme difficulties to our attack.

Generaloberst von Fritsch mentioned that it was the purpose of a study which he had laid on for this winter to investigate the possibilities of carrying out operations against Czechoslovakia with special consideration of the conquest of the Czechoslovakian system of fortifications; the Generaloberst also stated that owing to the prevailing conditions he would have to relinquish his leave abroad, which was to begin on 10 November. This intention was countermanded by the Fuhrer who gave as a reason that the possibility of the conflict was not to be regarded as being so imminent. In reply to the remark by the Minister for Foreign Affairs, that an Italian-English-French conflict be not as near as the Fuhrer appeared to assume, the Fuhrer stated that the date which appeared to him to be a possibility was summer 1938. In reply to statements by General-feldmarschall von Blomberg and Generaloberst von Fritsch regarding England and France's attitude, the Fuhrer repeated his previous statements and said that he was convinced of Britain's non-participation and that consequently he did not believe in military action by France against Germany. Should the Mediterranean conflict already mentioned lead to a general mobilization in Europe, then we should have to commence operations against Czechoslovakia immediately. If, however, the powers who are not participating in the war should declare their disinterestedness, then Germany would, for the time being, have to side with this attitude.

In view of the information given by the Fuhrer, General-oberst Goering considered it imperative to think of a reduction or abandonment of our military undertaking in Spain. The Fuhrer agreed to this in so far as he believed this decision should be postponed for a suitable date.

The second part of the discussion concerned material armament questions.

(SIGNED) HOSZBACH.

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TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 789-PS
OFFICE OF U.S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL.

Pencilled note: Duplicate

Nov. 23, 1939, 1200 hours. Conference with the Fuehrer, to which all Supreme Commanders are ordered. The Fuehrer gives the following speech:

The purpose of this conference is to give you an idea of the world of my thoughts, which takes charge of me, in the face of future events, and to tell you my decisions. The building up of our armed forces was only possible in connection with the ideological (weltanschaulich) education of the German people by the Party. When I started my political task in 1919, my strong belief in final success was based on a thorough observation of the events of the day and the study of the reasons for their occurrence. Therefore, I never lost my belief in the midst of set-backs which were not spared me during my period of struggle. Providence has had the last word and brought me success. On top of that, I had a clear recognition of the probably course of historical events, and the firm will to make brutal decisions. The first decision was in 1919 when I after long internal conflict became a politician and took up the struggle against my enemies. That was the hardest of all decisions. I had, however, the firm belief that I would arrive at my goal. First of all, I desired a new system of selection. I wanted to educate a minority which would take over the leadership. After 15 years, I arrived at my goal, after strenuous struggles and many set-backs. When I came to power in 1933, a period of the most difficult struggle lay behind me. Everything existing before that had collapsed. I had to reorganize everything beginning with the mass of the people and extending it to the armed forces. First reorganization of the interior, abolishment of appearance of decay and defeatist ideas, education to heroism. While reorganizing the interior, I undertook the second task; to release Germany from its international ties. Two particular characteristics are to be pointed out; secession from the League of Nations and denunciation of the disarmament conference. It was a hard decision. The number of prophets who predicted that it would lead to the occupation of the Rhineland was large, the number of believers was very small. I was supported by the nation, which stood firmly behind me, when I carried out my intentions. After that the order for rearmament. Here again there were numerous prophets who predicted misfortunes, and only a few believers. In 1935 the introduction of compulsory armed service. After that militarization of the Rhineland, again a process believed to be impossible at that time. The number of people who put trust in me, was very small. Then the beginning of the fortification of the whole country especially in the west.

One year later, Austria came, this step also was considered doubtful. It brought about a considerable reinforcement of the Reich. The next step was Bohemia, Moravia and Poland. This step also was not possible to accomplish in one campaign. First of all, the western fortification had to be finished. It was not possible to reach the goal in one effort. It was clear to me from the first moment that I could not be satisfied with the Sudeten-German territory. That was only a partial solution. The decision to march into Bohemia was made. Then followed the erection of the Protectorate and with that the basis for the action against Poland was laid, but I wasn't quite clear at that time whether I should start first against the east and then in the west or vice-versa. Moltke often made the same calculations in his time. Under pressure the decision came to fight with Poland first. One might accuse me of wanting to fight and fight again. In struggle I see the fate of all beings. Nobody can avoid a struggle if he does not want to lose out. The increasing number of people requires a larger living space (Lebensraum). My goal was to create a logical relation between the number of people and the space for them to live in. The struggle must start here. No people can get away from the solution of this task or else it must yield and gradually die out. That is taught by history. First migration of peoples to the southwest, then adaptation of the number of people to the small space by emigration. In the last years, adaptation of the people to insufficient space, by reducing the number of births. This would lead to the death and weakening of the blood of the people. If a people chooses that course all their weaknesses are mobilized. One yields to the force of the outside and uses this force against one's self by killing of the child. This means the greatest cowardice, decimation of the number, and loss of value. I decided a different way; adaptation of the living space to the number of people. One acknowledgement is important. The state has a meaning only if it supports the maintenance of its population potential. In our case 82 millions of people were concerned. That

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means the greatest responsibility. He who does not want to assume this responsibility is not worthy of belonging to the mass of the people. That gave me strength to fight. It is one eternal problem to bring the number of Germans to a proper relationship to the available space. Security of the needed space. No calculated cleverness is of any help, solution only with the sword. A people unable to produce the strength for fight, must withdraw. Struggles are different than those of 100 years ago. Today we can speak of a racial fight. Today we fight for oilfields, rubber, treasures of the earth, etc. After the peace of Westphalia Germany disintegrated. Disintegration, impotence of the German Reich was determined by decree. This German impotence was removed by the creation of the Reich when Prussia realized her task. Then the opposition between France and England began. Since 1870 England has been against us. Bismarck and Moltke were certain that there would have to be one more action. The danger at that time was of a two-front war. Moltke was at times in favour of a preventive war. To take advantage of the slow progress of the Russian mobilization. German armed might was not fully employed. Insufficient sternness of the leading personalities. The basic thought of Moltke was the offensive. He never thought of the defense. Many opportunities were missed after Moltke's death. The solution was only possible by attacking a country at a favourable moment. Political and military leadership always declared that it was not yet ready. In 1914 there came the war on several fronts. It did not bring the solution of these problems. Today the second act of this drama is being written. For the first time in 67 years it must be made clear that we do not have a two-front war to wage. That which has been desired since 1870 and considered as impossible of achievement has come to pass. For the first time in history we have to fight on only one front, the other front is at present free. But no one can know how long that will remain so. I have doubted for along time whether I should strike in the east and then in the west. Basically I did not organize the armed forces in order not to strike. The decision to strike was always in me. Earlier or later I wanted to solve the problem. Under pressure it was decided that the east was to be attacked first. If the Polish war was won so quickly, it was due to the superiority of our armed forces. The most glorious appearance in history. Unexpectedly small expenditures of men and material. Now the eastern front is held by only a few divisions. It is a situation which we viewed previously as unachievable. Now the situation is as follows: The opponent in the west lies behind his fortifications. There is no possibility of coming to grips with him. The decisive question is: how long can we endure this situation? Russia is at present not dangerous. It is weakened by many incidents today. Moreover, we have a pact with Russia. Pacts, however, are only so long as Russia considers it to be to her benefit. Even Bismarck thought so. Let one think of the pact to assure our back. Now Russia has far reaching goals, above all the strengthening of her position in the Baltic. We can oppose Russia only when we are free in the West. Further Russia is striving to increase her influence on the Balkans and is striving toward the Persoan Gulf. That is also the goal of our foreign policy. Russia will do that which she considers to benefit her. At the present moment it has retired from internationalism. In case she renounces this, she will proceed to Pan-Slavism. It is difficult to see into the future. It is a fact that at the present time the Russian army is of little worth. For the next one or two years the present situation will remain.

Much depends on Italy, above all on Mussolini, whose death could alter everything. Italy has a great goal for the consolidation of her empire. Those who carry this idea are fascism and the Duce, personally. The court is opposed to that. As long as the Duce lives, then it can be calculated that Italy will seize every opportunity to reach her imperialistic goal. However, it is too much to ask of Italy, that it should join in the battle before Germany has seized the offensive in the west: Just so Russia did not attack until we had marched into Poland. Otherwise Italy will think that France has only to deal with Italy, since Germany is sitting behind its West Wall. Italy will not attack until Germany has taken the offensive against France. Just as the death of Stalin, so the death of the Duce can bring danger to us. Just how easily the death of a statesman can come I myself have experienced recently. The time must be used to the full, otherwise one will suddenly find himself faced with a new situation. As long as Italy maintains this position then no danger from Jugoslavia is to be feared. Just so is the neutrality of Rumania achieved by the position of Russia. Scandinavia is hostile to us because of Marxistic influences, but is neutral now. America is still not dangerous to us because of its neutrality laws. The strengthening of our opponents by America is still not important. The position of Japan is still uncertain, it is

not yet certain whether she will join against England.

Everything is determined by the fact that the moment is favourable now, in 6 months it might not be so anymore.

As the last factor I must name my own person in all modesty: irreplaceable. Neither a military nor a civil person could replace me. Assassination attempts may be repeated. I am convinced of the powers of my intellect and of decision. Wars are always ended only be the destruction of the opponent. Everyone who believes differently is irresponsible. Time is working for our adversary. Now there is a relationship of forces which can never be more propitious, but can only deteriorate for us. The enemy will not make peace when the relationship of forces is unfavourable for us. No compromise. Sternness against ourselves. I shall strike and not capitulate. The fate of the Reich depends only on me. I shall deal accordingly. Today we have a superiority such as we have never had before. After 1914 our opponents disarmed themselves of their own accord. England disregarded the construction of her fleet. The fleet is no longer sufficiently large to safeguard the shipping lanes. Only two modern new constructions: Rodney and Nelson. New construction activity only in the cruisers of the Washington class, which were, however, an unsatisfactory type. The new measures can become effective only in 1941. In the Abyssinian war England did not have enough strength to occupy the Iona Sea. At Malta, Gibraltar and London little antiaircraft protection. Since 1937 a renewal of rearmament. At present however, only a small number of divisions, which must form the nucloue of new divisions. Material for the army being gathered together from all over the world. Not before next summer is a positive action to be expected. The British army has only a symbolic meaning. Rearmarent in the air is proceeding. The first phase will end in the spring of 1940. Anti-aircraft has only guns from the last war. A German flyer is safe from English anti-aircraft fire at 6000 meters altitude. The navy will not be fully rearmed before one to two years (1 - 2 Jahren). I have the greatest experience in rearmament and I know the difficulties which must be overcome therein.

After 1914 France reduced the length of service. After 1914 decrease of military might. Only in some special branches are we inferior. Only the French Navy was modernized. In the time after the war the French army deteriorated. There were no change until Germany rearmed and announced her demands.

In summary:

1) The number of active organizations in Germany is greatest.
2) Superiority of the Luftwaffe.
3) Anti-aircraft beyond all competition.
4) Tank corps.
5) Large number of anti-tank guns, five times as many as 1914 machine guns.
6) German artillery has great superiority because of the 10.5 gun.
7) French superiority in howitzers and mortars does not exist.

Numerical superiority, but also the value of the individual soldier is greater than for the others. I am most deeply pained when I hear the opinion that the German army is not individually as valuable as it should be. The infantry in Poland did not accomplish what one should have expected from it. Lax discipline. I believe that the soldiers must be judged in their relative value in comparison with the opponent. There is no doubt that our armed forces are the best. Every German infantryman is better that the French. Not the exhiliration of patriotism but tough determination. I am told that the troops will only advance if the officers lead the way. In 1914 that was also the case. I am told that we were better trained then. In reality we were only better trained on the drill field, but not for the war. I must pay the present leadership the compliment that it is better than it was in 1914. Mention of the collapse while storming Leige. There was nothing like this in the campaign in Poland.

Five million Germans have been called to the colours. Of what importance if a few of them collapse. Daring in the army, navy and Luftwaffe. I cannot bear it when one says the army is not in good shape. Everything lies in the hands of the military leader. I can do anything with the German soldier if he is well led. We have succeeded with our small navy in clearing the North Sea of the British. Recognition of the small navy, especially the High Command of the Navy.

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We have a Luftwaffe which has succeeded in safeguarding the entire living space of the Germans.

The land army achieved outstanding things in Poland. Even in the West it was not shown that the German soldier is inferior to the French.

Revolution from within is impossible. We are superior to the enemy numerically in the West. Behind the Army stands the strongestarmaments industry of the world.

I am disturbed by the stronger and stronger appearance of the English. The English are a tough enemy. Above all on defence. There is no doubt that England will be very much represented in France at the latest in six to eight months.

We have an Achilles heel: The Ruhr. The progress of the war depends on the possession of the Ruhr. If England and France push through Belgium and Holland into the Ruhr, we shall be in the greatest danger. That could lead to the paralizing of the German power of resistance. Every hope of compromise is childish: Victory of defeat! The question is not the fate of a national-socialistic Germany, but who is to dominate Europe in the future. The question is worthy of the greatest efforts. Certainly England and France will assume the offensive against Germany when they are armed. England and France have means of pressure to bring Belgium and Holland to request English and French help. In Belgium and Holland the sympathies are all for France and England. Mention of the incident at Venlo: The Man who was shot was not an Englishman, but a Dutch General Staff officer. This was kept silent in the press. The Dutch government asked that the body of the Dutch officer be given up. This is one of their greatest stupidities. The Dutch press does not even mention the incident anymore. At a given time I shall use that to motivate my action. If the French army marches into Belgium in order to attack us, it will be too late for us. We must anticipate them. One more thing. U-boat. Mines, and Luftwaffe (also for Mines) can strike England effectively, if we have a better starting point. Now a flight to England demands so much fuel that sufficient bomb loads cannot be carried. The invention of a new type mine is of greatest importance for the Navy. Aircraft will be the chief mine layers now. We shall sow the English coast with mines which cannot be cleared. This mine warfare with the Luftwaffe demands a different starting point. England cannot live without its imports. We can feed ourselves. The permanent sowing of mines on the English coasts will bring England to her knees. However, this can only occur if we have occupied Belgium and Holland. It is a difficult decision for me. None has ever achieved what I have achieved. My life is of no importance in all this. I have led the German people to a great height, even if the world does hate us now. I am setting this work on a gamble. I have to choose between victory or destruction. I choose victory. Greatest historical choice, to be compared with the decision of Friedrich the Great before the first Silesian war. Prussia owes its rise to the heroism of one man. Even there the closest advisers were disposed to capitulation. Everything depended on Friedrich the Great. Even the decisions of Bismarck in 1866 and 1870 were no less great. My decision is unchangeable. I shall attack France and England at the most favourable and quickest moment. Breach of the neutrality of Belgium and Holland is meaningless. No one will question that when we have won. We shall not bring about the breach of neutrality as idiotically as it was in 1914. If we do not break the neutrality, then England and France will. Without attack the war is not to be ended victoriously. I consider it as possible to end the war only by means of an attack. The question as to whether the attack will be successful no one can answer. Everything depends upon the favourable instant. The military conditions are favourable. A prerequisite however, is that the leadership must give an example of fanatical unity from above. There would not be any failures if the leaders always had the courage a rifleman must have.

Individual acknowledgements: The enemy must be beaten only by attack. Chances are different today than during the offensive of 1918. Numerically we can use more than 100 divisions. With respect to men, reserves can be supplied. The material situation is good. Moreover that which is not ready today must be ready tomorrow. The whole thing means the end of the World War, not just a single action. It concerns not just a single question but the existence or non-existence of the nation.

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I ask you to pass on the spirit of determination to the lower echelons.

1) The decision is irrevocable.
2) The only prospect for success, if the whole armed forces are determined.

The spirit of the great men of our history must hearten us all. Fate demands from us no more than from the great men of German history. As long as I live I shall think only of the victory of my people. I shall shrink from nothing and shall destroy everyone who is opposed to me. I have decided to live my life so that I can stand unashamed if I have to die. I want to destroy the enemy. Behind me stands the German people, whose morale can only grow worse. Only he who struggles with destiny can have a good intuition. In the last years I have experienced many examples of intuition. Even in the present development I see the prophecy.

If we come through this struggle victoriously - and we shall come through victoriously - our time will enter into the history of our people. I shall stand or fall in this struggle. I shall never survive the defeat of my people. No capitulation to the outside forces, no revolution from the interior forces.

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CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO.789-PS

3 October 1945.

I, FRED NIEBERGALL, 2nd Lt Inf, 0-1335567, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document 789-PS.

FRED NIEBERGALL
2nd Lt Inf.
0-1335567

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CONFIDENTIAL.

THE STRATEGIC POSITION AT THE BEGINNING OF THE 5TH YEAR OF WAR.

A lecture delivered by the Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces on the 7th November, 1943 at MUNICH to the Reich and Gau- Leaders.

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Original

The Strategic Position in the beginning of the 5th Year of War

Lecture
by the Chief of the General
Staff of the Armed Forces to
the Reichs - and Gau- leaders, delivered
in MUNICH on 7 Nov 1943.

Introduction

Reichs leader BORMANN has requested me to give you a review to-day of the strategic position in the beginning of the 5th Year of War.

I must admit that it was not without hesitation that I untertook this none too easy task. It is not possible to do it justice with a few generalities. It is not necessary to say what will be, but it is necessary to say openly what is. No-one - the FUEHRER has ordered - may know more or be told more than he needs for
2 own immediate task, but I have no doubt at all in my mind, Gentlemen, but that you need a great deal in order to be able to cope with your tasks. It is in your GAUS, after all, and among their inhabitants that all the enemy propaganda, the defeatism, and the malicious rumours concentrate that try to find themselves a plan among our people. Up and down the country the devil of subversion strides. All the cowards are seeking a way out, or - as they call it - a political solution. They say, we must negotiate while there is still something in hand, and all these gaus are made use of to attack the natural sense of the people that in this war there can only be a fight to the end. Capitulation is the end of the Nation, the end of Germany. Against this wave of enemy propaganda and cowardice you need more than force. You need to know the true situation and for this reason I believe that I am justified in giving you a perfectly open and uncoloured account of the state of affairs. This is no forbidden disclosure of secrets, but a weapon which may perhaps help you to fortify the morale of the people. For this war will not only be decided by force of arms but by the will to resist of the whole people. Germany was broken in 1918 not at the front but at
3. home. Italy suffered not military defeat but morale defeat. She broke down internally. The result has been not the peace she expected but - through the cowardice of these criminal traitors - a fate a thousand times harder than continuation of the war at our side would have brought to the Italian people. I can rely on you, Gentlemen, that since I give concrete figures and data concerning our own strength, you will treat these details as your secret; all the rest is at your disposal without restriction for application in your activities as leaders of the people.

I

4 The necessity and objectives of this war were clear to all and everyone at the moment when we entered upon the War of Liberation of Greater Germany and by attacking parried the danger which menaced us both from Poland and from the Western powers. Our further incursions into Scandinavia, in the direction of the Mediterranean and in that of Russia - these also aroused no doubts concerning the general conduct of the war so long as we were successful. It was not until more serious set-backs were encountered and our general situation began to become increasingly acute, that the German people began to ask itself whether perhaps we had not undertaken more than we could do and set our aims too high. To provide an answer to this questioning and to furnish you with certain points of view for use in your own explanatory activities is one of the main points of my present lecture. I shall divide it into three parts :

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I A review of the most important questions of development up to the present.

II Consideration of the present situation.

III The foundations of our morale and our confidence in victory.

In view of my position as military adviser to the Führer I shall confine myself in my remarks to the problems of my own personal sphere of action, fully appreciating at the same time that in view of the protean nature of this war, I shall in this way be giving expression only to one side of events.

6. I. Review

1. The fact that the National-Socialist movement and its struggle for internal power were the preparatory stage of the outer liberation from the bonds of the Dictate of Versailles is not one on which I need enlarge in this circle. I should like however to mention at this point how clearly all thoughtful regular soldiers realise what an important part has been played by the National-Socialist movement in re-awakening the will to fight ("WEHRWILLEN"), in nurturing fighting strength ("WEHRKRAFT") and in rearming the German people. In spite of all the virtue inherent in it, the numerically small REICHSWEHR would never have been able to cope wi this task, if only because of its own restricted radius of action. Indeed what the Fuhrer aimed at - and has so happily been successful in bringing about - was the fusion of these two forces.

7. 2. The seizure of power in its turn had meant in the first place the restoration of fighting sovereignty ("WEHRHOHEIT") (conscription, occupation of the Rhineland) and re-armament with special emphasis being l on the creation of a modern armoured and air arm.

3. The Austrian "Anschluss", in its turn, brought with it not only the fulfilment of an old national aim but also had the effect both of reinforcing our fighting strength and of materially improving our strategic position Whereas up till then the territory of Czechoslovakia had projected in a most menacing way right into Germany (a wasp waist in the direction of France and an air base for the Allies, in particular Russia), Czechoslovakia herself was now enclosed by pincers. Its own strategic position had now become so unfavourable that she was bound to fall a victi to any attack pressed home with rigour before effective aid from the WEST could be expected to arrive.

8. This possibility of aid was furthermore made more difficult by the construction of the WEST WALL, which in contra-distinction to the MAGINOT Line, was not a measure based on debility and resignation but one intended to afford rear cover or an active policy in the EAST.

4. The bloodless solution of the Czech conflict in the autumn of 1938 and spring of 1939 and the annexation of Slovakia rounded off the territory of Greater Germany in such a way that it now became possible to consider the Polish problem on the basis of more or less favourable strategic premises.

9. 5. This brings me to the actual outbreak of the present war, and the question which next arises is whether the moment for the struggle with Poland - in itself unavoidable - was favourably selected or not. The answer to this all the less in doubt since the opponent - after all not inconsiderable in itself - collapsed unexpectedly quickly, and the Western Powers who were his friends, while they did declare war on us and form a second front, yet for the rest made no use of the possibilities open to them of snatching the initiative from our hands. Concerning the course taken by the Polish campaign, nothing further need be said

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beyond that it proved in a measure which made the whole world sit up and take notice a point which up till then had not been certain by any means, i.e., the high state of efficiency of the young Armed Forces of Greater Germany.

e 10. 6. The main effect of this success was however that we now had no opponent in the EAST and that in view of the agreements with Russia the ' front problem might be regarded as for the time being solved.

7. As a result of all this the point of gravity in the conduct of the war naturally shifted to the WEST where the most urgent task was clearly defined as the protection of the RUHR area from the invasion of Holland by the British and French. Even before the Polish campaign had been concluded the FUHRER had already decided upon an attack against this enemy the aim of which could only be complete subjection of the opponent. The circumstance that this decision was not carried out - as originally planned - i.e. in the late autumn of 1939 - was mainly due to weather conditions but in part also influenced by our situation with regard to armaments.

11. 8. In the meantime however we were confronted by yet another problem which must be settled promptly: the occupation of Norway and Denmark. The point here lay in opening up a theatre of War which while it lay outside the zone of immediate danger yet possessed two-fold importance from the point of view of our general conduct of the war. In the first place there was danger that England would seize Scandinavia and thereby besides effecting a strategic encirclement from the NORTH would stop the import of iron and nickel which was of such importance to us for war purposes, Secondly, it was realisation of our own maritime necessities which made i imperative for us to secure for ourselves free access to the ATLANTIC by number of air and naval support points, here too, therefore, defensive an offensive requirements combined toform an indissoluble whole.

The course and conclusion of this campaign are known. In the main it was completed in such good time that it was possible to start upon the campaign in the WEST with the setting in of the most favourable season of the year, in May 1940.

12. 9. The decisive success of this campaign improved our position in the best possible way. We gained possession not only of the French potential of armaments - destined to do us important service in the furth course of the war - but above all the entire ATLANTIC Coast fell into our hands with its naval ports and air support points Direct threat to the British Motherland had by this means become possible.

The question now arose whether or not we should carry the war int England by a landing on the grand scale. Furthermore - in view of the possible eventuality of the USA entering the war - it was necessary to take into consideration the occupation of a number of advanced support points in the ATLANTIC (for instance, Iceland and the AZORES on
13. which in the meantime the enemy had laid his hand). From these islands we should be able both to carry on particularly effectively the fight against British supplies and to defend the territory of Europe in exactly the same way as Japan now holds Greater East Asia secure by means of its island advanced bases in the Pacific. However, very wisely the FUHRER refrained from adopting these objectives. Not alone their initial execution but the subsequent maintenance of communications by sea would have involved a measure of strength which our naval and air equipment coul not have provided permanently.

10. Instead of these considerations the winter of 1940/41. provided another opportunity of combating England. Although outwardly our action only took the form of aid to our Italian Ally, yet ultimately the point at issue was British command of the seas in the Mediterranean which inits turn represented a heavy menace to the Southern flank of the European continent.

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In a measure as the weakness and failure of Italy became more
o 14 and more manifest, as North Africa became more and more a German theatre of War. Employing our forces in this way - incidentally, no great force was involved - appeared to be all the more justified since by this means strong British land, sea, and air forces, and a very considerable tonnage in the way of sea-transport would be kept tied down, away from German "living space".

11. What was however less acceptable was the necessity of affording our assistance as an Ally in the Balkans in consequence of the 'extra-turn' of the Italians against Greece. The attack which they launched in the autumn of 1940 from Albania with totally inadequate means was contrary to all agreement but in the end led to a decision on our part which - taking a long view of the matter - would have become necessary in any case sooner or later. The planned attack on Greece from the NORTH was not executed merely as an operation in aid of an ally. Its real purpose was to prevent the British from gaining a foothold in Greece and from menacing our Roumanian oil area from that Country.

o 15 12 Parallel with all these developments realisation was steadily grow of the danger drawing constantly nearer from the Bolshevik East - that danger which has been only too little perceived in Germany and latterly, for diplomatic reasons, had deliberately to be ignored. However, the FUHRER himself has always kept this danger steadily in view and even as far back as during the Western Campaign had informed me of his fundamental decision to take steps against this danger the moment our military position made it at all possible.

13 Following on the interlude of the overthrow in Yugoslavia, the Balkan campaign which followed this, and our occupation of CRETE, this decision was translated into action. If put into effect at all, it had of necessity to take us deep into Russian territory - a circumstance entailing dangers to an extent not yet encountered in our previous campaigns.

16 14. In spite of the fact that we were not able either in 1941 nor in 1942 completely to annihilate the enemy's fighting forces and thereby to force Russia to her knees, yet we can definitely claim it as a positive result that the Bolshevist danger has been driven back far from our own frontiers.

If to-day, in view of the repeated and prolonged setbacks of the year 1943, the question comes up again and again, whether we had not thoroughly under-estimated the strength of the Bolshevik opponent, the answer to this question in regard to the execution of individual part-operations, may certainly be said to be 'Yes'. But as regards the decision to attack as a whole and that of holding on to this decision for a long as possible there can be no doubts. As in politics so in the conduct of war - the issue is not merely one of arithmetical sums, and one of the most important lessons taught by war is that correct estimation of the opponent is one of the hardest of all hard tasks,
17 and that even when everything has been correctly summed up, there still remains much that is imponderable and only becomes clear in the course of the battle itself.

One clarification of the situation is however to be perceived in that, as a result of our advance into the dark unknown which is Russia, we have taken the measure not only of the strength in personnel involved but also of a standard of equipment which has forced us in our turn to institute a state of totalitarian warfare and a technical counter-blast such as left to ourselves we were hardly likely to have produced. One can only think with a shudder of what would have happened if we had adopted a waiting attitude in the fact of this danger and, sooner or later, had been taken by it by surprise.

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15. Within the framework of this short sketch of the sweep of our strategy all that remains to mention is the occupation of TUNIS effected as a counter-measure to the landing of Anglo-American forces on the NORTH and WEST coasts of French North Africa, the rapid loss again of which position is probably specially likely to evoke doubt in the correctness of our wider strategy.

Taking it all in all, however, fighting along the periphery has built up for us a capital sum of space which we are now living upon.

e 19. In recapitulation, a brief summary of the course of the great tactical events up to the autumn of 1943:

The first two years of war saw Germany and its later Allies running a victorious course almost unparalleled in history. The campaigns in Poland, Norway, France, in North Africa, in the Balkans, and the attack on Russia as far as the DONETZ, up to the gates of MOSCOW and up to the VOLKHOV created a wide forefield for the defence of Europe and as a result of the occupation and making safe of rich areas of raw materials and food, provided the premises for a long war. Superior leadership, better employment of the modern means of war, a superior air arm and the exceptionally high fighting value and morale of our troops faced by opponents inferior on each of these counts have produced these successes. Nevertheless, during this period of the war, in which our superiority on land was undisputed and our superiority in the air was to make good; at all events in the coastal districts, our hopeless inferiority at sea, in our last grasp at the palm of victory success has eluded us. The landing in England, prepared for down to the smallest detail but with improvised transport resources only, could not be dared while the British Air arm had not been completely beaten. And this we were not able to do, just as we have not been able completely to shat the Soviet Armed Forces. Later generations will not be able to reproach with not having dared the utmost and spared no effort to achieve these aims which would have decided the war.

e 20.

But no one could take it upon himself to allow the German air arm to bleed to death in the Battle of Britain in view of the struggle which lay before us against Soviet Russia.

In the EAST however the natural catastrophe of the winter of 194 imposed an imperative halt on even the sternest resolution.

(Passage struck out)

Our third objective, that of drawing Spain into the war on our side and thereby creating the possibility of seizing GIBRALTAR, was wrecked by the resistance of the Spanish or, better say, Jesuit Foreign Minister, SERANO SUNJER.

e 21 It therefore became clear that we could no longer count upon an early end to the war, but that it would be hard and difficult and confront the whole nation with great hardships +.

After the first set-backs on the Eastern front and in the North African theatre of war in the winter of 1943, the Reich and its Allies once again gathered together all their strength in order to defeat this

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+ For as says CLAUSEWITZ - every attack which does not lead either to an armistice or to peace must of necessity end in defence.

692.

H1151 - 0098

Eastern opponent finally by a new assault and to deprive the British of their Egyptian base of operations. The great operation against the CAUCASUS and the DELTA of the NILE failed, however, owing to insufficient strength and inddequate supplies. For the first time our Western opponents showed themselves to be superior both on the technical side and numerically in the air over the Mediterranean. The Soviet Russian Command also continued to stabilise the front at STALINGRAD and before the CAUCASUS, and after that in wintertime using newly-formed strong reserves continued to break-through the petrified over-extended fronts on the VOLGA and along the DON - largely occupied moreover by the troops
e 22 of our Allies. The 6th Army, consisting of the best German formations, inadequately supplied and exposed to the storms of winter, succumbed to enemy superiority.

Similarly, the Western Powers were able to bring together in Egypt a concentration of land, sea and air forces which held us up at the very gates of Egypt and after the battle of EL ALAMEIN forced us to retreat, and finally, following on the landing of strong Anglo-American armies in French North Africa, to surrender the entire African position. Again some of the best German divisions fell a victim to the stranglehol of a superior enemy air force on our supplies by sea, although not before they had won for us a certain gain in time which was worth every sacrifi

At the end of the winter fighting of 1942/43 and after the loss the African Army the armed forces of Germany and her Allies were strained to the utmost. It proved possible to re-form the 5th Armoured Army and the 6th Army - but four allied armies were lost for good.

The tactical reserves in the EAST would, it is true be exceptionally well equipped, but their numbers would not longer be increased to such a pitch as to make it possible to envisage any extensive operations.
e 23 Gone was the great mobility of the Army and excepting on the Russian theatre of war, gone also our superiority in the air. The superior economic strength of our opponents and their greater reservoir of manpower, concentrated to form a point of gravity against Europe, was beginning to tell. The complete failure of Italy in all domains and the absence of any munitions production worthy of the name among our other Allies could not be adequately compensated by the tremendous efforts made by Germany.

Of necessity therefore the initiative was bound to pass over to the opposing side and the Reich, and the European nations fighting at Germany's side, to go over to the defensive.

So when the positions pushed out beyond the European front to the SOUTH had been taken by the enemy, in July 1943, the enemy attack started: in the EAST to regain the territories lost there and in the SOU against Fortress Europe proper at its weakest point. In the meantime
e 24 the air arms of the Anglo-Americans had already begun the grand assault on the production hearths and morale of our people at home.

In the Far East Japan's struggle has developed on much the same lines, with the difference, however, that the Japanese had pushed their advanced positions very much further away from the Motherland proper and Anglo-Saxons did not here undertake any attacks on a large-scale for the reason that they had directed their point of gravity against Europe.

e 25

II

It was at this stage of the war thatthe Italian betrayal took place. Its main features will be known to you from what appeared in the press, Actually it was even more dramatic than the newspapers showed. For the Supreme Command it was perhaps one of the hardest problems which it had as yet had to master. That the removal and arrest of the DUCE could not end otherwise than by the defection of Italy was completely cl to the FUEHRER from the first, although many politically less well-trained eyes thought to see in it rather an improvement in our position in the Mediterranean and our co-operation with the Italians. There were many personages at this time who failed to understand the Fuhrer's GHQ in its political and military actions. For these were directed towards

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overthrowing the new Government and liberating the DUCE. Only the smallest possible circle might know of this. On the military side in the meantime everything was to be done to stop enemy penetration of the Southern front as far SOUTH as possible, i.e. on SICILY.

26. That the enemy would bring this point of gravity to bear on some point further WEST in the Mediterranean - of that there was not the slightest doubt; the distributioh of his shipping and landing space made this clear. Where however would this point be? On SARDINIA, on CORSICA, in APULIA, in CALABRIA, or - if the thesis of betrayal were true - why not in ROME itself, or near LEGHORN or GENOA? If he did not do this, then our job was to hold as much of Italy as possible in orde not to let the base of the enemy succeed in landing in North Italy, then all the German formations in Central and Southern Italy would be lost. Moreover no grounds must be given which might serve the Italians as a
27 moral prêtext for their betrayal, or by premature hostile action to commit the betrayal ourselves. In the meantime the traitors simply oozed with amiability and assurances of faith, and even got as far as to make some of officers who came into contact with them daily doubtful of the truth of th betrayal-hypothesis. This was nothing to be wondered at, for to the German officers such depths of infamy were imply incomprehensible.

The situation became more and more difficult. It was perhaps the only time in this war when at times I myself hardly knew what I should suggest to the FUHRER. The measures to be taken in the event of open betrayal had been decided in every detail. The watchword "Axis" would set them in motion. In the meantime however all the divisions, which the FUHRER at once caused to be moved from the WEST to Upper Italy, were operatively idle there - and that at a time when the EAST front, subjected to severe assault, was begging for reserves more urgently than ever.

How much meanwhile we had been able to find out through our troops and through the bordering GAU'S - keen as sleuth-hounds on the track of It. machinations - in the matter of manifestly hostile actions and preparation
28. is known to you all. However somehow or other the Italians explained it all way, either as a misunderstanding or with excuses.

In this insupportable position the FUHRER agreed to slash through the Gordian knot by a political and military ultimatum. Then on the morning of the 7 September the enemy landing fleet appeared at SALERNO and the afternoon of September 8th news of the Italian capitulation flew throu the ether. Even now however, at the last moment, the freedom of action of the Command was still held up: the Italians refused to admit the authenticity of the wireless message. The password itself therefore would not be given but only the 'stand-by' for the troops, until at last at 19.15 this most monstrous of all betrayals in history was confirmed by the Italian political authorities themselves. What followed was both a drama and a tragedy. Only at a later date will it be possible gather together and set forth all the grotesque details. The more disillusioned the troops and the German Command, the harder the reaction.

General Outcome :

Appendix

H1151 - 0100

According to my experience, there is yet another anxiety stalking the land. It concerns the morale of our own Allies and the fear that yet other, as yet neutral states, might join the ranks of our enemies. At this point of course, I enter upon the ticklish question of foreign policy which is not my business and which I will traverse as speedily as possible.

Of the neutral countries, we are not loved by Sweden and Switzerland. The latter is surrounded, of no danger to us from the military point of view, and will not harm us. She lives on our bounty and we benefit from her.

The same does not apply to Sweden In the last few years she has been arming hard, and possesses 12 - 14 Infantry divisions, 3 - 4 armoured brigades, and in addition a few cyclist brigades, in all 400,000 men under arms. Sweden sways between fear of Bolshevism and hope of British-American aid. This latter is far away for as long as we in the SKAGERRAK cut off Sweden's contact with England.

Should an enemy landing in Norway or Denmark prove successful, Sweden may become dangerous - but not before.

Spain and Portugal have decided to remain neutral. They have not the necessary strength to defend themselves against England and America. Everything depends therefore on the good will of our Western opponents as to the measure in which they recognise this neutrality. Latest events in Portugal have shown this. I do not believe however that it is in the interest of the ANGLO-SAXONS either for political or militaryreasons to unleash war on the Iberian Peninsula and that is what would undoubtedly happen were Spain to be attacked. Whether the simpler methods of political disintegration which are at present being employed will be successful is doubtful, at all events in the case of Spain.

TURKEY so far has maintained a clear policy of neutrality. Its ideal would have been agreement between England and Germany and consequently reliable security against her traditional enemy : Russia. However, the closer the Soviet Power approaches the Balkans, the more England - in order to win the war - enters into the tow of the Bolshevists, the more difficult the position of Turkey becomes, for against Soviet Russia and England she cannot possibly maintain her neutrality - Attack by surprise on the part of Turkey against the Axis powers is not to be expected. No more likely however is it that England should allow the Dardanelles to pass into the hands of the Soviet Russia and so lose her own safety in the Mediterranean which is her aim. Nevertheless even if England were merely to occupy the Dardanelles, this would at once be regarded by the Soviets as a hostile act. Turkey's future attitude is dominated by this problem of 'Haute Politique'. She is able to maintain her neutrality thanks to the diverging interests of Soviet Russia and the Western Powers. Expansionist plans she has none, not even against BULGARIA.

32. Our own Allies on the other hand are united and kept at our side by the fear of Bolshevism. That is understandable, for no people fights for another but only for its own existence.

Concerning the forces internal morale of Finland and Bulgaria there can be no doubt.

Roumania contains two worlds, the rigorous policy faithful to the alliance with us looks two ways.+) We must be clear with ourselves as to that.

+ Translator's note : JODL says literally : "stands on 2 eyes".

H1151-0101

In Hungary, as a feudal state on the old pattern, social contrasts are still present in their most acute form. The country is therefore particularly liable to infection with the Communist idea. In no city in Europe however does this fact appear to be less recognised than in BUDAPEST. In that city a dissolute and strongly JUDAIFIED society strate is living and dancing on a volcano. However in contra distinction to Italy, here the main mass of the officer caste at least has recognised the danger. For the present at all events for Hungary there is no political way out.

Japan : There a heroic people is fighting for its existence just as we are. From the political-strategic point of view a great gap yawns in the Far East in the clear line of the fronts. ROOSEVELT and CHURCHILL want Russia to join in the fight against Japan. We ourselves, from the purely military point of view, would be glad to see the Manchurian Armies cross the AMUR or advance against VLADIVOSTOK. But on this point both the Asiatic powers stop their ears to the syren songs of the West. The reasons for this do not lie solely in the supplementary military burdens which both States would have to take upon themselves by such a decision, but more probably in their own long-term political considerations. For why should Japan start a war against Russia for as long as can be certain that there will be no American-British air base at VLADIVOSTOK and while on the distant horizon there still looms large a conflict of the Western powers against Soviet Russia?

VI

34 Leaving the slippery ground of politics, I now turn to the problem which confronts the High Command to-day and will confront it in the near future. We are fighting along the inner line, that is, we are in a position to transfer strong forces from one theatre of war to another in a much shorter time. Our great successes in the East in 1917/18 and in Italy in 1917 we owe to able exploitation of the inner line. To-day this tactical advanta e of the inner line is not so marked; at the moment the enemy is so strong on all fronts that in spite of our shorter lines of communication we are scarcely in a position to produce more than local superiority. This state of affairs may change if the Anglo-Saxons take steps to form a second or third front in addition to the Italian. At the present time,
35 however, the hardest task of all of the Command is to distribute its forces throughout the theatre of war as a whole in such a way that we may be sufficiently strong as those points at which the enemy delivers the blow. Moreover, it must be borne in mind that we are not in a position rapidly to reinforce the South-East, or Finland, or Norway, because the necessary technical facilities are not present there. We have won advanced positions in Finland, Norway, Denmark, in the West, in Italy and in the South-East in order to keep the core of the Reich itself alive. The same reasons which compelled us to take these positions also compel us now, at this particular time, when the superior range of the enemy air arm is inflicting grave injury to the centre of the Reich, to maintain them. To do so a certain measure of strength is necessary. That things are getting warm on the East front, must be admitted; however no success gained by the enemy is directly fatal there, with the exception of the loss of the Roumanian oil region. None the less the Command cannot close its eyes to the fact that the brand is now held in readiness at some time or another to start a conflagration in the West which if not extinguished then and there will pass beyond control.

e 36.

It is at this point the various fronts ceaselessly drag on the nerves and decisions of the FUHRER. STEGEMANN once put this into words as follows : "In war there is always the same conflict : the swing between spending and saving the forces accumulated. This has been and still is a problem not easy to solve. War with its unpredictabilities its intangible dynamics and its fluctuations of luck and chance cannot be determined beforehand. He who expends everything on one throw may later on, as the result of circumstances, be left with empty hands, and he who expends his accumulated forces sparingly may, as the result of circumstances, never come to win the upper hand. Only he who is able to solve this problem is able to master war. One thing however has always been so, namely, that whatever may be done must be done with all one's might if it is to pay. That is the only rule which in war has never failed."

ge 37

Where the enemy will strike to obtain that decision, we do not know. He has jumping-off base in the Mediterranean and a jumping-off base in England.

No theatre of war can be weakened below a certain level. Our uttermost efforts can therefore only take the form of creating, in spite of all our manpower problems, new tactical central reserves over and above the necessary minimum of occupying forces. That is now being done (Appendix).

This however brings us to the next difficult problem which always arises in every long war : the interplay and conflict between the need for soldiers at the front and the need for workers at home. Never before has this problem presented itself in so acute a form as in this highly mechanized war. Herewith a few figures (Appendix).

How therefore is the Command to decide? The front needs soldiers and the front needs weapons. Many weapons, and the better weapons the higher the value attached to the life of the fighting man himself.

If we had not the FUHRER at the head with sovereign rights of decision there would be black murder done on this question. One thing however is sure : it is a crime to keep a man able to bear arms working at home if he can be replaced by some other worker or if his work is

e 38

not vital. Fortunately Italy's betrayal has its good side in this question. The flow of military internees and workers from Italy will afford considerable relief in this domain.

This dilemma of man-power shortage has led to the idea of making more thorough use of the man-power reserves in the territories occupied by us. Here right thinking and wrong thinking are mixed up together. I believe that in so far as concerns labour, everything has been done that could be done. But where this has not yet been achieved, it appeared to be more favourable politically not to have recourse to measures of compulsion, exchanging for these order and economic aid. In my opinion however the time has now come to take

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steps with remorseless vigour and resolution in Denmark, Holland, France and Belgium also to compel thousands of idlesto carry out the fortification work which is more important than any other work. The necessary orders for this have already been given.

The question of recruiting alien peoples as fighting men should however be examined with the greatest caution and scepticism. There was a time when something in the nature of a neurosis emanated from the East Front with the slogan "Russia can be conquered+) only by Russians".

+) In the typescript the word was typed as 'liberated'. This has been scratched out in favour of 'conquered'.

H1151-0102

H1151-0103

Many heads were haunted by the notion of an immense VLASJOV army. At that time we recruited over 160 battalions. Our experiences were good while we were ourselves attacking successfully. They became bad when the position changed for the worse and we were compelled to retreat. To-day only about 100 Eastern battalions are available and hardly one of these is in the East. One Cossack and one TURKMEN division are at the moment undergoing their test by fire in the South-East. At the moment the Reichfuhrer of the SS is engaged in draining the defensive resources of Estonia and Latvia as well as the Croatian, Moslem and Macedonian manpower supplies.

e 40

However, what weighs most heavily to-day on the home front and consequently by reaction on the front line also, are the enemy terror raids from the air on our homes and so on our wives and children. In this respect the war - and this cannot be repeated often enough - has assumed forms solely through the fault of England such as are believed to be no longer possible since the days of the racial and religious wars.

The effect of these terror raids, psychological, moral, and material, is such that they must be relieved if they cannot be made to cease completely. It is true that they - like any other great trouble - has had some good effects. In face of the ruins of one's own possessions all social problems, all enviousness and all the petty impulses of the human soul die down. But this is no consolation for us. Asking too much of our air arm and inability on the technical side to keep pace with the aircraft development and radio location of our enemies have brought us to this pass. The efforts of the FUHRER and the Reichs Marshal will overcome this crisis also. The first beginnin s and first fruits are there. We shall counter the avy and powerful armament of the 4 engined ombers by speed and the annihilating effect of fire at long range. Our enemies have realized this danger and are endeavouring to meet it by destroying the hearths of production. It is enough if the enemy bombers can be made with absolute certainty in all day and night raids to lose 10 - 12% of the aircraft put in. They might perhaps replace this loss on the equipment side, but not in personnel; and above all the morale of the crews, most of whom have no idea for what they are fighting and who among the Americans are mainly materialists, will not hold out against it. I am fully convinced that thanks to our new weapons and technical progress the raids in close squadron formation which alone by means of their bomb carpets have been able to produce so annihilating an effect will not escape their fate.

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Nevertheless the greatest hopes of all have been stamped by the military command and the German people in U-boat warfare, and that with every right since within the framework of the general large-scale strategic defensive which we have been forced by the development of the war and the gradual coming into effect of the superior war potential of our enemies, submarine warfare may be regarded as the only offensive sector of the German command. Here too, in the activities of this weapon, heavy set backs have had to be recorded in the course of the last few months, set backs which have resulted in the successes of the tonnage war no longer being able to keep up with the rate at which the enemy is able to build his merchantmen. The reason for the decline in U-boat successes lies in the anti U-boat defence measures which the opponent has been driving forward with the uttermost energy, making use for this purpose of wide-scale support by the air arm and new highly efficient detector equipment together with high efficiency bombs and submarine weapons. The present crisis in the German U-boat war is therefore directly traceable to the enemy's air superiority over the Atlantic. This crisis must and will be overcome. The extraordinary importance of the tonnage war remains unassailable, as before. In the past it has afforded the greatest hindrance to all enemy plans of operation and it will continue in the future to present the greatest threat to

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H1151-0104

any future developments since all the continuous heavy transportation of men and equipment for the Anglo-Saxon Command and all supply for the armies employed in Europe and for England itself must come by sea. Elimination of the threat presented by the Tonnage-war would inevitably set free a vast enemy war potential for employment at other points.

On our side measures have been instituted, or are already being developed and driven forward with the almost resolution, with
ge 44 a view to breaking the enemy defence and bringing about a radical improvement in the fighting value of the U-boat.

There is every reason to believe that they will lead to success in the near future and in this way put an end to the present slackening in the U-boat war.

For the rest the C in C of the navy has himself given you an account in greater detail of the general situation in the U-boat war.

ge 45 VII

III. The grounds for our confidence in Final Victory.

When at the end of my considerations I come to sum up the general situation in a few words I am bound to describe it quite candidly as difficult, moreover I cannot gloss over the fact that I expect further severe crises. My own attitude towards these prospects I should like to characterise directly by the aphorism from FONTAINE :

> "Great times are always just those when everything seems to be going wrong, when every moment brings the fear: now its all done for. That's when it shows. Courage is good but sticking it out is better. Sticking it out, that's the main thing."

ge 46 In particular however our confidence is built up on a period of points of view to be set forth objectively. At the head comes the ethical and moral foundation of our struggle which gives its impress to the general attitude of the German people in the hands of its Command. The force of the revolutionary idea has not only made possible a series of unprecedented successes, it also enables our brave troops to achieve feats in defence and in retreat according to plan such perhaps the Russians but certainly no other people could achieve and which drive off into the realm of Utopia any hope on the part of our opponents for a military breakdown.

As against this moral, political and military tendencies of our opponents by no means from a closed uniformly directed whole. This shows most clearly in the fighting morale of the English and
e 47 Americans whose successes in Africa, Sicily and Italy are solely ascribable to the weakness and treachery of our Italian ally. Where they have met German force in battle, they have shown themselves inferior throughout and gained the advantage only as a result of multiple numerical advantage. This shows particularly clearly from the point of view of their conduct of the war, for according to our ideas it is totally incomprehensible that the Anglo-Americans should have avoided forming the Second Front in the WEST which their Russian allies have been demanding for over two years, and they have by no means extracted from their opportunities in Mediterranean that which according to the true state of affairs and by German standards of activity they might have extracted.

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Well, whatever comes, any further attack by our opponents whether in the NORTH or WEST, in Italy or in the Balkans - will place their readiness for action to a hard test. We ourselves could tell a tale from the struggle in North Africa what supply difficulties can mean and the sacrifices they may entail. And reports of the most various kinds from the camps of our opponents all point in the same direction, showing how difficult the reversion of these conditions is already being found by the enemy.

48

My most profound confidence is however based upon the fact that at the head of Germany there stands a man who by his entire development, his desires and striving can only have been destined by fate to lead our people into a brighter future. In defiance of all views to the contrary I must here testify that he is the soul not only of the political but also of the military conduct of the war and that the force of his willpower and the creative riches of his though animate and hold together the whole of the German Armed Forces, with respect to strategy, organization and munitions of war. Similarly the unity of political and military command which is so important is personified by him in a way such as has never been known since the days of Frederick the Great.

That no command is free of errors has often been said by the FUHRER himself, moreover the history of war - to use an aphorism of SCHLIEFFEN's - consists in general only of a series of errors and every war situation, naturally, can only be the product of errors.

49

What matters ultimately is contant readiness to act, the determination never to let oneself be beaten and always to stick to the enemy. That it is so now I am able to assure you from the bottom of my heart.

Further, as regards the part played by his collaborators, once again, as before, a quotation from CLAUSEWITZ which is not very generally known has been found true; "The most perfect General Staff with the most correct views and principles does not in itself represent perfect leadership of an Army, if the soul of a great General is missing."

It behoves us all therefore to crush down within ourselves all faint heartedness and by so doing to create within ourselves the foundations of that confidence out of which alone victory can grow. After all, the other fellow is just a bit more frightened still, and a war is only lost when it is given up.

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How this war will end, that no man can foretell. What imponderables it may yet bring with it, how many hopes may be disappointed and how many troubles may turn to the contrary, lies hidden in the darkness of the future. All that is sure is that we shall never cease to fight, for through the history of the world there run, like an iron law, progress and advance upward. In these Europe has led and at the head of Europe - Germany. A Europe under the whip of American Jews or Bolshevik commissars is unthinkable.

At this hour I would wish to testify not with the lips but from my deepest heart,

- That our trust and faith in the FUHRER is boundless.

H1151-0106

- that for us there is no higher law and no more holy duty than to fight to the last breath for the freedom of our people.

51

- that we will throw off all who are soft and forget their duties.

- that all the threats of our opponents only make us harder and more resolute.

- that we do cherish any false hopes that anyone else might save us from that Bolshevism which will sweep away all should Germany fall.

- that we ourselves will defend the ruins of our country to the last cartridge since it is a thousand times better to live among them than in servitude.

- that we shall win because we must win since otherwise world history would have lost all meaning.

Exhibit G.B. 38
Offered Dec. 6, 1945
Vide 27

TC 73.

OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS

concerning

POLISH - GERMAN and POLISH - SOVIET RELATIONS

1933 - 1939.

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The Polish White Book.

No.61.

M. Lipski, to M. Beck

Berlin, March 21. 1939.

I saw M. von Ribbentrop to-day. He began by saying he had asked me to call on him in order to discuss Polish-German relations in their entirety.

He complained about our Press, and the Warsaw students' demonstrations during Count Ciano's visit. He said the Chancellor was convinced that the poster in Danzig had been the work of Polish students themselves.[1] I reacted vigorously, asserting that this was a clear attempt to influence the Chancellor unfavourably to Poland.

He mentioned the question of Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia, which had particularly troubled Polish opinion, and stated that this question had been settled in conformity with Poland's wishes. This was to be communicated to you by Ambassador von Moltke. He spoke of the experts' negotiations on the Minority questions, and dwelt on the fact of the failure to reach agreement as to a joint communique.

At this point I interrupted him to correct his inaccurate statement.

Further, M. von Ribbentrop referred to the conversation at Berchtesgaden between you and the Chancellor, in which M. Hitler put forward the idea of guaranteeing Poland's frontiers in exchange for a motor road and the incorporation of Danzig in the Reich. He said that there had been further conversations between you and him in Warsaw on the subject, and that you had pointed out the great difficulties in the way of accepting these suggestions. He gave me to understand that all this had made an unfavourable impression on the Chancellor, since so far he had received no positive reaction whatever on our part to his suggestions. M. von Ribbentrop had had a talk with the Chancellor only yesterday. He stated that the Chancellor was still in favour of good relations with Poland, and had expressed a desire to have a thorough conversation with you on the subject of our mutual relations. M. von Ribbentrop indicated that he was under the impression that difficulties arising between us were also due to some misunderstanding of the Reich's real aims. The problem needed to be considered on a higher plane. In his opinion our two States were dependent on each other.

[1] Some days prior to the date of this conversation a poster had been put up in a cafe at Danzig, bearing the inscription: "Entry forbidden to Poles and dogs." This had caused protest demonstrations by Polish students.

H1151-0107

H1151-0108

It must not be forgotten that, by defeating Russia in the World War, Germany had been a contributory factor in the emergence of the Polish State. Obviously they could not forget the shedding of Polish blood, which they held in high honour. Subsequently, thanks to Chancellor Hitler's policy, General Schleicher's plan of German-Soviet collaboration had been smashed. That plan, which would have led to the annihilation of the Polish State, was defeated. It must also be remembered that Danzig and Pomorze had belonged to the Second Reich, and that only through Germany's breakdown had Poland obtained these territories.

At this point I remarked that it was not to be forgotten that before the Partitions these territories had belonged to Poland.

M. von Ribbentrop replied that it was difficult to appeal to purely historical conceptions, and he stressed that the ethnic factor was to-day of prime importance.

I remarked that Pomorze certainly was Polish, and alluded to the fact that in regard to the annexation of Bohemia and Moravia the Germans had used historical arguments.

M. von Ribbentrop recalled that after all Danzig was a German city, but he realized that in regard to the Danzig question Poland also was actuated by sentiment.

I corrected him by pointing out that in addition it was a vital necessity to Poland, to which M. von Ribbentrop remarked that that could be settled by way of a guarantee.

Discussing the guarantee which the Chancellor was prepared to give with respect to Poland's frontiers and Pomorze in particular, M. von Ribbentrop stressed the point that no previous German Government had been able to give such a guarantee.

In connection with Danzig, the motor road and the guarantee, M. von Ribbentrop also mentioned the question of Slovakia, indicating that conversations would be possible on this subject. He emphasized that obviously an understanding between us would have to include explicit anti-Soviet tendencies. He affirmed that Germany could never collaborate with the Soviets, and that a Polish-Soviet Understanding would inevitably lead to Bolshevism in Poland.

I stated that no Polish patriot would allow himself to be drawn towards Bolshevism. He said he realized that, but in this respect the Jewish element in Poland was a danger.

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Replying generally to M. von Ribbentrop's arguments, I pointed out that so far as our Press was concerned its tone was now quieter than that of any other country. M. von Ribbentrop retorted that he took no notice of the uproar in the British Press. That agitation was entirely without importance. He believed that the Fuehrer always followed the right policy.

Subsequently, I stressed the fact that since 1934 our public opinion had been put to considerable trials. Nevertheless it remained quiet. I recalled that we had adopted a completly understanding attitude on the question of realization of Germany's equality of rights. We had maintained the same attitude in regard to the Austrian problem. After the settlement of the Sudeten problem, the question of Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia had come up, and had clouded the atmosphere between our two countries.

H1151-0109

I stated that now, during the settlement of the Czecho-Slovakian question, there was no understanding whatever between us. The Czech issue was already hard enough for the Polish public to swallow, for, despite our disputes with the Czechs, they were after all a Slav people. But in regard to Slovakia the position was far worse. I emphasized our community of race, language and religion, and mentioned the help we had given in their achievement of independence. I pointed out our long frontier with Slovakia. I indicated that the Polish man in the street could not understand why the Reich had assumed the protection of Slovakia, that protection being directed against Poland. I said emphatically that this question was a serious blow to our relations.

M. von Ribbentrop reflected a moment, and then answered that this could be discussed.

I promised to refer to you the suggestion of a conversation between you and the Chancellor. M. von Ribbentrop remarked that I might go to Warsaw during the next few days to talk over this matter. He advised that the talk should not be delayed, lest the Chancellor should come to the conclusion that Poland was rejecting all his offers.

Finally, I asked whether he could tell me anything about his conversation with the Foreign Minister of Lithuania.

M. von Ribbentrop answered vaguely that he had seen M. Urbszys on the latter's return from Rome, and they had discussed the Memel question, which called for a solution.

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In view of the importance of this conversation I am sending this report through Prince Lubomirski.

Arising out of the conversation, I am prompted to make the following remarks:

The fact that M. von Ribbentrop said nothing on his own initiative about Memel suggests that his conversation with me to-day, proposing a fundamental exchange of views between you and the Chancellor, is perhaps aimed at securing our neutrality during the Memel crisis.

M. von Ribbentrop's suggestion of a conversation and his emphasis on its urgency are a proof that Germany has resolved to carry out her Eastern programme quickly, and so desires to have Poland's attitude clearly defined.

In these circumstances the conversation acquires very real importance, and must be carefully considered in all its aspects.

I assume that you will be desiring to summon me to Warsaw in a day or two in regard to this matter.

H1151-0110

(703) T.C. 53A.

Marginal Note to the law concerning the Reunion of the Memel Territory with the German Reich of 23 March 1939.

D. d.d. P. Vol. VII Pt.2 P. 552.
Note 2.

The transfer commissioner (Ueberleitungskommissar) for the Memel Territory, Gauleiter and Oberpresident Erich Koch, effected on 3 April 1939 during a conference at Memel the final incorporation of the late Memel Territory into the national-socialist party Gau of East Prussia and into the state administration of the East-Prussian Regierungsbezirk of Grunbinnen.

Exhibit GB 39
Filed Dec. 6, 1945

TC/72

Documents concerning German-Polish relations and the outbreak of Hostilities between Great Britain and Germany on September 3, 1939.

ANGLO-POLISH AGREEMENT

No. 17.

Statement by the Prime Minister in the House of Commons on March 31,1939

The Prime Minister (Mr. Chamberlain): The right hon. gentleman the leader of the Opposition asked me this morning whether I could make a statement as to the European situation. As I said this morning, His Majesty's Government have no official confirmation of the rumours of any projected attack on Poland and they must not, therefore, be taken as accepting them as true.

I am glad to take this opportunity of stating again the general policy of His Majesty's Government. They have constantly advocated the adjustment, by way of free negotiation between the parties concerned, of any differences that may arise between them. They consider that this is the natural and proper course where differences exist. In their opinion there should be no question incapable of solution by peaceful means, and they would see no justification for the substitution of force or threats of force for the method of negotiation.

As the House is aware, certain consultations are now proceeding with other Governments. In order to make perfectly clear the position of His Majesty's Government in the meantime before those consultations are concluded, I now have to inform the House that during that period, in the event of any action which clearly threatened Polish independence, and which the Polish Government accordingly considered it vital to resist with their national forces, His Majesty's Government would feel themselves bound at once to lend the Polish Government all support in their power. They have given the Polish Government an assuarance to this effect.

I may add that the French Government have authorised me to make it plain that they stand in the same position in this matter as do His Majesty's Government.

H1151-0111

Exhibit GB 40
Filed Dec. 6, 1945
vide Ex. 39

Documents concerning German-Polish relations and the outbreak of Hostilities between Great Britain and Germany on September 3, 1939.

TC/72

No. 18

Anglo-Polish communique.. issued on April 6, 1939

The conversations with M. Beck have covered a wide field and shown that the two Governments are in complete agreement upon certain general principles.

It was agreed that the two countries were prepared to enter into an agreement of a permanent and reciprocal character to replace the present temporary and unilateral assurance given by His Majesty's Government to the Polish Government. Pending the completion of the permanent agreement, M. Beck gave His Majesty's Government an assurance that the Polish Government would consider themselves under an obligation to render assistance to His Majesty's Government under the same conditions as those contained in the temporary assurance already given by His Majesty's Government to Poland.

Like the temporary assurance, the permanent agreement would not be directed against any other country but would be designed to assure Great Britain and Poland of mutual assistance in the event of any threat, direct or indirect, to the independence of either. It was recognised that certain matters, including a more precise definition of the various ways in which the necessity for such assistance might arise, would require further examination before the permanent agreement could be completed.

It was understood that the arrangements above mentioned should not preclude either Government from making agreements with other countries in the general interest of the consolidation of Peace.

1422.

H1151-0112

Exhibit G.B. 41
Filed Dec. 6, 1945

(SEC-24.6/C-120)/A

C120

H1151-0113

DIRECTIVES FROM HITLER AND KEITEL PREPARING FOR WAR AND THE INVASION OF POLAND.

Not part of document

(Extracts from a file containing Directives with detailed Annexes. The Directives are mostly translated in full. The Annexes, owing to their length, are given mostly in the form of precis. The extracts are supplemented by C-126).

1. Translation of document signed by KEITEL.

Top Secret
Officer Only

The High Command of the Armed Forces
WFA Nr. 37/39 Top Secret Officer Only L Ia

Berlin, 3rd April 1939

SUBJECT : Directive for the Armed Forces 1939/40

5 copies
2nd. Copy

The Directive for the Uniform Preparation of War by the Armed Forces for 1939/40 is being re-issued.

Part I ("Frontier Defence") and Part III ("Danzig") will be issued in the middle of April. Their basic principles remain unchanged.

Marginal note in ink 'Attached")

Part II "Fall Weiss" + is attached herewith. The signature of the Führer will be appended later.

The Führer has added the following Directives to "Fall Weiss":

1) Preparations must be made in such a way that the operation can be carried out at any time from 1.9.39 onwards

2) The High Command of the Armed Forces has been directed to draw up a precise time-table for "Fall Weiss" and to arrange by conferences the synchronised timings between the 3 branches of the Armed Forces

(SEC-24.6/C-120)/A

3) The plans of the branches of the Armed Forces and the details for the time-table must be submitted to the OKW by 1.5.39.

= used as an operational codeword for Defence of the Reich Frontier. See Annex I.

+ Translator's Note: "Fall Weiss" (literally "Case White") is the cover name for the intended invasion of Poland.

The Chief of the High Command of the Armed Forces.

(signed) KEITEL.

H1151-0114

Distribution:-

OKH	=	1 (Copy No. 1.)
OKM	=	1 (" " 2.)
RdL u Ob.d L	=	1 (" " 3.)
OKW(L)	=	2 (" " 4 u. 5)
Total		5

++ (Translator's Note : Reichsmarschall der Luftwaffe und Oberbefehlshaber der Luftwaffe, i.e. Goering.)

(SEC-24.6/C-120)/B

2. Translation of document signed by HITLER.

Top Secret.
Officer Only

The Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces Berlin, 11th April, 1939
OKW Nr. 37/39 Top Secret Officer Only. WFA/LI

5 copies
2nd Copy.

Directive for the Uniform Preparation of War by the Armed Forces, 1939/40.

I shall lay down in a later directive the future tasks of the Armed Forces and the preparations to be made in accordance with these for the conduct of the war.

Until that directive comes into force, the Armed Forces must be prepared for the following eventualities :

I) Safeguarding of the frontiers of the German Reich and protection against surprise air attacks. (see Annexe I)

II) "Fall Weiss" (see Annexe II)

III) The Annexation of Danzig (see Annexe III)

Annexe IV contains regulations for the exercise of military authority in East Prussia in the event of a warlike development.

(signed) Adolf Hitler.

Distribution :

OKH	=	1 (Copy No. 1)
OKM	=	1 (" " 2)
RdL u. Ob. d. L	=	1 (" " 3)
OKW (WFA/L)	=	2 (" " 4 u. 5)

(SEC-24.6/C-120)/C

3. Precis of Annexes to 2. (Portions in quotes are translations of the text)

(The Annexes are unsigned)

H1151-0115

Annexe I.

Directives of a general nature to the 3 branches of the Armed Forces for the defence of the Reich frontiers and air and sea defence. Preparations for this must be made in such a way that an effective defence is possible at any time without a general or partial mobilisation. The code word is "Frontier Defence" ("Grenzsicherung")

The Directives are supplemented by

"Special Orders".

Setting out the organisation of defence powers in more detail. Of particular interest is para 2) of these Directives translated below showing the intention of concealing mobilisation.

"2) Legal Basis.

It should be anticipated that a state of Defence or State of War as defined in the R.V. Law⊕ of 4.9.38 will not be declared. All measures and demands necessary for carrying out a mobilisation are to be based on the laws valid in peace-time".

⊕ Translator's Note: R.V. "Reichsverteidigung" = Reich Defence.

(SEC-24.6/C-120)/D

4. Annexe II contains the directives for "Fall Weiss"

In para 1) headed "Political Hypotheses and Aims" it is stated that quarrels with Poland should be avoided. Should Poland, however, change her present policy which is based on the same principle and adopt a threatening attitude towards Germany, a "final settlement" will be necessary notwithstanding the pact with Poland. ⊕ The Free State of Danzig will be incorporated into Germany at the outbreak of the conflict at the latest. "Policy aims at limiting the war to Poland, and this is considered possible in view of the internal crisis in France and British restraint as a result of this. Should Russia intervene, this would imply Poland's destruction by Bolshevism. German military exigencies will determine the attitude of the Baltic States. Hungary is not a certain ally. Italy's attitude is determined by the Berlin-Rome Axis".

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In para 2) - Military conclusions are drawn from the above political promises.

The remaining paras set out the tasks and operational objectives of the 3 branches of the Armed Forces. "A camouflaged or open ('general' added in ink) mobilisation will not be ordered before D-day - 1 at the last possible moment".

The Army may, on its Southern flank, enter Slovak territory. In the North, a junction between Pomerania and East Prussia must be quickly established. "The preparations for the opening of operations are to be made in such a way that -without waiting for the planned assembly of mobilised units - positions can be taken up immediately by the first available troops."

H1151-0116

(SEC-24.6/C-120)/E

5. Translation of a document signed by Keitel.

Typed by Officer

Top Secret. Officer Only

High Command of the Armed Forces.
WFA. Nr 67/39 Top Secret Officer Only. L(I)

Berlin, 24th June 1939

5 Copies
2nd Copy

Subject :- "Fall Weiss"

The Army High Command is herewith directed to prepare all measures necessary for the capture, in undamaged condition, of the bridges over the lower Vistula. On the completion of preparations, the Army High Command will briefly report to the Armed Forces High Command.

Besides, the Army and Navy High Commands will again examine whether the element of surprise in sudden attacks against the bridge at Dirschau will be impaired by preceding actions of the Navy in the Danzig Bay. In view of the importance of the bridge, it should be stated if the consent of the Army High Command to the intended measures of the Navy (mining before D-day) is upheld.

The Chief of the High Command
of the Armed Forces.

(signed) KEITEL. 24.6.

Distribution:-

OKH	1st Copy
OKM	2nd Copy
R.d.L. u. Ob.d.L.	3rd Copy
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WFA/L	5th Copy.

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+ Translator's Note: Probably Gdynia

(SEC-24.6/C-120)/F

6. Annex II is supplemented by further "Special Orders for "Fall Weiss"

Here again it is stated, as in the Special Orders attached to Annexe I, that a State of Defence or War will not be declared.

H1151-0117

The directives refer to mobilisation (a clandestine mobilisation will not include the civil sphere and the armaments industry, a public one will) the area of operations and executive power, the organisation of frontier guards, Goering's powers, clearing the frontier areas, receiving refugees, evacuation measures, division of responsibilities, communications, etc. As regards feeding the troops the directives say that they can take food from the occupied area, on orders of the Army High Command, but the German minority should be spared because of its distressed condition. Requisitioning may be carried out "in accordance with the Hague Land War Convention". Supplies by people of German race must however be paid for in German currency.

(SEC-24.6/C-120)/G

7. Annexe III deals with the Annexation of Danzig

"A lightning annexation of the Free State of Danzig may be carried out, independently of "Fall Weiss", to exploit a favourable political situation".

The rest of the directive deals with the tasks of the 3 branches of the Armed Forces in preparing and carrying out this operation.

Annexe III is supplemented by "Special Orders for the Annexation of Danzig".

The annexation should be considered as an act of restoring a purely German area to German sovereignity after a long separation. In this case, too, a State of Defence or War will not be declared. Mobilisation is not intended "as the coup will be carried out by only a part of the Peacetime Army". A number of other administrative and organisational measures in carrying out this operation are laid down.

(SEC-24.6/C-120)/H

8. In Annexe IV (unsigned) the organisation and exercise of the powers of Command in East Prussia in case of a warlike conflict are laid down in detail.

(SEC-24.6/C-120)/I

9. In Annexe V dated 12.5.39., signed by Hitler, the operational areas for the Army are defined under reference to a map which is included in the file.

With regard to these operational areas, the following directive is given in the last para of the Annexe.

"If our troops advance beyond the Reich frontier or the further frontier of the Slovak protected zone, the operational area will be extended accordingly in the direction of the advance".

(SEC-24.6/C-120)/J

10. Precis of Directives dated 10 May 1939, signed by KEITEL.

Subject : Exercise of military powers in the operational areas of the Army.

These directives, outlining at first the principal tasks of the 3 branches of the Armed Forces, deal with the division of

military authority and duties between the 3 branches and their various commands in the operational area of the Army in general.

(SEC-24.6/C-120)/K

11. Translation of a document signed by HITLER.

Top Secret
Officer Only

The Supreme Commander
of the Armed Forces

Berlin, 10th May 39

7 Copies
2nd Copy

Nr. 48/39 Top Secret WFA/L(I)

Subject : Directive for the uniform preparation of War by the Armed Forces, 1939/40 (OKW.Nr.37/39 g.K.Chefs. WFA/L(I) of 11.4.39.)

(Stamp:
Ob.d.M. AI
Op. 50/39
Received:
12.5.39
Enclosures: 1
attached in note
on report)

Herewith, as Part VI of the "Directive", instructions for the economic war and the protection of our own economy.

The Commanders-in-Chief of the 3 branches of the Armed Forces will report to the Armed Forces High Command on the measures taken in consequence of these instructions by 1st August 1939

(signed) Adolf Hitler.

Marginal note in copying pencil "Done 31.7. Note in green pencil: "Verbal report in time". Note in copying pencil: before leave: from 1.7. onwards) Verbal report has been made on 30.6. Ia(Initial) 29."

Note in red pencil: "Submit report about 20/25. VI Translator's Note: S. (SCHNIEWIND) 16.5.)

Distribution:-

O.K.H.	=	1 (Pruef Nr. 1)
O.K.M.	=	1 (" " 2)
R.d.L.u.Ob.d.L.	=	1 (" " 3)
O.K.W. (W Stb)	=	1 (" " 4)
O.K.W. (Ausl/Abr)	=	1 (" " 5)
O.K.W. (L)	=	2 (" " 6 u. 7)

H1151-0118

(SEC-24.6/C-120)/L

12. Precis of Annexe VI referred to in 10

"Directives for the war against the enemy economy (economic warfare) and measures of protection for our economy".

Navy and Air Force in particular are directed to make preparations for the immediate opening of economic warfare, principally against Britain, and, as second priority, against France, in the event of "Grenzsicherung" (Translator's Note: see Annexe I) being ordered. The measures to be taken by Army, Navy and Air Force are described in detail and based on the assumption that the operations will be offensive in character.

A Directive for "Fall Weiss" (see Annexe II) sets out as the main objective the capture, in undamaged condition, of Polish economic installations. A speedy occupation of the industrial areas of Polish Upper-Silesia and Teschen is considered important. Poland must be cut off from imports by sea, and this must be borne in mind when dealing with ships sailing under neutral flags and perhaps carrying goods for Poland to neutral ports.

H1151-0119

Exhibit G.B. 42
Filed Dec. 6, 1945
vide G.B. Ex. 39 TC 72

DOCUMENTS CONCERNING GERMAN-POLISH RELATIONS AND THE OUTBREAK OF HOSTILITIES BETWEEN GREAT BRITAIN AND GERMANY ON SEPTEMBER 3, 1939.

No. 14.

German Government Memorandum handed to the Polish Government on April 28, 1939.

(Translation.)

The German Government have taken note of the Polish-British declaration regarding the progress and aims of the negotiations recently conducted between Poland and Great Britain. According to this declaration there has been concluded between the Polish Government and the British Government and temporary understanding, to be replaced shortly by a permanent agreement which will provide for the giving of mutual assistance by Poland and Great Britain in the event of the independence of one of the two States being directly or indirectly threatened.

2. The German Government consider themselves obliged to communicate the following to the Polish Government:-

3. When in 1933 the National Socialist Government set about the reshaping of German policy, after Germany's departure from the League of Nations, their first object was to stabilise German-Polish relations on a new plane. The Chancellor of the German Reich and the late Marshal Pilsudski concurred in the decision to break with the political methods of the past and to enter, as regards the settlement of all questions affecting both States, on the path of direct understanding between them.

4. By means of the unconditional renunciation of the use of force, guarantees of peace were instituted in order to assist the two States in the difficult task of solving all political, economic and cultural problems by means of the just and equitable adjustment of mutual interests. These principles, contained in a binding form in the German-Polish Peace Declaration of the 26th January, 1934, had this aim in view [sic] and by their practical success were intended to introduce an entirely new phase of German-Polish relations. The political history of the last five years shows that they proved efficacious in practice for both nations. As recently as the 26th January of this year, on the fifth anniversary of the signature of the declaration, both sides publicly confirmed this fact, while emphasising their united will to maintain in the future their adhesion to the principles established in 1934.

5. The agreement which has now been concluded by the Polish Government with the British Government is in such obvious contradiction to these solemn declarations of a few months ago that the German Government can take note only with surprise and astonishment of such a violent reversal of Polish policy. Irrespective of the manner in which its final formulation may be determined by both parties, the new Polish-British Agreement is intended as a regular pact of alliance, which by reason of its general sense and of the present state of political relations is directed exclusively against Germany. From the obligation now accepted by the Polish Government it appears that Poland intends in certain circumstances to take an active part in any possible German-British conflict in the event of aggression against Germany, even should this conflict not affect Poland and her interests. This is a direct and open blow against the renunciation of all use of force contained in the 1934 declaration.

H1151-0121

6. The contradiction between the German-Polish Declaration and the Polish-British Agreement is, however, even more far-reaching in its importance than that. The 1934 declaration was to constitute a basis for the regulation of all differences arising between the two countries, independently of international complications and combinations, by means of direct discussion between Berlin and Warsaw, to the exclusion of external influences. Naturally, such a basis must rest on the mutual confidence of both parties and on the political loyalty of the intentions of one party with regard to the other.

7. The Polish Government, however, by their recent decision to accede to an alliance directed against Germany, have given it to be understood that they prefer a promise of help by a third Power to the direct guarantee of peace by the German Government. In view of this the German Government are obliged to conclude that the Polish Government do not at present attach any importance to seeking a solution of German-Polish problems by means of direct friendly discussions with the German Government. The Polish Government have thus abandoned the path traced out in 1934 for the shaping of German-Polish relations.

8. The Polish Government cannot in this connexion appeal to the fact that the 1934 declaration was not to affect the obligations previously accepted by Poland and Germany in relation to third parties, and that the Treaty of Alliance between Poland and France maintained its value side by side with that declaration. The Polish-French Alliance already existed in 1934 when Poland and Germany proceeded to reorganise their relations. The German Government were able to accept this fact, since they were entitled to expect that the possible dangers of the Polish-French Alliance, dating from the period of the acutest German-Polish differences, would automatically lose more and more of their significance through the establishment of friendly relations between Germany and Poland. However, the entry of Poland into relations of alliance with Great Britain, which was effected five years after the publication of the declaration of 1934, can for this reason in no way be compared politically with the still valid Polish-French Alliance. By this new alliance the Polish Government have subordinated themselves to a policy inaugurated from another quarter aiming at the encirclement of Germany.

9. The German Government for their part have not given the least cause for such a change in Polish policy. Whenever opportunity offered, they have furnished the Polish Government, both publicly and in confidential conversations, with the most binding assurances that the friendly development of German-Polish relations is a fundamental aim of their foreign policy, and that, in their political decisions, they will always respect Poland's proper interests. Thus the action taken by Germany in March of this year with a view to the pacification of Central Europe did not, in the opinion of the Government of the Reich, disturb Polish interests in any way. This action led to the creation of a common Polish-Hungarian frontier, which had constantly been described on Poland's side as an important political objective. Moreover, the German Government gave unequivocal expression to their readiness to discuss with the Polish Government in a friendly manner all problems which, in the Polish Government's opinion, might arise out of the changed conditions in Central Europe.

H1151-0122

10. In an equally friendly spirit the German Government tried to regulate yet another question outstanding between Germany and Poland, namely, that of Danzig. The fact that this question required settlement had long been emphasised on the German side, and was not denied on the Polish side. For a long time past the German Government have endeavoured to convince the Polish Government that a solution was certainly possible which would be equitable to the interests of both parties and that the removal of this last obstacle would open a path for a political collaboration of Germany and Poland with the most favourable prospects. In this connection the German Government did not confine themselves to allusions of a general nature, but in March of this year proposed to the Polish Geovernment in a friendly form a settlement of this question on the following basis:-

11. The return of Danzig to the Reich. An extra-territorial railway line and autostrada between East Prussia and the Reich. In exchange, the recognition by the Reich of the whole Polish Corridor and the whole of Poland's western frontier; the conclusion of a non-aggression pact for twenty-five years; the maintenance of Poland's economic interests in Danzig and the settlement of the remaining economic and communications problems arising for Poland out of the union of Danzig with the Reich. At the same time, the German Covernment expressed their readiness to respect Polish interests in ensuring the independence of Slovakia.

12. Nobody knowing conditions in Danzig and the Corridor and the problems connected therewith can deny, in judging the matter objectively, that this proposal constitutes the very minimum which must be demanded from the point of view of German interests, which cannot be renounced. The Polish Government, however, gave a reply which, although couched in the form of counter-proposals, showed in its essence an entire lack of comprehension for the German point of view and was equivalent merely to a rejection of the German proposals. The Polish Government proved that they did not consider their reply suitable for the initiation of friendly discussions by proceeding at the same time, in a manner as unexpected as it was drastic, to effect a partial mobilisation of the Polish army on a large scale. By these entirely injustified measures the Polish Government demonstrated the meaning and object of the negotiations which they immediately afterwards entered upon with the British Government. The German Government do not consider it necessary to reply to thepartial Polish mobilisation by counter-measures of a military character. They cannot, however, disregard without a word the decisions recently taken by the Polish Government, and are forced, to their own regret, to declare as follows:-

(1) The Polish Government did not avail themselves of the opportunity offered to them by the German Government for a just settlement of the Danzig question, for the final safeguarding of Poland's frontiers with the Reich, and thereby for a permanent strengthening of the friendly neighbourly relations between the two countries. The Polish Government even rejected German proposals made with this object.

(2) At the same time the Polish Government accepted, with regard to another State, political obligations which are not compatible either with the spirit, the meaning or the text of the German-Polish Declaration of the 26th January, 1934. Thereby the Polish Government arbitrarily and unilaterally rendered this declaration null and void.

H1151-0123

13. In spite of this necessary statement of fact, the Government of the Reich do not intend to alter their fundamental attitude towards the question of the future of German-Polish relations. Should the Polish Government attach importance to a new settlement of these relations by means of a treaty, the German Government are ready to do this, but on one condition, namely, that such a settlement would have to consist of a clear obligation binding on both parties.

Exhibit G.B. 43
Filed ~~Offered~~ Dec. 6, 1945
vide G. 39

DOCUMENTS CONCERNING GERMAN-POLISH RELATIONS AND THE OUTBREAK OF HOSTILITIES BETWEEN GREAT BRITAIN AND GERMANY ON SEPTEMBER 3, 1939.

NO.13.

Extract from Herr Hitler's speech to the Reichstag on April 28, 1939.

(Translation)

There is little to be said as regards German-Polish relations. Here, too, the Peace Treaty of Versailles- of course intentionally - inflicted a most severe wound on Germany. The strange way in which the Corridor giving Poland access to the sea was marked out was meant, above all, to prevent for all time the establishment of an understanding between Poland and Germany. This problem is - as I have already stressed - perhaps the most painful of all problems for Germany. Nevertheless, I have never ceased to uphold the view that the necessity of a free access to the sea for the Polish State cannot be ignored, and that as a general principle, valid for this case, too, nations which Providence has destined or, if you like, condemned to live side by side would be well advised not to make life still harder for each other artifically and unnecessarily. The late Marshal Pilsudski, who was of the same opinion, was therefore prepared to go into the question of clarifying the atmosphere of German-Polish relations, and, finally, to conclude an agreement whereby Germany and Poland expressed their intention of renouncing war altogether as a means of settling the questions which concerned them both. This agreement contained one single exception which was in practice conceded to Poland. It was laid down that the pacts of mutual assistance already entered into by Poland - this applied to the pact with France - should not be affected by the agreement. But it was obvious that this could apply only to the pact of mutual assistance already concluded beforehand, and not to whatever new pacts might be concluded in the future. It is a fact that the German-Polish Agreement resulted in a remarkable lessening of the European tension. Nevertheless, there remained one open question between Germany and Poland, which sooner or later quite naturally had to be solved - the question of the Germany city of Danzig. Danzig is a German city and wishes to belong to Germany. On the other hand, this city has contracts with Poland, which were admittedly forced upon it by the dictators of the Peace of Versailles. But since, moreover, the League of Nations, formerly the greatest stirrer-up of trouble, is now represented by a High Commissioner - incidentally a man of extraordinary tact - the problem of Danzig must in any case come up for discussion, at the latest with the gradual extinction of this calamitous institution. I regarded the peaceful settlement of this problem as a further contribution to a final loosening of the European tension. For this loosening of the tension is assuredly not to be achieved through the agitations of insane warmongers, but through the removal of the real elements of danger. After the problem of Danzig had already been discussed several times some months ago, I made a concrete offer to the Polish Government. I now make this offer known to you, Gentlemen, and you yourselves will judge whether this offer did not represent the greatest imaginable concession in the interests of European peace. As I have already pointed out, I have always seen the necessity of an access to the sea for this country, and have consequently taken this necessity into consideration. I am no democratic statesman, but a National Socialist and a realist.

I considered it, however, necessary to make it clear to the Government in Warsaw that just as they desire access to the sea, so Germany needs access to her province in the east. Now these are all difficult problems. It is not Germany who is responsible for them, however, but rather the jugglers of Versailles, who either in their maliciousness or their thoughtlessness placed 100 powder barrels round about in Europe, all equipped with hardly

H1151-0124

H1151-0125

extinguishable lighted fuses. These problems cannot be solved according to old-fashioned ideas; I think, rather, that we should adopt new methods. Poland's access to the sea by way of the Corridor, and, on the other hand, a German route through the Corridor have, for example, no kind of military importance whatsoever. Their importance is exclusively psychological and economic. To accord military importance to a traffic route of this kind, would be to show oneself completely ignorant of military affairs. Consequently, I have had the following proposal submitted to the Polish Government:-

(1) Danzig returns as a Free State into the framework of the German Reich.

(2) Germany receives a route through the Corridor and a railway line at her own disposal possessing the same extra-territorial status for Germany as the Corridor itself has for Poland.

In return, Germany is prepared:-

(1) To recognise all Polish economic rights in Danzig.

(2) To ensure for Poland a free harbour in Danzig of any size desired which would have completely free access to the sea.

(3) To accept at the same time the present boundaries between Germany and Poland and to regard them as ultimate.

(4) To conclude a twenty-five-year non-aggression treaty with Poland, a treaty therefore which would extend far beyond the duration of my own life.

(5) To guarantee the independence of the Slovak State by Germany, Poland and Hungary jointly - which means in practice the renunciation of any unilateral German hegemony in this territory.

The Polish Government have rejected my offer and have only declared that they are prepared (1) to negotiate concerning the question of a substitute for the Commissioner of the League of Nations and (2) to consider facilities for the transit traffic through the Corridor.

I have regretted greatly this incomprehensible attitude of the Polish Government, but that alone is not the decisive fact; the worst is that now Poland, like Czecho-Slovakia a year ago, believes, under the pressure of a lying international campaign, that it must call up troops, although Germany on her part has not called up a single man and had not thought of proceeding in any way against Poland. As I have said, this is in itself very regrettable and posterity will one day decide whether it was really right to refuse this suggestion madd this once by me. This - as I have said - was an endeavour on my part to solve a question which intimately affects the German people by a truly unique compromise, and to solve it to the advantage of both countries. According to my conviction Poland was not a giving party in this solution at all but only a receiving party, because it should be beyond all doubt that Danzig will never become Polish. The intention to attack on the part of Germany, which was merely invented by the international press, led as you know to the so-called guarantee offer and to an obligation on the part of the Polish Government for mutual assistance, which would also, under certain circumstances, compel Poland to take military action against Germany in the event of a conflict between Germany and any other Power and in which England, in her turn, would be involved. This obligation is contradictory to the agreement which I mad with Marshal Pilsudski some time ago, seeing that in this agreement reference is made exclusively to existing obligations, that is at that time, namely, to the obligations of Poland towards France of which we were aware. To extend these obligations subsequently is contrary to the terms of the German-Polish non-aggression pact. Under these circumstances I should not have entered into this pact

H1151-0126

at that time, because what sense can non-aggression pacts have if one partner in practice leaves open an enormous number of exceptions.

There is either collective security, that is collective insecurity and continuous danger of war, or clear agreements which, however, exclude fundamentally any use of arms between the contracting parties. I therefore look upon the agreement which Marshal Pilsudski and I at one time concluded as having been unilaterally infringed by Poland and thereby no longer in existence!

I have sent a communication to this effect to the Polish Government. However, I can only repeat at this point that my decision does not constitute a modification of my attitude in principle with regard to the problems mentioned above. Should the polish Government wish to come to fresh contractual arrangements governing its relations with Germany, I can but welcome such an idea, provided, of course, that these arrangements are based on an absolutely clear obligation binding both parties in equal measure. Germany is perfectly willing at any time to undertake such obligations and also to fulfil them.

Exhibit # B 44

TC/72 Filed Dec. 6, 1945

Documents concerning German-Polish relations and the outbreak of Hostilities between Great Britain and Germany on September 3, 1939. vide Ex. 39

No 16

Memorandum communicated to the German Government by the Polish Government on May 5, 1939, in reply to the German Government Memorandum of April 28, 1939.

(Translation)

As appears from the text of the Polish-German Declaration of the 26th. January, 1934, and from the course of the negotiations which preceded its conclusion, this declaration had as its object to lay the foundations for a new framing of mutual relations based on the following two principles:-

(a) The renunciation of the use of force as between Poland and Germany, and

(b) The friendly settlement by means of free negotiations of any contentious questions which might arise in the relations between the two countries.

The Polish Government have always understood in this manner their obligations under the declaration, and it is in this spirit that they have always been prepared to conduct neighbourly relations with the German Reich.

2. The Polish Government had forseen for several years that the difficulties encountered by the League of Nations in carrying out its functions at Danzig would create a confused situation which it was in Poland's and Germany's interest to unravel. For several years the Polish Government had given the German Government to understand that frank conversations should be held on this subject. The German Government, however, avoided these and confined themselves to stating that Polish-German relations should not be exposed to difficulties by questions relating to Danzig. Moreover, the German Government more than once gave assurances to the Polish Government regarding the Free City of Danzig. It is sufficient here to quote the declaration made by the Chancellor of the Reich on the 20th. February 1938.

The Chancellor made publicly in the Reichstag the following declaration regarding Danzig:-

"The Polish State respects the National conditions in this State, and the Free City and Germany respect Polish rights. It has thus been possible to clear the way for an understanding which, while arising out of the question of Danzig, has to-day in spite of the efforts of certain disturbers of the peace succeeded in effectively purifying relations between Germany and Poland and has transformed them into sincere and friendly collaboration."

It was only after the events of September, 1938, that the German Government suggested the opening of Polish-German conversations regarding the alteration in the situation in Danzig and regarding the transit routes between the Reich and East Prussia. In this connection the German memorandum of the 28th. April, 1939, refers to the suggestion put forward by the Reich Minister for Foreign Affairs in his conversation of the 21st March, 1939, with the Polish Ambassador in Berlin. In this conversation emphasis was laid on the German side on the necessity for a rapid settlement of these questions which was a condition of the Reich maintaining its proposals in force in their entirety. The Polish Government, animated by the desire to maintain good relations with the Reich, although surprised at the pressing form in which these proposals were put forward, and by the circumstances in which they were advanced, did not refuse conversations although they considered the German demands thus couched to be unacceptable.

H1151-0127

H1151-0128

In order to facilitate endeavours to reach an amicable solution of the question, the Polish Government on the 26th. March, 1939, formulated their point of view in writing to the German Government, stating that they attached full importance to the maintenance of good neighbourly relations with the German Reich. The Polish point of view was summarised in the following points:-

(a) The Polish Government propose a joint guarantee by Poland and Germany of the separate character of the Free City of Danzig, the existence of which was to be based on complete freedom of the local population in internal affairs and on the assurance of respect for Polish rights and interests.

(b) The Polish Government were prepared to examine together with the German Government any further simplifications for persons in transit as well as the technical facilitating of railway and motor transit between the German Reich and East Prussia. The Polish Government were inspired by the idea of giving every possible facility which would permit the citizens of the Reich to travel in transit across the Polish territory, if possible without any hindrances. The Polish Government emphasised that their intention was to secure the most liberal treatment possible of the German desiderata in this respect with the sole reservation that Poland could not give up her sovereignty over the belt of territory through which the transit routes would run. Finally, the Polish Government indicated that their attitude in the question of facilitating communications across Pomerania depended on the attitude of the Reich regarding the Free City of Danzig.

In formulating the above proposals the Polish Government acted in the spirit of the Polish-German Declaration of 1934 which, by providing the direct exchanges of views on questions of interest to both countries authorised each State to formulate its point of view in the course of negotiations.

The Polish Government received no formal reply to their counter-proposals for a month, and it was only on the 28th. April, 1939, that they learnt from the Chancellor's speech and from the German Government's memorandum that the mere fact of the formulation of counter-proposals instead of the acceptance of the verbal German suggestions without alteration or reservation had been regarded by the Reich as a refusal of discussions.

It is clear that negotiations in which one State formulates demands and the other is to be obliged to accept those demands unaltered are not negotiations in the spirit of the declaration of 1934 and are incompatible with the vital interests and dignity of Poland.

In this connection it should be pointed out that the Polish Government were unable at that time to express an opinion regarding the Polish-German-Hungarian guarantee of the independence of Slovakia which was alluded to in a general way in the German memorandum and more precisely stated in the Chancellor's speech of the 28th. April, 1939, since a proposal of this description and in this form had never been made to them before. It is, moreover, difficult to imagine how such guarantee could be reconciled with the political and military protectorate of the Reich over Slovakia which had been announced a few days previouly before the German Reich formulated its proposals towards Poland.

H1151-0129

3. The Polish Government cannot accept such an interpretation of the declaration of 1934 as would be equivalent to a renunciation of theright to conclude political agreements with third Statesand consequently, almost a renunciation of independence in foreign policy. The Policy of the German Reich in recent years has clearly indicated that the German Government have not drawn conclusions of this sort from the declaration as far as they themselves were concerned. The obligations publicly accepted by the Reich towards Italy and the German-Slovak Agreement of March, 1939, are clear indications of such an interpretation by the German Government of the declaration of 1934. The Polish Government must here recall that in their relations with other States they give and require full reciprocity as being the only possible foundation of normal relations between States.

The Polish Government reject as completely without foundation all accusations regarding the alleged incompatibility of the Anglo-Polish Mutual Guarantee of April, 1939, with the Polish-German Declaration of 1934. This guarantee has a purely defensive character and in no way threatens the German Reich, in the same way as the Polish-French Alliance, whose compatibility with the Declaration of 1934 has been recognised by the German Reich. The declaration of 1934 in its introductory paragraphs clearly stated that both Governments have "decidedto base their mutual relations on the principles laid down in the Pact of Paris of the 27th. August, 1928." Now the Pact of Paris, which constituted a general renunciation of war as an instrument of national policy, just as the declaration of 1934 constituted such renunciation in bilateral Polish-German relations, contained the explicit reservation that"any signatory Power which shall hereafter seek to promote its national interests by resort to war should be denied the benefits furnished by this treaty". Germany accepted this principle in signing the Pact of Paris and re-affirmed it in the declaration of 1934, together with other principles of the Pact of Paris. It appears from this that the declaration of 1934 would cease to be binding on Poland should Germany have recourse to war in violation of the Pact of Paris. Poland's obligations arising out of the Polish-British understanding would come into operation in the event of German action threatening the independence of Great Britain, and, consequently, in the very circumstacnes in which the declaration of 1934 and the Pact of Paris had ceased to be binding on Poland as regards Germany.

The German Government in making a complaint against the Polish Government for undertaking obligations to guarantee the independence of Great Britain and in regarding this as a violation by Poland of the declaration of 1934, ignore their own obligations towards Italy of which the Chancellor spoke on the 30th. January, 1939, and in particular their obligations towards Slovakia contained in the agreement of the 18th. and 23 rd. March, 1939. The German guarantees of Slovakia did not exclude Poland (sic), and, indeed, as appears from the provisions of the above agreement regarding the distribution of garrisons and military fortifications in Western Slovakia, were directed primarily against Poland.

4. It appears from the above that the Government of the German Reich had no justification for their unilateral decision to regard the declaration of 1934 as not binding. The Pact was, indeed, concluded for ten years without any possibility of denunciation during that time. It should be pointed out that the decision to regard the 1934 Declaration as not binding took place after the previous refusal of the German State to accept explanations as to the compatibility of the Anglo-Polish guarantee with the 1934 Declaration, which it was the intention of the Polish Government to furnish to the representative of the Reich in Warsaw.

H1151-0130

5. Although the Polish Government do not share the view of the German Government that the treaty of 1934 has been violated by Poland nevertheless, should the German Government attach importance to the fresh regulation, by means of a treaty, of Polish-German relations on a good neighbourly basis, the Polish Government would be prepared to entertain suggestions of this kind with the reservation of their fundamental observations contained above in the present memorandum.

H1151-0131

TOP SECRET (Transl. Geheime Reichsache)
To be transmitted by officer only.

L. 79

Minutes
of a conference on 23 May 39

Place: The Fuhrer's Study, New Reich Chancellery.

Adjudant on duty: Lt.-Col. (G.S.) Schmundt.

Present: The Fuhrer, Field-Marshal Goring, Grand-Admiral Raeder.

Col-Gen. von Brauchitsch, Col-Gen. Keitel, Col-Gen. Milch, Gen. (of Artillery) Halder, Gen. Bodenschatz, Rear-Admi. Schmundt, Col. (G.S.) Jeschonnek, Col. (G.S.) Warlimont, Lt-Col. (G.S.) Schmundt, Capt. Engel (Army), Lieut-Comd. Albrecht, Capt. v. Below (Army).

Subject: Indoctrination on the political situation and future aims.

(Page 2)

The Fuhrer defined as the purpose of the conference:

1) Analysis of the situation.
2) Definition of the tasks for the Armed Forces arising from that situation.
3) Exposition of the consequences of those tasks.
4) Ensuring the secrecy of all decisions and work resulting from these consequences.

Secrecy is the first essential for success.

The Fuhrer's observations are given in systematised form below.

Our present situation must be considered from two points of view:

1) The actual development of events between 1933 and 1939;
2) The permanent and unchanging situation in which Germany lies.

In the period 1933-1939, progress was made in all fields. Our military situation improved enormously.

Our situation with regard to the rest of the world has remained the same.

Germany had dropped from the circle of Great Powers. The balance of power had been effected without the participation of Germany.

This equilibrium is disturbed when Germany's demands for the necessities of life make themselves felt, and Germany re-emerges as a Great Power. All demands are regarded as "Encroachments". The English are more afraid of dangers in the economic sphere than of the simple threat of force. (p. 3)

H1151-0132

A mass of 80 million people has solved the ideological problems. So, too, must the economic problems be solved. No German can evade the creation of the necessary economic conditions for this. The solution of the problems demands courage. The principle, by which one evades solving the problem by adapting oneself to circumstances, is inadmissable. Circumstances must rather be adapted to aims. This is impossible without invasion of foreign states or attacks upon foreign property.

Living space, in proportion to the magnitude of the state, is the basis of all power. One may refuse for a time to face the problem, but finally it is solved one way or the other. The choice is between advancement or decline. In 15 or 20 years' time we shall be compelled to find a solution. No German statesman can evade the question longer than that

We are at present in a state of patriotic fervour, which is shared by two other nations: Italy and Japan.

The period which lies behind us has indeed been put to good use. All measures have been taken in the correct sequence and in harmony with our aims.

After 6 years, the situation is today as follows: (p. 4)

The national-political unity of the Germans has been achieved, apart from minor exceptions. Further successes cannot be attained without the shedding of blood.

The demarkation of frontiers is of military importance.

The Pole is no "supplementary enemy". Poland will always be on the side of our adversaries. In spite of the treaties of friendship, Poland has always had the secret intention of exploiting every opportunity to do us harm.

Danzig is not the subject of the dispute at all. It is a question of expanding our living space in the East and of securing our food supplies, & the settlement of the Baltic problem. Food supplies can be expected only from thinly populated areas. Over and above the natural fertility, thorough-going German exploitation will enormously increase the surplus.

There is no other possibility for Europe.

Colonies: Beware of gifts of colonial territory. This does not solve the food problem. Remember the blockade.

If fate brings us into conflict with the West, the possession of extensive areas in the East will be advantageous. We shall be able to rely upon record harvests, even less in time of war than in peace.

The population of non-German areas will perform no military service, and will be available as a source of labour. (p. 5)

The Polish problem is inseparable from conflict with the West.

Poland's internal power of resistance to Bolshevism is doubtful. Thus Poland is of doubtful value as a barrier against Russia.

It is questionable whether military success in the West can be achieved by a quick decision, questionable too is the attitude of Poland.

The Polish government will not resist pressure from Russia. Poland sees danger in a German victory in the West, and will attempt to rob us of the victory.

There is therefore no question of sparing Poland, and we are left with

the

H1151-0133

The decision:

To attack Poland at the first suitable opportunity

We cannot expect a repetition of the Czech affair. There will be war. Our task is to isolate Poland. The success of the isolation will be decisive.

Therefore, the Fuhrer must reserve the right to give the final order to attack. There must be no simultaneous conflict with the Western Powers (France and England).

If it is not certain that a German-Polish conflict will not lead to war in the West, then the fight must be primarily against England and France, (p. 6)

Fundamentally therefore: Conflict with Poland - beginning with an attack on Poland - will only be successful if the Western Powers keep out of it.
If this is impossible, then it will be better to attack in the West and to settle Poland at the same time.

The isolation of Poland is a matter of skilful politics.

Japan is a weighty problem. Even if at first for various reasons her collaboration with us appears to be somewhat cool and restricted, it is nevertheless in Japan's own interest to take the initiative in attacking Russia in good time.

Economic relations with Russia are possible only if political relations have improved. A cautious trend is apparent in Press comments. It is not impossible that Russia will show herself to be disinterested in the destruction of Poland. Should Russia take steps to oppose us, our relations with Japan may become closer.

If there were an alliance of France, England and Russia against Germany Italy and Japan, I would be constrained to attack England and France with a few annihiliating blows. (p. 7). The Fuhrer doubts the possibility of a peaceful settlement with England. We must prepare ourselves for the conflict. England sees in our development the foundation of a hegemony which would weaken England. England is therefore our enemy, and the conflict with England will be a life-and-death struggle.

What will this struggle be like?

England cannot deal with Germany and subjugate us with a few powerful blows. It is imperative for England that the war should be brought as near to the Ruhr basin as possible. French blood will not be spared (West Wall). The possession of the Ruhr basin will determine the duration of our resistance.

The Dutch and Belgian air bases must be occupied by armed force. Declarations of neutrality must be ignored. If England and France intend the war between Germany and Poland to lead to a conflict, they will support Holland and Belgium in their neutrality and make them build fortifications, in order finally to force them into cooperation.

Albeit under protest, Belgium and Holland will yield to pressure. (p. 8)

Therefore, if England intends to intervene in the Polish war, we must [illegible] with lightening speed. We must aim at securing a new defence [illegible] soil up to the Zuider Zee.

H1151-0134

The war with England and France will be a life-and-death struggle.

The idea that we can get off cheaply is dangerous; there is no such possibility We must burn our boats, and it is no longer a question of justice or injustice but of life or death for 80 million human beings.

Question: Short or long war?

Every country's armed forces or government must aim at a short war. The government, however, must also be prepared for a war of 10-15 years' duration.

History has always shown that the people have believed that wars would be short. In 1914, the opinion still prevailed that it was impossible to finance a long war. Even today this idea still persists in many minds. But on the contrary, every state will hold out as long as possible, unless it immediately suffers some grave weakening (e.g. Ruhr basin). England has similar weaknesses.

England knows that to lose a war will mean the end of her world power. (p 9)

England is the driving force against Germany.
(Literally: England is the motor driving against Germany). Her strength lies in the following:

1. The British themselves are proud, courageous, tenacious, firm in resistance and gifted as organisers. They know how to exploit every new development. They have the love of adventure and bravery of the Nordic race. Quality is lowered by dispersal. The German average is higher.

2. World power in itself. It has been constant for 300 years. Extended by the acquisition of allies. This power is not merely something concrete, but must also be considered as a psychological force embracing the entire world. Add to this immeasurable wealth, with consequental financial credit.

3. Geopolitical safety and protection by strong sea power and a courageous air force.

England's weakness:

If in the World War I we had had two battleships and two cruisers more, and if the battle of Jutland had begun in the morning, the British fleet would have been defeated and England brought to her knees. It would have meant [illegible] the end of this War (p 10). It was formerly not sufficient to defeat the fleet, landings had to be made in order to defeat England. England could provide her own food supplies. Today it is no longer possible.

The moment England's food supply routes are cut, she is forced to capitulate. The import of food and oil depends on the fleet's protection.

If the German Air Force attacks English territory, England will not be forced to capitulate in one day. But if the fleet is destroyed, immediate capitulation will be the result.

There is no doubt that a surprise attack can lead to a quick decision. It would be criminal, however, for the government to rely entirely on the element of surprise.

Experience has shown that surprise may be nullified by:-

1. Disclosure outside the limit of the military circles concerned;
2. Mere chance, which may cause the collapse of the whole enterprise;
3. Human failings;
4. Weather conditions.

H1151-0135

The final date for striking must be fixed well in advance. Beyond that time the tension cannot be endured for long. (p 11). It must be borne in mind that weather conditions can render any surprise intervention by Navy and Air Force impossible.

This must be regarded as a most unfavourable basis for action.

1. An effort must be made to deal the enemy a significant or the final decisive blow. Considerations of right and wrong, or treaties, do not enter into the matter.
This will only be possible if we are not involved in a war with England on account of Poland.

2. In addition to the surprise attack, preparations for a long war must be made, while opportunities on the Continent for England are eliminated.

The army will have to hold positions essential to the Navy and Air Force. If Holland and Belgium are successfully occupied and held, and if France is also defeated, the fundamental conditions for a successful war against England will have been secured.

England can then be blockaded from Western France at close quarters by the Air Force, while the Navy with its submarines can extend the range of the blockade.

(page 12)

Consequences:

England will not be able to fight on the Continent:
Daily attacks by the Air Force and Navy will cut all her life-lines;
Time will not be on England's side;
Germany will not bleed to death on land.

Such strategy has been shown to be necessary by World War I and subsequent military operations. World War I is responsible for the following strategic considerations which are imperative:-

1. With a more powerful Navy at the outbreak of the war, or a wheeling movement by the Army towards the Channel ports, the end would have been different.

2. A country cannot be brought to defeat by an Air Force. It is impossible to attack all objectives simultaneously and the lapse of time of a few minutes would evoke defensive counter-measures.

3. The unrestricted use of all resources is essential.

4. Once the Army, in cooperation with the Air Force and the Navy, has taken the most important positions, industrial production will cease to flow into the bottomless pit of the Army's battles and can be diverted to benefit the Air Force and Navy. (p 13)

The Army must therefore be capable of taking these positions. Systematic preparation must be made for the attack.

Study to this end is of the utmost importance.

The aim will always be to force England to her knees.

A weapon will only be of decisive importance in winning battles, so long as the enemy does not possess it.

12

H1151-0136

This applies to gas, submarines and the Air Force. It would be true of the latter for instance, as long as the English fleet had no available counter-measures; it will no longer be the case in 1940 and 1941. Against Poland, for example, tanks will be effective, as the Polish Army possesses no counter-measures.

Where straight forward pressure is no longer considered to be decisive, its place must be taken by the elements of surprise and by masterly handling.

This as the plan of attack

The plan demands:- (Page 14)

1. A correct estimate of weapons and their effectiveness:-
   e.g. (a) Battleship or aircraft carrier; which is the more effective individually or considered as a whole? The aircraft carrier is the better protection for a convoy.

   (b) Is air attack more important on a factory than on a battleship? Where are bottlenecks in production located.

2. Immediate preparedness on the part of the Army.
   The Army must move straight from its peace stations to overrun neighbouring states. (Literally: Neighbouring states must be overrun direct from barracks).

3. A study of the enemy's weak points.

These studies must not be left to the General Staffs. Secrecy would no longer be guaranteed.

This staff will keep the Fuhrer informed and report to him.

(page 15)

The planning staff is responsible for the planning of operations on the highest level and on the technical preparations and organisation necessarily required by the decisions taken.

The purpose of certain regulations concerns no-one outside the staff.

However great are the increases in the armaments of our adversaries they must, at some time, come to the end of their resources, and ours will be greater. French recruiting - 120,000 men in each age class!

We shall not be forced into a war, but we shall not be able to avoid one.

Secrecy is the decisive requirement for success. Our object must be kept secret even from Italy or Japan. The break-through through the Maginot line is still a possibility for Italy, and must be studied. The Fuhrer considers that such a break-through is possible.

The close combination of the services, for the study of the problem in its entirety, is important.

8[illegible]

H1151-0137

The object:

1. Study of the problem in its entirety.
2. Study of the procedure.
3. Study of the necessary requirements.
4. Study of the necessary training.

The staff must include men with great imaginative power and the best technical knowledge, as well as officers of sober and sceptical judgment.

Working principles:

1. No-one must be admitted who is not concerned.
2. No-one may know more than it is necessary for him to know.
3. When must the person concerned know, at latest? No-one may know of a matter earlier than is necessary for him to know of it.

At the request of Field Marshal Goring, the Fuhrer decrees that:

a) The various services shall decide what construction is to be undertaken.
b) There shall be no alterations in the shipbuilding programme.
c) The armaments programme are to be postponed to 1943 or 1944.

Certified correct record
(signed) SCHMUNDT, Lt. Col

H1151-0138

BRITISH DOCUMENT BOOK NO.2.

P A R T V:

FINAL PREPARATIONS JUNE - SEP. 1939

(a) ARMED FORCES

C 126	22 June 39	Preliminary Time Table for "Fall Weiss" and Directions for Secret Mobilisation
C 30	27 July 39	Air/Sea Forces Orders for Occupation Danzig
TC 71	July 39	Reports of British Consul in Danzig
TC 77	12-13 Aug 39	Minutes of Hitler-Ciano Meeting

(b) ECONOMIC

PS 699	25 Aug 39	Funk's letter to Hitler

(c) OBERSALZBERG SPEECH

PS 1014 US 30	22 Aug 39	Hitler's Speech to Commanders in Chief
PS 798 US 29	22 Aug 39	Hitler's Speech to Commanders in Chief

(d) POLITICAL

TC 72 No.62	23 Aug 39	Danzig Senate Decree appointing Forster Head of State
" 53	26 Aug 39	Report of British Ambassador, Warsaw
" 54	26 Aug 39	Report of British Ambassador, Warsaw
" 55	27 Aug 39	Report of British Ambassador, Warsaw
PS 795	17 Aug 39	Memorandum of Keitel conversation

Exhibit G.B. 45
Filed Dec. 6, 1945

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT C 126
OFFICE OF U.S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL

C 126

EXTRACT FROM LETTER TO THE FLEET F.O. (U/B) & B.d.P.

Berlin, August 2nd, 1939.

Attached are Operational Directions for the employment of U-Boats which are to be sent out to the Atlantic, by way of precaution, in the event of the intention to carry out "Fall Weiss" remaining unchanged. F.O. (U/B) is handing in his Operation Orders to Skl. by 12 August (Ink note - a decision on the sailings of U-Boats for the Atlantic will probably be made at the middle of August).

These directions must, if the Operations are not carried out, be destroyed by the 1 September 1939 at the latest.....

(Initialled) F.A.
Skl.
1/Skl.

Berlin 22.6.1939

Supreme Command of the Armed Forces

Re: Preparations for "Fall Weiss".
.....

The Supreme Command of the Armed Forces has submitted to the Führer and Supreme Commander a "preliminary time-table" for "Fall Weiss", based on the particulars so far available from the Navy, Army and Air Force. Details concerning the days preceding the attack and the start of the attack were not included in this time-table.

The Führer and the Supreme Commander is, in the main, in agreement with the intentions of the Navy, Army and Air Force and made the following comments on individual points:-

1. In order not to disquiet the population by calling up reserves on a larger scale than usual for the manoeuvres scheduled for 1939, as is intended, civilian establishments, employers or other private persons who make enquiries should be told that men are being called up for the autumn manoeuvres and for the exercise units it is intended to form for those manoeuvres.

It is requested that directions to this effect be issued to subordinate establishments.

2. For reasons of security the clearing of hospitals in the area of the frontier which the Supreme Command of the Army proposed should take place from the middle of July, must not be carried out.

3. It should be ascertained whether it appears to be expedient to transfer the S.S. Artillery Regiment to East Prussia and use it there for the purpose intended, in view of the fact that this regiment had only been formed a short time previously, or whether it seems more profitable to use an Army Artillery Regiment in place of an S.S. Artillery Regiment.

The result of the investigation should be communicated to the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces.

H1151-0139

H1151-0140

4. The Führer and Supreme Commander will decide at the beginning of August whether the training ships of the Navy will put out according to plan.

Chief of the Supreme Command
of the Armed Forces.

Keitel.

SUPREME COMMANDER OF THE ARMED FORCES
OKW/WFA No. 170/39 gk Chefs. L.I.

Berlin, 31 August 1939

MOST SECRET

8 Copies
2nd. Copy

Known to Ob.d.L.

S.O. only (Stamp)
Access only through an officer.

Direction No I for the conduct of the war.

1. Now that all the political possibilities of disposing by peaceful means of a situation on the Eastern Frontier which is intolerable for Germany are exhausted, I have determined on a solution by force.

2. The attack on Poland is to be carried out in accordance with the preparations made for "Fall Weiss", with the alterations which result, where the Army is concerned, from the fact that it has in the meantime almost completed its dispositions.

Allotment of tasks and the operational target remain unchanged.

Date of attack - 1 September 1939
Time of attack - 04:45 (Inserted in red pencil)

This time also applies to the operation at Gdynia, Bay of Danzig and the Dirschau Bridge.

3. In the West it is important that the responsibility for the opening of hostilities should rest unequivocally with England and France. At first purely local action should be taken against insignificant frontier violations.

and Denmark (red pencil note) The neutrality assured by us to Holland, Belgium, Luxembourg and Switzerland should be scrupulously observed.

The German land frontier in the West is not to be crossed at any point without my express consent.

According to this Atlantic U-boats must remain in their waiting positions for The same applies to warlike actions at sea or any which may be so interpreted.

Defensive measures on the part of the Luftwaffe should at first be confined exclusively to the warding off of enemy air attacks on the frontier of the Reich. In doing so the frontier of the neutral states should be observed as long as possible when dealing with single aircraft and smaller units.

H1151-0141

Defensive operations should only be permitted over the neutral territory when, where French and English attacking squadrons are operating over neutral states against German territory in considerable force, air defence in the West is no longer assured.

the time being. (pencil note)

It is of special importance that the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces should be informed with the least possible delay of any violation of the neutrality of their States on the part of our opponents in the West.

4. If England and France open hostilities against Germany, the task of those sections of the Armed Forces which are operating in the West is to uphold, while conserving their strength as far as possible, against these conditions necessary for the successful conclusion of the operations against Poland. Within the scope of this duty, damage should be done to enemy forces and their economic sources of supply as far as resources allow. In any case I reserve to myself the order to commence attack operations.

Warfare here against Merchant Shipping (Green pencil)

(See Directions to Groups, ships and U-Boats) (red pencil note)

The Army is holding the West wall and is making preparations to prevent its being turned. - The Western Powers violating Belgian or Dutch territory in doing so. If French forces move into Luxemburg, the frontier bridges may be blown up.

(Undecipherable note in green pencil)

In its warfare on merchant shipping the Navy is concentrating on England. To intensify the effect of this, a declaration of danger zones is to be expected.
The Supreme Command of the Navy announces in which areas of sea and within what limits danger zones are considered expedient. The wording of a public declaration should be prepared in conjunction with the Foreign Office and should be submitted to me for approval through the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces.

The Baltic should be secured against penetration by the enemy. The C - C. of the Navy decides whether the approaches to the ... should be mined for this purposes.

Address to... (undecipherable) General Warning! (Red pencil note)

The primary task of the Luftwaffe is to prevent the French and English Air Force operating against the German Army and German "Lebensraum".

In waging war against England preparations should be made for the use of the Luftwaffe in causing damage to sea transport, the armament industry and troop transports to France. Full use should be made of favourable opportunities to make an effective attack on massed English Naval units, especially on battleships and aircraft carriers. The decisions regarding attacks on London rests with me.

Attacks on the English motherland should be prepared, bearing in mind that whatever happens, inadequate success with part forces is to be avoided.

(Sgd) A. Hitler

..... (undecipherable)

Warning ? (Note in red pencil)

H1151-0142

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

OF DOCUMENT C 126

16 November 1945

I ERNST M. COHN, PFC, 33925738, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German Languages; and that the above is a true and correct partial translation of Document C 126

ERNST M. COHN
PFC, 33925738.

Exhibit G.B. 46
Filed Dec. 6, 1945

C 30.

MOST SECRET.

(SEC24-3/C-30) 27. 7. 39.

C. O. Air/Sea Forces.

"Transportubung Stolpmünde"

SECRET.

C. O. Air/Sea Forces - Order No.3.

Occupation of the German Free State of Danzig on ------(Y-day)

I. The Führer and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces has ordered the reunion of the German Free State of Danzig with the Greater German Reich. The Armed Forces must occupy the Danzig Free State immediately in order to protect the German population. There will be no hostile intention on the part of Poland so long as the occupation takes place without the force of arms.

II. How the occupation is to be effected.

a) The Army will enter the Danzig Free State with troop units from East Prussia, in order to occupy and defend the Polish frontiers.

Until the town of Danzig is reached - the advance, unhindered, is expected about - o'clock (Y+16 hours), - the Danzig police, supported by the population, will hold and defend the town.

b) The Air Force, will support the army by the employment of air-borne troops in Danzig and will defend Danzig territory against the Polish air-force.

c) The Navy will defend the bay of Danzig against Polish forces, at the same time protecting the mouth of the Weichsel at Schiewenhorst and Neufahr against the penetration of Polish Light forces and auxiliary vessels, It will afford protection and support to the German population, by entering the Neufahr waters and Danzig, and defend the westerplatte which belongs to the Polish armed forces installation----------

Sgd. Cooler.

2158.

H1151-0143

Exhibit G.B. 47
Filed Dec. 6, 1945

FURTHER CORRESPONDENCE RESPECTING POLAND.

TC71.

III. Danzig and the Corridor.

(15923).

(C 9225/54/18) No. 1.

Consul-General Shepherd to Viscount Halifax. - (Received July 1.)

(No. 72.)
(Telegraphic.)

Danzig, July 1, 1939.

MY telegram No. 71.

Yesterday morning four German army officers in mufti arrived here by night express from Berlin to organise Danzig Heimwehr.

2. All approaches to hills and dismantled fort, which constitute a popular public promenade on western fringe of the city, have been closed with barbed wire and "verboten" notices.

3. The walls surrounding the shipyards bear placards: "Comrades keep your mouths shut lest you regret consequence".

4. Master of British steamer "High Commissioner Wood", whilst he was roving Königsberg from 28th June to 30th June, observed considerable military activity, including extensive shipment of camouflaged covered lorries and similar material by small coasting vessels. On 28th June four medium-sized steamers loaded with troops, lorries, field kitchens, etc., left Königsberg, ostensibly returning to Hamburg after manoeuvres, but actually proceeding to Stettin. Names of steamers were "Hohenhorn", with heavy derricks, each capable of lifting about 50 tons, "Scharhorn", "Tilsit" and "Utlandhorn", all modern, well-equipped vessels, each about 5,000 tons gross. Please inform Admiralty.

(C 9561/54/18.) No. 8.

Consul-General Shepherd to Viscount Halifax. - (Received July 8.)

No. 17. Saving.)
(Telegraphic.)

Danzig, July 6, 1939.

WARSAW telegram No. 206.

I learn from a reliable source that for several nights past light (believed to be anti-tank) guns have been smuggled into Danzig from Königsberg in German shallow draught naval lighters via Frisches Haff, Vistula-Haff Canal, Vistula, Dead Vistula and Holm Island, whence they were transferred to Schichau shipyard for distribution by road, and that in the early hours of 2nd July light tanks were smuggled in by the same route, but landed on south bank of Dead Vistula opposite Bohnsack, whence they were removed on lorries. On the night of 30th June a considerable number of closely covered grey lorries passed this consulate-general singly, but at short intervals apart, coming from direction of Schichau shipyard (paragraph 2 of my telegram No. 71) and proceeding in that of barracks referred to in paragraph 4 of my telegram No. 71 and of hills referred to in paragraph 2 of my telegram No. 72.

2. On afternoon of 1st July local newspapers announced that band and some officers of second West Prussian Field Artillery Regiment, No. 36, would arrive that evening from Leting for ceremonies the following day in honour of regiment associated with Danzig. On 2nd July the visitors paraded through the streets wearing swords. I asked one of the counsellors at Polish Commissariat-General whether permission had been obtained for this procedure, and, if not, whether it was not irregular (your telegram No. 205 to Warsaw, paragraph 3, sentence 2).

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H1151-0145

but he professed to be uncertain on both points. So far as I am aware, the P have refrained from protesting to the Senate about the recent militaristic activities here. This attitude has given rise to impression in some (notably French) circles here that in the last resort the Poles will acquiesce in retu the Free City to Germany.

3. Danzig students are being required to spend their summer holidays patrolling frontier, learning and teaching motor cycling, etc.

4. Arrival of horses, referred to in paragraph 1 of telegram No. 71, at barracks was resumed on 5th July and hay is delivered there daily.

5. A German who yesterday enquired whether, in view of all recent activities here, it would be wise for him to send his wife and baby to his g in Memel was told by counsellor in the foreign section of the Senate that, although last days of June and first days of July had been very critical for Danzig, it was believed, barring accidents, the remainder of July should be reasonably calm. This seems to confirm the opinion expressed in last paragr of my telegram No. 71 that both Danzig and Polish activities are at present defensive, but Danzigers feared that the Poles might launch a surprise attack during recent smuggling of considerable quantities of munitions into the free city.

6. So far as can at present be foreseen, it seems that no serious dev need be anticipated before August.

7. I learn from a reliable source that concrete gun mountings are being constructed along the coast between Kefahrwasser and Neufahr, and that three about 4.7-in. calibre with long recoils, have already been mounted at Quellb Tracks made in bringing guns from Durchbruch are clearly visible.

(C 9745/54/18) No. 11.

Consul-General Shepherd to Viscount Halifax. - (Received July 12.)

(No. 20. Saving.) (By Bag.)
(Telegraphic.) En clair
Danzig, July 10, 1939.

MY telegram No. 17, Saving, paragraph 7.

The same informant, whom I believe to be reliable, advises me that on 8th July he personally saw about thirty military lorries with East Prussian licence numbers on the Bischofsberg, where numerous field kitchens had been placed along the hedges. There were also eight large anti-aircraft guns in position, which he estimated as being of over 3-inch calibre, and three six-barrelled light anti-aircraft machine guns. There were about 500 men drilli with rifles, and the whole place is extensively fortified with barbed wire, e

After seeing the above-mentioned anti-aircraft guns at close range, my informant is of the opinion that the three guns which he saw from a great distance at Quellberg were also anti-aircraft. The other guns along the coa he believes to be naval guns.

A member of this consulate-general personally saw heavy machine guns wit ammunition being openly unloaded in the middle of the day at the police stat situated in a street running at the back of this consulate-general. On 10th he also saw forty-three bell tents at the foot of the Quellberg and seventee between Ostliche Neufahr and Bohnsack, and a lorry with S.A. men and one quick-firing anti-aircraft gun (single barrel) on the ferry crossing from Danzig t Bohnsack.

(C 10491/54/19) No. 31.

Consul-General Shepherd to Viscount Halifax. - (Received July 25.)

(No. 98.)
(Telegraphic.)
Danzig, July 25, 193

HERR FORSTER informed High Commissioner yesterday that Danzig question co

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if necessary, wait a year or more, and said that military precautions now bei taken would be liquidated in the middle of September.

2. Meanwhile, there is increasing amount of horse and motor transport visible, and frequent reports reach me of men being called up and of arrival o men and material from East Prussia. While I cannot at present confirm these (group omitted), it would be unwise to ignore them. There are numerous ware- houses and other buildings in Danzig where material could be stored and men housed.

3. I learn that a certain Major-General Eberhard is now in command he

(Repeated to Berlin, No. 35, and Warsaw, No. 52.)

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Exhibit GB 48
Filed Dec. 6, 1945

T.C.77

II

Memorandum of a Conversation between Hitler, Ribbentrop and Ciano. Obersalzberg, August 12, 1939

At the beginning of the conversation the Führer, with the aid of maps showed Count Ciano the present position of Germany from a military point of view. He particularly emphasised the German western fortifications. There were the points at which in earlier times the French, for geographical and strategical reasons, had always attempted a "break-through". These points had now been protected with special care, so that a "break-through" was impossible at any of them. The western fortifications had been carried along the Luxembourg and Belgian frontiers to the borders of Holland so that a violation of the Belgian frontier would no longer bring any advantages to France, but would invoke the serious risk that Belgium, in order to defend her neutrality, and under pressure of the Flemish element in her population, would place herself on the German side. The one remaining possibility of attack was, theoretically, across the Netherlands, but, according to the view of the Führer, the Dutch would defend their neutrality with energy because they knew that if they took part in a general war they knew they would lose to Japan their almost undefended east-Asian colonies. Furthermore, in view of the countless rivers and canals, and of the possibility of flooding wide areas of the lowlands, the Netherlands offered very unsuitable territory as a starting-off point for a great army. Germany would obviously invade the Netherlands, in the event of a violation of Dutch neutrality and, owing to the very short distance of the German frontier from the Meuse, could reach this river within a few hours. Finally the Rhine, which in Holland was 1 - 1½ miles broad, offered a natural protection against attacks from this direction.

The third possibility of an attack in Germany consisted in blockade by the British navy. In this connexion it should be remembered that the great range of the latest German bombers brought the whole of England within their sphere of action and would allow them to attack the blockading ships from the air. There were no other possibilities of attacking Germany. The Scandinavian countries would doubtless remain neutral and they were certain that neither side would attack them because the occupation of countri as large as Norway and Sweden hardly came into consideration (it was not a practical question). Similarly Switzerland would certainly oppose to the uttermost any attempt on her neutrality.

In the East Germany had also erected strong defences. The Führer showed Count Ciano the various defence systems of East Prussia. On the other frontier strong fortifications were being constructed and as on the Polish frontier opposite Berlin was built up into an impregnable system of successor lines. The capital, however, was only 150 km. from the Polish frontier, and therefore exposed to air attack especially because, owing to its great size, it could be bombed from a very great height without attacking particular targets but with a certainty that bombs would fall somewhere within the city area.

Turning to the military position of the Western Powers the Führer pointed again to the vulnerability of England from the air. British aircraft production had made progress, but protected measures against raids were still much in arrears. It was known that England had decided only in the previous Autumn upon the definite type of anti-aircraft gun. The German experience of their own seven years of rearmament assured them that large scale production was possible only some long time after the selection of a prototype, so that no real anti-aircraft protection could come into existence in England for one or two years. Furthermore, London and all the large British cities and centres of industry suffered from the same disadvantage as Berlin in relation to air attack; bombing can be carried out from a great height and out of range of English anti-aircraft guns with the complete certainty that the results would always be successful.

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At sea, England had for the moment no immediate reinforcements in prospect. Some time would elapse before any of the ships now under construction could be taken into service. As far as the Land army was concerned, after the introduction of conscription 60,000 men had been called to the colours. If England kept the necessary troops in her own country she could send to France at the most two infantry divisions and one armoured division. For the rest she could supply a few bomber squadrons but hardly any fighters, since, at the outbreak of war the German Air Force would at once attack England and the English fighters would be urgently needed for the defence of their own country. With regard to the position of France, the Führer said that in the event of a general war, after the destruction of Poland, (which would not take long) Germany would be in a position to assemble hundreds of divisions along the West Wall and France would then be compelled to concentrate all her available forces from the Colonies, from the Italian frontier and elsewhere on her own Maginot Line for the life and death struggle which would then ensue. The Führer also thought that the French would find it no easier to overrun theItalian fortifications than to overrun the West Wall. Here Count Ciano showed signs of extreme doubt.

The Polish Army was most uneven in quality. Together with a few parade divisions, there were large numbers of troops of less value. Poland was very weak in anti-tank and anti-aircraft defence and at the moment neither France nor England could help her in this respect. If, however, Poland were given assistance by the Western Powers, over a longer period, she could obtain these weapons and German superiority would thereby be diminished. In contrast to the fanatics of Warsaw and Cracow, the population of their areas was different, furthermore, it was necessary to consider the position of the Polish state. Out of 34,000,000 inhabitants, 1½ million were German, about 4 million were Jews and 9 million Ukrainians, so that genuine Poles were much less in number than the total population and as already said, their striking power was not to be valued highly. In these circumstances Poland could be struck to the ground by Germany in the shortest time.

Since the Poles through their whole attitude had made it clear that in any case in the event of a conflict they would stand on the side of the enemies of Germany and Italy, a quick liquidation at the present moment could only be of advantage for the unavoidable conflict with the Western Democracies. If a hostile Poland remained on Germany's eastern frontier, not only would the eleven East Prussian divisions be tied down, but also further contingents would be kept in Pomerania and Silesia. This would not be necessary in the event of a previous liquidation. Generally speaking, the best thing to happen would be for the neutrals to be liquidated one after the other. This process could be carried out more easily if on every occasion one partner of the Axis covered the other, while it was dealing with an uncertain neutral. Italy might well regard Yugoslavia as a neutral of this kind. The Führer had told the Prince Regent on his visit to Germany that, with special relation to Italy, he should make a gesture showing that he sided politically with the Axis and thought of a closer connexion with the Axis and of the withdrawal of Yugoslavia from the League of Nations. Prince Paul agreed with the latter proposal. The Prince Regent had recently been to London and had tried there to reinsure himself with the Western Powers. He had thus taken the same line as Gafencu who had also been extremely reasonable during his visit to Germany and had repudiated an interest in the importance of the Western Democracies. It appeared that subsequently Gafencu had taken up an opposite standpoint in England. Of the Balkan countries, the Axis could trust completely Bulgaria alone as to some extent a natural ally of Italy and Germany. Therefore Germany had supplied Bulgaria as far as possible with armaments and could continue to do so. Yugoslavia would remain neutral only as long as it was dangerous for her to come openly on to the side of the Western Democracies. If matters took a turn for the worse for Germany and Italy, Yugoslavia would openly join the other side in the hope that she would then influence the course of events to take an official turn to the disadvantage of the Axis. Roumania was afraid of Hungary and from the military point of view externally weak and internally corrupt. King Carol would certainly abandon his neutrality if he

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were compelled to do so. Hungary was friendly and Slovakia was under German influence with German garrisons in certain areas.

Coming back to the Danzig question, the Führer said that it was impossible for him now to go back. He had made an agreement with Italy for the withdrawal of the Germans from South Tyrol, but for this reason he must take the greatest care to avoid giving the impression that this Tyrolese withdrawal could be taken as a precedent for other areas. Furthermore, he had justified the withdrawal by pointing to a general easterly and north easterly direction of a German policy. The east and north-east, that is to say the Baltic countries, had been Germany's undisputed sphere of influence since time immemorial, as the Mediterranean had been an appropriate sphere for Italy. For economic reasons also, Germany needed the foodstuffs and timber from these eastern regions. In the case of Danzig, German interests were not only material, although the city had the greatest harbour in the Baltic. Danzig was a Nuremberg of the north, an ancient German city awaking sentimental feelings for every German and the Führer was bound to take account of this psychological element in public opinion. To make a comparison with Italy, Count Ciano should suppose that Trieste was in Yugoslav hands and that a large Italian minority was being treated brutally on Yugoslav soil. It would be difficult to assume that Italy would long remain quiet over anything of this kind.

Count Ciano in replying to the Führer's statement first expressed the great surprise on the Italian side over the completely unexpected seriousness of the position. Neither in the conversations in Milan nor in those which took place during his Berlin visit had there been any sign from the German side that the position with regard to Poland was so serious. On the contrary, Ribbentrop had said that in his opinion, the Danzig question would be settled in the course of time. On these grounds, the Duce in view of his conviction that a conflict with the Western Powers was unavoidable, had assumed that he should make his preparations for this event; he had made plans for a period of two or three years. If immediate confliot were unavoidable, the Duce as he had told Ciano, would certainly stand on the German side but for various reasons he would welcome the postponement of a general conflict until a later time. Ciano then showed with the aid of a map, the position of Italy in the event of a general war. Italy believed that a conflict with Poland would not be limited to that country but would develop into a general European war.

The Führer commented that on this point there were differences of opinion. He personally was absolutely certain that the Western Democracies in the last resort would shrink from entering into a general war.

Count Ciano replied that he wished that the Führer were right, but that he did not think so, in any case it was necessary to consider the most unfavourable case that is to say a general war. Since the Abyssinian war, Italy had lived in a perpetual state of war and therefore needed a breathing space. Ciano then gave figures to show how great the material effort of Italy had been in relation to the Spanish war. Italian supplies of raw material were completely exhausted and it is necessary to allow time for their replacement. The Italian war industries which were in exposed sites and must also be moved south for purposes of defence. The talian artillery, especially anti-aircraft guns, greatly needed modernisation. The long coast line and other exposed places were most insufficiently defended. The naval position was also most unfavourable. At present Italy could only provide two battleships to meet the eleven or twelve battleships of the combined British and French fleets, whereas, in a few years she would have eight more ships at her disposition. (These figures were disputed by the Führer). Ciano said that the long Italian coast was difficult to defend and that the Anglo-French fleets had many bases at their disposition and particularly in harbours of Greece.

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Italy was especially vulnerable in her colonies although Libya was difficult to attack from Egypt, and the Italians might be able to reach Mersamatruh. On the other hand the position was very different in Tunis. The relation between the Italian-Arab and the French-Arab population there was 1-20, while the strength of the European troops was 1-5 to the disadvantage of Italy. Furthermore, the Italian fortifications on the side of the French frontier were completely insufficient and new pillboxes were needed.

Abyssinia was almost pacified as far as certain areas along the frontier merging with British territory were concerned. English gold and propaganda raised trouble upon the population. This pacification, however, was only superficial. In a general war it would suffice if a few English aeroplanes were to drop leaflets in Abyssinia maintaining that the world had risen against Italy and that the Negus would come back to cross the Abyssinian frontier. Furthermore, in the case of war Abyssinia would be completely cut off from Italy and the fate of the 200,000 Italians in the country would be completely uncertain. In a few days there would be an army of 4 to 5,000,000 men in Abyssinia able to advance successfully. In the case of war against the Sudan, Kenya and French Somaliland, the islands of the Dodecanese would be in a difficult position owing to the attitude of Turkey. Leros and Rhodes could defend themselves for years. Albania was a completely undeveloped country and could not for some years to come form a workable basis of operations against the Balkans, roads would have to be built and it would be necessary to exploit the mineral wealth, iron, copper, chrome and oil, after which a successful advance could be made to Salonika and other directions in the Balkans.

In the economic sphere Italy had plans of autarky which would take some years for realisation after which she would be in a position to endure a longer war without difficulties. An additional reason for the Duce's wish to postpone the conflict, was the question of the Italians abroad who should be brought back to Italy according to plan. There were a million Italians in France from whom about 700,000 could be regarded as still belonging to Italy, the remaining 300,000, however, in the case of war with France would be used as hostages as was clear from the measures taken in France in September of the previous year.

Finally the Duce himself set great importance upon carrying through the Rome Exhibition in the year 1942 for which the large scale preparations had been made and from which in the economic sphere and particularly in the matter of foreign currencies favourable results were expected.

In addition to these considerations especially affecting Italy there were other factors of a general political kind tending to favour the postponement of a general war. According to the Duce's view the encirclement policy of the Western Democracies would certainly function at the present time but, after an interval of time, the points of difference and the fundamental lack of unity between the parties of the encirclement front would make themselves felt and the front would accordingly fall to pieces.

Finally the Duce was convinced that the present strong state of feeling in England and France would not last very much longer especially in France the union sacree would break up in party quarrels if sufficient time were allowed on the side of the Axis. At the moment the Axis itself was responsible for the fact that party differences had been set aside in the countries concerned.

The position of Japan would also be considerably strengthened in two years time after the expected conclusion of the China war, while the position of Roosevelt in America would be severely shaken after a period of external tranquility, so that he would not be elected to the presidency for a third time, whereas his election was certain if war broke out. Spain which had just secured a government friendly to the Axis needed a period of rest after the Civil War but in two to three years time would be in fact a considerable factor on the side of the Axis, e.g. within two years Spain propose

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to build four battleships of 35,000 tons, the plans of which had recently been brought to Spain by an Italian General. This construction would take place at Ferrol.

For these reasons the Duce insisted that the Axis Powers should make a gesture which would reassure people of the peaceful intentions of Italy and Germany. This could be done through the publication of a communique which Ciano had already given to Ribbentrop (then follows the text of the proposed communique). Ciano said that the Duce had in mind a proposal for an international conference. The Führer declared that if a conference were held, Russia could no longer be excluded from future meetings of the Powers. In the German-Russian conversations, the Russians had made it clear with reference to Munich and other occasions, when they were excluded, that in future they would not submit to such treatment. In addition to the four great Powers and apart from Russia, Poland and Spain must also be summoned to a conference. That would mean, however, that Italy and Spain would be ranged against England, France, Russia and Poland, i.e. an unfavourable position. Ciano said that the Duce considered that the party would win at a conference which was ready in given circumstances to allow the conference to fail and take into account the eventuality of war as a result of failure. The Duce had, however, given consideration to the Fuhrer's view and had turned down his proposal. He was in favour of a peaceful gesture on the part of Italy and Germany saying that the Western Powers were not really ready for war. These Powers, however, according to the conviction of the Duce, who obtained very valuable information about the Democracies, would certainly begin war at the present time if they were in any way driven into a corner by the Axis and saw no other way out. The proposed German-Italian gesture offered an honourable way out which the democracies would certainly use for avoiding war. Wide circles warned them against war and the position of this (anti-war) party would naturally be considered strengthened by a peaceful gesture. Poland, from which the Western Powers would certainly draw apart, would be isolated after a certain time and be ready to accept reasonable solutions to the outstanding difficulties.

The Führer answered that for a solution of the Polish problem no time should be lost; the longer one waited until the autumn, the more difficult would military operations in Eastern Europe become. From the middle of September, weather conditions made air operations hardly possible in these areas, while the condition of the roads, which were quickly turned into a morass by the autumn rains, would be such as to make them impossible for motorised forces. From September to May, Poland was a great marsh and entirely unsuited for any kind of military operations. Poland could, however, occupy Danzig in September and Germany would not be able to do anything about it since they obviously could not bombard or destroy the place.

Ciano asked how soon, according to the Führer's view, the Danzig question must be settled. The Führer answered that this settlement must be made one way or another by the end of August. To the question of Ciano's: what solution the Führer proposed? Hitler answered that Poland must give up political control of Danzig, but that Polish economic interests would obviously be reserved and that Polish general behaviour must contribute to a general lessening of the tension. He doubted whether Poland was ready to accept this solution since up to the present the German proposals had been refused. The Führer had made this proposal personally to Beck at his visit to Obersalzberg. They were extremely favourable to Poland. In return for the political surrender of Danzig, under a complete guarantee of Polish interests and the establishment of a connexion between East Prussia and the Reich, Germany would have given a frontier guarantee, a 25 years pact of friendship and the participation of Poland in influence over Slovakia. Beck had received the proposal with remark that he was willing to examine it. The plain refusal of it came only as a result of English intervention. The general Polish aims could be seen clearly from the press. They wanted the whole of East Prussia and even

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proposed to advance to Berlin. It was unendurable for a Great Power to tolerate a neighbour of such hostile disposition at 150 kilometres from its capital. The Führer had therefore resolved to use the occasion of the next Polish provocation in the form of an ultimatum, the brutal ill-treatment of Germans in Poland, an attempt to starve out Danzig or the invasion of Poland within 48 hours and in this way to leave the problem. This would mean a considerable strengthening of the Axis just as an Italian liquidation of Yugoslavia would also mean an increase in strength. Ciano asked what action of this kind against Poland was to be expected because Italy must amply prepare herself for all eventualities. The Führer answered that in the circumstances a move against Poland must be reckoned with at any minute.

During this exchange of conversation the Führer was given a telegram from Moscow and a telegram from Tokio. The conversation was interrupted for a short time and Ciano was then told the text of the Moscow telegram. The Russians agreed to the despatch of a German political negotiator to Moscow. Ribbentrop added that the Russians were fully informed of the intentions of Germany with regard to Poland. He himself at the Führer's orders had informed the Russian Charge d'Affaires, the Führer added that according to his opinion Russia would not be ready to take the chestnuts out of the fire for the Western Powers. Stalin's position would be endangered as much by a victorious as by a defeated Russian army. Russian interest was to extend her access to the Balkans. Germany had nothing against this. On the other hand, Russia would never interfere on behalf of Poland whom she hated whole-heartedly. The sending of the Anglo-French Military Mission to Moscow had only one purpose, i.e. to conceal the catastrophic position of the political negotiations.

After a further consideration over the communique proposal the Fuhrer said that he would consider this proposal and Ciano's news about the general situation for inter-aid. He therefore proposed that the discussions should be continued on the following day.

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III

Memorandum of a conversation between Hitler, Ribbentrop and Ciano at Obersalzberg August 13, 1939

The Führer said that since the last conversation, he had been considering the whole position. Ribbentrop had meanwhile told him that in the circumstances Ciano had decided not to conclude the conversations with a communique. The Führer agreed with this decision. The door was therefore open, no-one was committed and no course was blocked.

The Führer had also come to the conclusion, as he had said in a previous conversation, that the danger of delaying too long into the autumn was that Poland would be able to carry out its relatively limited aims. Danzig could be made to submit by slow pressure and the treaty position was extremely favourable to Poland. Danzig could be blockaded and slowly ruined or even starved out from the second half of September and particularly from the beginning of October. The Poles could easily occupy the place. This occupation would be followed by a re-conquest of the Corridor and Danzig on the German side but any further military operations would be impossible at the present time of the year. Danzig therefore would fall into ruin, and the heavily motorised German forces which were necessary for deep penetration into Poland could not be used. In a severe winter, it would be possible to undertake certain military operations, but the weather conditions would make the emergency landing places and the usual aerodromes unusable. If Germany used these aerodromes the flying distances would be much prolonged, more petrol would be consumed and a considerable less weight of bombs could be carried. It was therefore necessary that within the shortest time, Poland should clearly state her intentions, and no further pro ocation should be endured by Germany. If these provocations were just allowed to pass, the affair would be prolonged until October when tanks and aircraft could not be used. The Polish General Staff knew these climatic conditions and their effect upon the German forces and therefore Poland was playing for time. The Führer had therefore come to two definite conclusions , 1) in the event of any further provocation, he would immediately attack, 2) if Poland did not clearly and plainly state her political intention, she must be forced to do so. It should not be forgotten that the test of nerves which the Poles had begun by means of continual instances of provocation had not lasted for three months. Any sign of giving way would, in view of the Slav mentality, bring a violent reaction of over-confidence on the part of the Poles. Surrender would not, in any way strengthen the German position but would be regarded by every other country as a sign of weakness. If the Western Democracies had already decided to move against the Axis, they would not in any case wait for three or four years before carrying out their plan and attack only at a time when the Axis Powers had completed their necessary preparations, but they would pass the earlier conflict. If, however, they had not yet come to a decision in the matter (and the Führer thought that in the state of their armaments they had not come to this decision), the best way of preventing them would be to deal with the Polish matter quickly. In general, however, success by one of the Axis partners, not only strategical but also psychological strengthening of the other partner and also of the whole Axis would ensue. Italy carried through a number of successful operations in Abyssinia, Spain and Albania and each time against the wishes of the Democratic Entente. These individual actions have not only strengthened Italian local interests but had also reinforced her general position, the same was the case with German actions in Austria and Czechoslovakia. Here also not only had German local interest been strengthened but the general position had been re-inforced. The Axis had thereby won considerable victories. If one were to consider what would have happened if these individual operations had not been successful and to ask what the position of Germany would then have been, one reached a similar conclusion. The strengthening of the Axis by these individual operations was of the greatest importance for the unavoidable clash with the Western Powers. As matters now stand, Germany and Italy would simply not

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exist further in the world through lack of space, not only was there no more space but existing space was completely blockaded by its present possessors, they sat like misers with their heaps of gold and deluded themselves about their riches. The Western Democracies were dominated by the desire to rule the world and would not regard Germany and Italy as their class. This psychological element of contempt was perhaps the worst thing about the whole business. It could only be settled by a life and death business. It could only be settled by a life and death struggle which the two Axis partners could meet more easily because their interests did not clash on any point. The Mediterranean was obviously the most ancient domain for which Italy had a claim to predominance. The Duce himself had summed up the position to him in the words that Italy already was the dominant power in the Mediterranean. On the other hand, the Führer said that Germany must take the old German road eastwards and that this road was also desirable for economic reasons, and that Italy had geographical and historical claims to permanency in the Mediterranean. Bismarck had recognised it and had said as much in his well-known letter to Manzzini. The interests of Germany and Italy went in quite different directions and there never could be a conflict between them. Ribbentrop added that if the two problems mentioned in yesterday's conversations were settled, Italy and Germany would have their backs free for work against the west. The Führer said that Poland must be struck down so that for (?50) years long she was incapable of fighting. In such a case, matters in the west could be settled. Ciano thanked the Führer for his extremely clear explanation of the situation. He had, on his side, nothing to add and would give the Duce full details. He asked for more definite information on one point in order that the Duce might have all the facts before him. The Duce might indeed have to make no decision because the Führer believed that the conflict with Poland could be localised on the basis of long experience. He (Ciano) quite saw that so far the Führer had always been right in his judgment of the position. If, however, Mussolini had no decision to make, he had to take certain measures of precaution and therefore Ciano would put the following question:-

The Führer had mentioned two conditions under which he would take Poland 1) if Poland were guilty of serious provocation and 2) if Poland did not make her political position clear. The first of these conditions depended on the decision of the Führer and German reaction could follow it in a moment. The second condition required certain decisions as to times. Ciano therefore asked what was the date by which Poland must have satisfied Germany about her political condition. He realised that this date depended upon climatic conditions.

The Führer answered that the decision of Poland must be made clear at the latest by the end of August. Since, however, the decisive part of military operations against Poland could be carried out within a period of 14 days and the final liquidation would need another 4 weeks, it could be finished at the end of September or the beginning of October these could be regarded as the dates. It followed therefore that the last dates on which he could begin to take action was the end of August. Finally the Führer assured Ciano that since his youth, he had favoured German-Italian co-operation and that no other view was expressed in his books. He had always thought that Germany and Italy were naturally suited for collaboration since there were no conflicts of interests between them. He was personally fortunate to live at a time in which, apart from himself, there was one other statesman who would stand out great and unique in history; that he could be this man's friend was for him a matter of great personal satisfaction and if the hour of common battle struck, he would always be found on the side of the Duce.

Exhibit G.B. 49
Filed Dec. 6, 1945

PS 699

H1151-0155

Berlin 48, 25th August, 1939
Unter der linden 13.

Minister ff the Reich Walter Funk

My Fuhrer!

I thank you sincerely and heartily for your most friendly and kind wishes on the occasion of my birthday. How happy and how grateful to you we ought to be for being granted the favour of experiencing these overwhelmingly great and world-changing times and taking part in the mighty events of these days.

The information given to me by Field Marshal Goering, that you, my Fuhrer, yesterday evening approved in principle the measures prepared by me for financing the war and for shaping the relationship between wages and prices and for carrying through emergency sacrifices, made me deeply happy. I hereby report to you with all respect, that I have succeeded by means of precautions taken during the last few months, in making the Reichsbank internally so strong and externally so unassailable, that even the most serious shocks in the international money and credit market cannot affect us in the least. In the meantime I have quite inconspicuously changed into gold all the assets of the Reichsbank and of the whole of German economy abroad which it was possible to lay hands on. Under the proposals I have prepared for a ruthless elimination of all consumption which is not of vital importance and of all public expenditure and public works which are not of importance for the war effort, we will be in a position to cope with all demands on finance and economy, without any serious shocks. I have considered it my duty as the general plenipotentiary for economy appointed by you to make this report and solemn promise to you, my Fuhrer.

Heil my Fuhrer

Walter Funk.

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ride USA 30

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1014-PS
OFFICE OF U.S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL.

SECOND SPEECH BY THE FUEHRER ON 22 AUG '39.

It may also turn out differently regarding England and France. One cannot predict it with certainty. I figure on a trade-barrier, not on blocka and with severance of relations. Most iron determination on our side. Retreat before nothing. Everybody shall have to make a point of it that we were determined from the beginning to fight the Western powers. Struggle for life or death. Germany has won every war as long as she was united. Iron, unflinching attitude of all superiors, greatest confidence, faith in victory, overcoming of the past by getting used to heaviest strain. A long period of peace would not do us any good. Therefore it is necessary to expect everything. Manly bearing. It is not machines that fight each other, but men. We have the better quality of men. Mental factors are decisive. The opposite camp has weaker people. In 1918, the Nation fell down because the mental prerequisities were not sufficient. Frederic the Great secured final success only through his mental power.

Destruction of Poland in the foreground. The aim is elimination of living forces, not the arrival at a certain line. Even if war should break out in the West, the destruction of Poland shall be the primary objective. Quick decision because of the season.

I shall give a propagandistic cause for starting the war, - never mind whether it be plausible or not. The victor shall not be asked later on, whether we told the truth or not. In starting and making a war, not the Right is what matters but Victory.

Have no pity, brutal attitude. 80 million people shall get what is their right. Their existence has to be secure . The strongest has the Right. Greatest severity.

Quick decision necessary. Unshakeable faith in the German soldier. A crisis may happen only if the nerves of the leaders give way.

First aim, advance to the Vistula and Narew. Our technical superiority will break the nerves of the Poles. Every newly created Polish force shall again be broken at once. Constant war of atrition.

New German frontier according to healthy principle. Possibly a protectorate as a buffer. Military operations shall not be influenced by these reflections. Complete destruction of Poland is the military aim. To be fast is the main thing. Pursuit until complete elimination.

Conviction that the German Wehrmacht is up to the requirements. The start shall be ordered, probably by Saturday morning.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. 1014-PS.

12 Oct. 1945.

I, FRED NIEBERGALL, 2nd Lt. Inf 0-133 55 67, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true translation of Document No. 1014-PS.

'Sgd' FRED NIBERGALL

2nd Lt. Inf.
?-133 55 67.

H1151-0156

H1151-0157

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT NO. 798-PS
Office of U.S. Chief of Counsel.

The Führer's speech to the Commanders in Chief on 22 August 1939.

I have called you together to give you a picture of the political situation, in order that you may have insight into the individual elements on which I have based my decision to act and in order to strengthen your confidence.

After this we will discuss military details.

It was clear to me that a conflict with Poland had to come sooner or later. I had already made this decision in spring, but I thought that I would first turn against the West in a few years, and only afterwards against the East. But the sequence cannot be fixed. One cannot close one's eyes even before a threatening situation. I wanted to establish an acceptable relationship with Poland in order to fight first against the West. But this plan, which was agreeable to me, could not be executed, since essential points have changed. It became clear to me, that Poland would attack us in case of a conflict with the West. Poland wants access to the sea. The further development became obvious after the occupation of the Memel region, and it became clear to me that under circumstances a conflict with Poland could arise at an inopportune moment. I enumerate as reasons for this reflection:

1) First of all two personal constitutions:

My own personality and that of Mussolini.

Essentially it depends on me, my existence, because of my political activities. Furthermore the fact that probably no one will ever again have the confidence of the whole German people as I do. There will probably never again be a man in the future with more authority than I have. My existence is therefore a factor of great value. But I can be eliminated at any time by a criminal or an idiot.

The second personal factor is the Duce. His existence is also decisive. If something happens to him, Italy's loyality to the alliance will no longer be certain. The basic attitude of the Italian court is against the Duce. Above all, the court sees in the expansion of the empire a burden. The Duce is the man with the strongest nerves in Italy.

The third factor favourable for us is France. We can ask only benevolent neutrality from Spain. But this depends on France's personality. He guarantees a certain uniformity and steadiness of the present system in Spain. We must take into account the fact that Spain does not as yet have a Fascist party of our internal unity.

On the other side a negative picture as far as decisive personalities are concerned. There is no outstanding personality in England or France.

For us it is easy to make decision. We have nothing to lose; we can only gain. Our economic situation is such, because of our restrictions, that we cannot hold out more than a few years. Goering can confirm this. We have no other choice, we must act. Our opponents risk much and can gain only a little. England's stake in a war is unimaginably great. Our enemies have men who are below average. No personalities. No masters, no men of action.

Besides the personal factor, the political situation is favourable for us; in the Mediterranean rivalry among Italy, France, and England, in the Orient tension, which leads to the alarming of the Mohammedan world.

The English empire did not emerge from the last war strengthened. From a maritime point of view, nothing was achieved. Conflict between England and Ireland. The South African Union became more independent. Concessions had to be made to India. England is in great danger. Unhealthy industries. A British statesman can look into the future only with concern.

France's position has also deteriorated particularly in the Mediterranean.

Further favourable factors for us are these:

Since Albania there is an equilibrium of power in the Balkans. Yugoslavia carries the germ of collapse because of her internal situation.

Rumania did not grow stronger. She is liable to attack and vulnerable. She is threatened by Hungary and Bulgaria. Since Kemal's death, Turkey has been ruled by small minds, unsteady, weak men.

All these fortunate circumstances will no longer prevail in 2 to 3 years. No one knows how long I shall live. Therefore conflict better now.

The creation of Greater Germany was a great achievement politically, but militarily it was questionable, since it was achieved through a bluff of the political leaders. It is necessary to test the military. If at all possible, not by general settlement, but by solving individual tasks.

The relation to Poland has become unbearable. My Polish policy hitherto was in contrast to the ideas of the people. My propositions to Poland (Danzig corridor) were distrubed by England's intervention. Poland changed her tone towards us. The initiative cannot be allowed to pass to the others. This moment is more favourable than in 2 to 3 years. An attempt on my life or Mussolini's could change the situation to our disadvantage. One cannot eternally stand opposite one another with cocked rifle. A suggested compromise would have demanded that we change our convictions and make agreeable gestures. They talked to us again in the language of Versailles. There was danger of losing prestige. Now the probability is still great that the West will not interfere. We must accept the risk with reckless resolution. A politician must accept a risk as much as a military leader. We are facing the alternative to strike or to be destroyed with certainty sooner or later.

Reference to previous risks.

I would have been stoned if I had not carried my point. The most dangerous step was the invasion of the neutral zone. Only a week before, I got a warning through France. I have always accepted a great risk in the conviction that it may succeed.

Now it is also a great risk. Iron nerves, iron resolution.

The following special reasons strengthen my idea. England and France are obligated, neither is in a position for it. There is no actual rearmament in England, just propaganda. It has done much damage that many reluctant Germans said and wrote to Englishmen after the solution of the Czech question; The Führer carried his point because you lost your nerve, because you capitulated too soon. This explains the present propaganda war. The English speak of a war of nerves. It is one element of this war of nerves to present the increase of armament. But how is British rearmament in actual fact. The construction programme of the Navy for 1938 has not yet been filled. Only mobilization of the reserve fleet. Purchase of fishing steamers. Considerable strengthening of the Navy, not before 1941 or 1942.

Little has been done on land. England will be able to send a maximum of 3 divisions to the continent. A little has been done for the air force, but it is only a beginning. AA defense is in its beginning stages. At the moment England has only 150 AA guns. The new AA gun has been ordered. It will take a long time until enough have been produced. Fire directors are lacking. England is still vulnerable from the air. This can change in 2 to 3 years. At the moment the English air force has only 130,000 men, France 72,000 men, Poland 15,000 men. England does not want the conflict to break out for two or three years.

The following is characteristic for England. Poland wanted a loan from England for rearmament. England, however, only gave credit in order to make sure that Poland buys in England, although England cannot deliver. This means that England does not really want to support Poland. She does not risk 8 million pounds in Poland, although she put half a billion into China. England's position in the world is very precarious. She will not accept any risks.

France lacks men (decline of the birth rate). Little has been done for rearmament. The artillery is antiquated. France did not want to enter on this adventure. The West has only two possibilities to fight against us:

1) Blockade: It will not be effective because of our antarchy and because we have sources of aid in the east.

2) Attack from the West from the Maginot line: I consider this impossible.

Another possibility is the violation of Dutch, Belgium, and Swiss neutrality. I have no doubts that all these states as well as Skandinavia will defend their neutrality by all available means. England and France will not violate the neutrality of these countries. Actually England cannot help Poland. There remains an attack on Italy. A military attack is out of the question. No one is counting on a long war. If Mr. von Brandutch had told me that I would need 4 years to conquer Poland I would have replied: then it

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cannot be done. It is nonsense to say that England wants to wage a long war.

We will hold our position in the West until we have conquered Poland. We must be conscious of our great production. It is much bigger than in 1914-1918.

The enemy had another hope, that Russia would become our enemy after the conquest of Poland. The enemy did not count on my great power of resolution. Our enemies are little worms. I saw them in Munich.

I was convinced that Stalin would never accept the England offer. Russia has no interest in maintaining Poland and Stalin knows that it is the end of his regime no matter whether his soldiers come out of a war victorious or beaten. Litvinow's replacement was decisive. I brought about the change toward Russia gradually. In connection with the commercial treaty we got into political conversation. Proposal of a non-aggression pact. Then came a general proposal from Russia. Four days ago I took a special step, which brought it about that Russia answered yesterday that she is ready to sign. The personal contract with Stalin is established. The day after tomorrow von Ribbentrop will conclude the treaty. Now Poland is in the position in which I wanted her.

We need not be afraid of a blockade. The East will supply us with grain, cattle, coal, lead and zinc. It is a big arm, which demands great efforts. I am only afraid that at the last minute some Schweinehund will make a proposal for mediation.

The political arm is set farther. A beginning has been made for the destruction of England's hegemony. The way is open for the soldier, after I have made the political preparations.

Today's publication of the non-aggression pact with Russia hit like a shell. The consequences cannot be overlooked. Stalin also said that this course will be of benefit to both countries. The effect on Poland will be tremendous.

Goering answers with thanks to the Führer and the assurance that the armed forces will do their duty.

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CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. 798-PS

15 Nov. 1945.

I, Virginia von Schon, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a correct and true translation of Document No. 798-PS.

Virginia von Schon
046318

Exhibit G.B. 50
Filed Dec. 6, 1945

TC 72

DOCUMENTS CONCERNING GERMAN POLISH RELATIONS
and the
OUTBREAK OF HOSTILITIES BETWEEN GREAT BRITAIN AND GERMANY
3rd September, 1939

No. 62

Mr. F.M. Shepherd to Viscount Halifax.

(Telegraphic)

Danzig, August 26, 1939.

Following is translation of decree of Senate dated 23rd August:-

"Decree: Article 1.- Gauleiter of Danzig is Head of State ('Staatsoberhaupt') of the Free City of Danzig.

"Article 2.- This decree comes into force on 23rd August, 1939.

Following are translations of letters dated 24th August (a) from President of Senate to Herr Forster, and (b) of latter's reply:-

"(a) At its meeting yesterday the Senate passed a resolution according to which you have been declared Staatsoberhaupt of the Free City of Danzig as from yesterday. A copy of the certified resolution is enclosed. In addition, a legal decree has been prepared today and signed making the above-mentioned resolution of the Senate operative. By means of these two acts of the Government the Danzig Constitution has been altered in the above-mentioned sense. The Senate has authorised me to request you, Herr Gauleiter, to accept this office forthwith in order in these difficult but wonderful last decisive days outwardly to give expression to the unity between party and State, which has so often been stressed and which inwardly has always existed.

"(b) I have taken cognisance of the contents of your letter of the 24th instant and of the enclosed certified copy of the decree regarding the Staatsoberhaupt of the Free City of Danzig of 23rd August, 1939, and of the copy of the Senate's resolution of the 23rd August, 1939, which was also enclosed. It, of course, goes without saying that in my capacity as Leader of the N.S.D.A.P. of the Danzig district I am prepared in days which are so fateful for Danzig also to conduct the affairs of the State. With this decree promulgated on the 23rd August, 1939, a state of affairs is officially sanctioned which, since the accession to power by the National Socialists in 1933, has in practice been in force."

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Exhibit G.B. 51
Filed Dec. 6, 1945

T.C.72.

No.53.

Sir H. Kennard to Viscount Halifax.

(Telegraphic)

Warsaw, August 26, 1939.

Series of incidents again occurred yesterday on German frontier.

2. Polish patrol met party Germans 1 kilometre from East Prussian froniter near Pelta. Germans opened fire. Polish patrol replied, killing leader, whose body is being returned.

3. German bands also crossed Silesian frontier near Szczyglo, twice near Rybnik and twice elsewhere, firing shots and attacking blockhouses and customs posts with machine guns and hand grenades. Poles have protested vigorously to Berlin.

4. Gazeta Polska, in inspired leader to-day, says these are more than incidents. They are clearly prepared acts of aggression of para-military disciplined detachments supplied with regular army's arms, and in one case it was a regular army detachment. Attacks more or less continuous.

5. These incidents did not cause Poland to forsake calm and strong attitude of defence. Facts spoke for themselves and acts of aggression came from German side. This was best answer to ravings of German press.

6. Ministry for Foreign Affairs state uniformed German detachment has since shot Pole across frontier and wounded another.

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Exhibit USA 52
Filed Dec. 6, 1945

T.C.72.

No. 54.

Sir H. Kennard to Viscount Halifax.

(Telegraphic) Warsaw, August 26, 1939.

Ministry for Foreign Affairs categorically deny story recounted by Herr Hitler to French Ambassador that twenty-four Germans were recently kiled at Lodz and eight at Bielsko. Story is without any foundation whatever.

(1980)

H1151-0163

Exhibit #13 53
Filed Dec. 6, 1945

T.C.72

No. 55.

Sir H. Kennard to Viscount Halifax.

(Telegraphic) Warsaw, August 27, 1939.

So far as I can judge, German allegations of mass ill-treatment of German minority by Polish authorities are gross exaggeration, if not complete falsification.

2. There is no sign of any loss of control of situation by Polish civil authorities. Warsaw (and so far as I can ascertain the rest of Poland) is still completely calm.

3. Such allegations are reminiscent of Nazi propaganda methods regarding Czecho-Slovakia last year.

4. In any case it is purely and simply deliberate German provocation in accordance with fixed policy that has since March exacerbated feeling between the two nationalities. I suppose this has been done with object (a) creating war spirit in Germany, (b) impressing public opinion abroad, (c) provoking either defeatism or apparent aggression in Poland.

5. It has signally failed to achieve either of the two latter objects.

6. It is noteworthy that Danzig was hardly mentioned by Herr Hitler.

7. German treatment of Czech Jews and Polish minority is apparently negligible factor compared with alleged sufferings of Germans in Poland, where, be it noted, they do not amount to more than 10 per cent of population in any commune.

8. In face of these facts, it can hardly be doubted that, if Herr Hitler decided on war, it is for the sole purpose of destroying Polish independence.

9. I shall lose no opportunity of impressing on Minister for Foreign Affairs necessity of doing everything possible to prove that Herr Hitler's allegations regarding German minority are false.

(1981)

Exhibit U.S.A. 54
Filed Dec. 6, 1945

(Identified by General Keitel as a memorandum of Admiral Canaris)

PS 795

CONVERSATION WITH GENERAL KEITEL
on 17 August 1939

I reported my conference with Jost to Keitel. He said that he would not pay any attention to this action, as the Fuehrer had not informed him and had only let him know that we were to furnish HEYDERICH with Polish uniforms. He agrees that I instruct the General Staff. He says that he does not think much of actions of this kind. However, there is nothing else to be done if they have been ordered by the Fuehrer, that he could not ask the Fuehrer how he had planned the execution of this special action. In regard to Dirschau he has decided that this action would be executed only by the army.

I then reported my conference with ROATTA. He told me that he thought it very good if MUSSOLINI would tell the Fuehrer in definite terms that he would not enter the war. He personally is of the opinion that MUSSOLINI would join anyhow. I answered him that I believed this improbable by reason of the conference between CIANO and RIBBENTROP which I reported to him once more in detail. He says that the Fuehrer had told him contrarywise. Based on my reports he had to conclude that the Fuehrer does not tell him - KEITEL - everything. Furthermore, I told him that I had learned from Count MAROGNA that the King of Italy had told King Alfonso a few days ago that he would not sign under any circumstances if MUSSOLINI should present the order for mobilization.

In connection with this KEITEL expresses the opinion that it is quite interesting to note that even a country like Italy which is governed by a dictatorship does not think much of war. How much more so must it be in the democratic countries? He is confident that the English would not interfere. I tried to contradict his views and say that the English would certainly at once institute a blockade and would destroy our merchant shipping. KEITEL believes this to be of no great importance as we would receive oil from Rumania. I answered that this is not the deciding factor and that we could not resist a blockade for a long time and that England would fight against this with all their means if we should use force against the Poles and if it were to come to bloodshed. I told him that the English would have acted in precisely the same manner, had any bloodshed occurred when we marched into Czechoslovakia. I tried to explain to KEITEL the consequences of economic warfare for Germany and tell him that we have only very few means to counteract it. Just a short while ago I had heard that we could only send 10 submarines into the Atlantic Ocean. KEITEL thinks that it should be easy to force Rumania to surrender her oil after the conquest of Poland. I called his attention to the actions of the English in the Balkans and tried to explain to him that the English would certainly have everything prepared in the Balkans for such an eventuality. Bulgaria would not be useful to us as an ally as it would be attacked at once by Rumania and Turkey.

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H1151-0165

BRITISH DOCUMENT BOOK NO.2.

PART VI

POLITICAL ACTION - LAST WEEK AUG. 1939

(a) BRITISH AND FRENCH GOVERNMENTS POSITION MADE CLEAR

TC 72 No.56		22 Aug 39	British P.M.'s letter to Hitler
"	60	23 Aug 39	Hitler's reply to British P.M.
TC 73	91	25 Aug 39	Anglo-Polish Agreement
TC 78		26 Aug 39	M.Daladier's letter to Hitler
TC 79		27 Aug 39	Hitler's reply to M.Daladier

(b) APPEALS FOR PEACE

TC 72 No.124		24 Aug 39	President Roosevelt's Appeal
"	126	25 Aug 39	President Moscicki's reply
"	127	25 Aug 39	President Roosevelt's second appeal
"	139	24 Aug 39	The Pope's appeal
"	141	31 Aug 39	The Pope's appeal

(c) FINAL GERMAN OFFERS

TC 90			Extract Goering's interrogation 29 Aug P.M. p.7
" 91			Extract Ribbentrop's interrogation 29 Aug P.M. p.16
" 72 No 68		25 Aug 39	Hitler's verbal communique
" 7	74	28 Aug 39	British Government's reply
"	75	28 Aug 39	Hitler - Sir N.Henderson conversation
"	78	29 Aug 39	Hitler's reply to British Govt.
"	79	29 Aug 39	Hitler - Sir N.Henderson conversation
"	89	30 Aug 39	British Government's reply

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TC 72 92	30 Aug 39	Ribbentrop - Sir N.Henderson conversation midnight 30 Aug 39
TC 73 No 112	31 Aug 39	Ribbentrop - Lipski conversation
C 126	31 Aug 39	Hitler's Directive No.1 for conduct of war
TC 73 No 113	31 Aug 39	German Broadcast 9 p.m. 31 Aug 39
TC 72 No.113	31 Aug 39	Copy German Proposals handed to Sir N.Henderson 9.15 P.M. 31 Aug 39
TC 54	1 Sep 39	Hitler's Proclamation
TC 72 No.110	1 Sep 39	British Government's ultimatum
" 118	3 Sep 39	British Government's final ultimatum
PS 1831	3 Sep 39	Mussolini's telegram to Hitler
"	4 Sep 39	Hitler's letter to Mussolini
TC 72		British Blue Book
TC 73		Polish White Book

Exhibit G.B. 55
Filed Dec. 6, 1945

TC.72.

DOCUMENTS CONCERNING GERMAN-POLISH RELATIONS AND THE OUTBREAK OF HOSTILITIES BETWEEN GREAT BRITAIN AND GERMANY ON SEPTEMBER 3rd., 1939.

Developments leading immediately to the outbreak of hostilities between Great Britain and Germany on 3 Sep 39.

No. 56.

Letter of August 22, 1939, from the Prime Minister to the German Chancellor.

Your Excellency,

10 Downing Street, Aug. 22, 39.

Your Excellency will have already heard of certain measures taken by His Majesty's Government, and announced in the press and on the wireless this evening.

These steps have, in the opinion of His Majesty's Government, been rendered necessary by the military movements which have been reported from Germany, and by the fact that apparently the announcement of a German-Soviet Agreement is taken in some quarters in Berlin to indicate that intervention by Great Britain on behalf of Poland is no longer a contingency that need be reckoned with. No greater mistake could be made. Whatever may prove to be the nature of the German-Soviet Agreement, it cannot alter Great Britain's obligation to Poland which His Majesty's Government have stated in public repeatedly and plainly, and which they are determined to fulfil.

It has been alleged that, if His Majesty's Government had made their position more clear in 1914, the great catastrophe would have been avoided. Whether or not there is any force in that allegation, His Majesty's Government are resolved that on this occasion there shall be no such tragic misunderstanding.

If the case should arise, they are resolved, and prepared, to employ without delay all the forces at their command, and it is impossible to foresee the end of hostilities once engaged. It would be a dangerous illusion to think that, if war once starts, it will come to an early end even if a success on any one of the several fronts on which it will be engaged should have been secured.

Having thus made our position perfectly clear, I wish to repeat to you my conviction that war between our two peoples would be the greatest calamity that could occur. I am certain that it is desired neither by our people, nor by yours, and I cannot see that there is anything in the questions arising between Germany and Poland which could not and should not be resolved without the use of force, if only a situation of confidence could be restored to enable discussions to be carried on in an atmosphere different from that which prevails to-day.

We have been, and at all times will be, ready to assist in creating conditions in which such negotiations could take place, and in which it might be possible concurrently to discuss the wider problems affecting the future of international relations, including matters of interest to us and to you.

The difficulties in the way of any peaceful discussion in the present state of tension are, however, obvious, and the longer that tension is maintained, the harder will it be for reason to prevail.

These difficulties, however, might be mitigated, if not removed, provided that there could for an initial period be a truce on both sides -

H1151-0167

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to press polemics and to all incitement.

If such a truce could be arranged, then, at the end of that period, during which steps could be taken to examine and deal with complaints made by either side as to the treatment of minorities, it is reasonable to hope that suitable conditions might have been established for direct negotiations between Germany and Poland upon the issues between them (with the aid of a neutral intermediary, if both sides should think that that would be helpful).

But I am bound to say that there would be slender hope of bringing such negotiations to successful issue unless it were understood beforehand that any settlement reached would, when concluded, be guaranteed by other Powers. His Majesty's Government would be ready, if desired, to make such contribution as they could to the effective operation of such guarantees.

At this moment I confess I can see no other way to avoid a catastrophe that will involve Europe in war.

In view of the grave consequences to humanity, which may follow from the action of their rulers, I trust that Your Excellency will weigh with the utmost deliberation the considerations which I have put before you.

Yours sincerely,

NEVILLE CHAMBERLAIN.

Exhibit G.B. 56
Filed Dec. 6, 1945

TC.72.

DOCUMENTS CONCERNING GERMAN-POLISH RELATIONS AND THE OUTBREAK OF HOSTILITIES BETWEEN GREAT BRITAIN AND GERMANY ON SEPTEMBER 3rd., 1939.

Developments leading immediately to the outbreak of hostilities between Great Britain and Germany on 3 Sep 39.

No. 60.

Communication from the German Chancellor to the Prime Minister, handed to His Majesty's Ambassador on August 23,1939.

(Translation.)

Your Excellency,

The British Ambassador has just handed to me a communication in which your Excellency draws attention in the name of the British Government to a number of points which in your estimation are of the greatest importance.

I may be permitted to answer your letter as follows:-

1. Germany has never sought conflict with England and has never interfered in English interests. On the contrary, she has for years endeavoured - although unfortunately in vain - to win England's friendship. On this account she voluntarily assumed in a wide area of Europe the limitations on her own interests which from a national-political point of view it would have otherwise been very difficult to tolerate.

2. The German Reich, however, like every other State possesses certain definite interests which it is impossible to renounce. These do not extend beyond the limits of the necessities laid down by former German history and deriving from vital economic pre-requisities. Some of these questions held and still hold a significance both of a national-political and a psychological character which no German Government is able to ignore.

To these questions belong the German City of Danzig, and the connected problem of the Corridor. Numerous statesmen, historians and men of letters even in England have been conscious of this at any rate up to a few years ago. I would add that all these territories lying in the aforesaid German sphere of interest and in particular those lands which returned to the Reich eighteen months ago received their cultural development at the hands not of the English but exclusively of the Germans and this, moreover, already from a time dating back over a thousand years.

3. Germany was prepared to settle the questions of Danzig and of the Corridor by the method of negotiation on the basis of a proposal of truly unparalleled magnanimity. The allegations disseminated by England regarding a German mobilisation against Poland, the assertion of aggressive designs towards Roumania, Hungary, &c., as well as the so-called guarantee declarations which were subsequently given had, however, dispelled Polish inclination to negotiate on a basis of this kind which would have been tolerable for Germany also.

4. The unconditional assurance given by England to Poland that she would render assistance to that country in all circumstances regardless of the causes from which a conflict might spring, could only be interpreted in that country as an encouragement thence-forward to unloosen, under cover of such a charter, a wave of appalling terrorism against the one and a half million German inhabitants living in Poland. The atrocities

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which since then have been taking place in that country are terrible for the victims, but intolerable for a Great Power such as the German Reich which is expected to remain a passive onlooker during these happenings. Poland has been guilty of numerous breaches of her legal obligations towards the Free City of Danzig, has made demands in the character of ultimata, and has initiated a process of economic strangulation.

5. The Government of the German Reich therefore recently caused the Polish Government to be informed that it was not prepared passively to accept this development of affairs, that it will not tolerate further addressing of notes in the character of ultimata to Danzig, that it will not tolerate a continuance of the persecution of the German minority, that it will equally not tolerate the extermination of the Free City of Danzig by economic measures, in other words, the destruction of the vital bases of the population of Danzig by a kind of Customs blockade, and that it will not tolerate the occurrence of further acts of provocation directed against the Reich. Apart from this, the questions of the Corridor and of Danzig must and shall be solved.

6. Your Excellency informs me in the name of the British Government that you will be obliged to render assistance to Poland in any such case of intervention on the part of Germany. I take note of this statement of yours and assure you that it can make no change in the determination of the Reich Government to safeguard the interests of the Reich as stated in paragraph 5 above. Your assurance to the effect that in such an event you anticipate a long war is shared by myself. Germany, if attacked by England, will be found prepared and determined. I have already more than once declared before the German people and the world that there can be no doubt concerning the determination of the new German Reich rather to accept, for however long it might be, every sort of misery and tribulation than to sacrifice its national interests, let alone its honour.

7. The German Reich Government has received information to the effect that the British Government has the intention to carry out measures of mobilisation which, according to the statements contained in your own letter, are clearly directed against Germany alone. This is said to be true of France as well. Since Germany has never had the intention of taking military measures other than those of a defensive character against England or France, and, as has already been emphasised, has never intended, and does not in the future intend, to attack England or France, it follows that this announcement as confirmed by you, Mr. Prime Minister, in your own letter, can only refer to a contemplated act of menace directed against the Reich. I therefore inform your Excellency that, in the event of these military announcements being carried into effect, I shall order immediate mobilisation of the German forces.

8. The question of the treatment of European problems on a peaceful basis is not a decision which rests on Germany but primarily on those who since the crime committed by the Versailles dictate have stubbornly and consistently opposed any peaceful revision. Only after a change of spirit on the part of the responsible Powers can there be any real change in the relationship between England and Germany. I have all my life fought for Anglo-German friendship; the attitude adopted by British diplomacy - at any rate up to the present - has, however, convinced me of the futility of such an attempt. Should there be any change in this respect in the future nobody could be happier than I.

ADOLF HITLER.

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Exhibit U.S. 57
Offered Dec. 6, 1945
Vide 27

T.C. 73
No. 91

T.C. 73.
No. 91.

Anglo-Polish Agreement of Mutual Assistance
London, August, 25, 1939

The Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and North Ireland and the Polish Government,

Desiring to place on a permanent basis the collaboration between their respective countries resulting from the assurances of mutual assistance of a defensive character which they have already exchanged

Have resolved to conclude an Agreement for that purpose and have appointed as their Plenipotentiaries:

The Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland:
The Rt. Hon. Viscount Halifax, K.G., G.C.S.I., G.C.I.E., Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs;

The Polish Government:

His Excellency Count Edward Raczynski, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Polish Republic in London;

Who, having exchanged their Full Powers, found in good and due form, have agreed on the following provisions:-

ARTICLE 1

Should one of the Contracting Parties become engaged in hostilities with a European Power in consequence of aggression by the latter against that Contracting Party, the other Contracting Party will at once give the Contracting Party engaged in hostilities all the support and assistance in its power.

ARTICLE 2

(1) The provisions of Article 1 will also apply in the event of any action by a European Power which clearly threatened, directly or indirectly, the independence of one of the Contracting Parties, and was of such a nature that the Party in question considered it vital to resist it with its armed forces.

(2) Should one of the Contracting Parties become engaged in hostilities with a European Power in consequence of action by that Power which threatened the independence or neutrality of another European State in such a way as to constitute a clear menace to the security of that Contracting Party, the provisions of Article 1 will apply, without prejudice, however, to the rights of the other European State concerned.

ARTICLE 3

Should a European Power attempt to undermine the independence of one of the Contracting Parties by processes of economic penetration or in any other way, the Contracting Parties will support each other in resistance to such attempts. Should the European Power concerned thereupon embark on hostilities against one of the Contracting Parties the provisions of Article 1 will apply.

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ARTICLE 4

The methods of applying the undertakings of mutual assistance provided for by the present Agreement are established between the competent naval, military and air authorities of the Contracting Parties.

ARTICLE 5

Without prejudice to the foregoing undertakings of the Contracting Parties to give each other mutual support and assistance immediately on the outbreak of hostilities, they will exchange complete and speedy information concerning any development which might threaten their independence and, in particular, concerning any development which threatened to call the said undertakings into operation.

ARTICLE 6

(1) The Contracting Parties will communicate to each other the terms of any undertakings of assistance against aggression which they have already given or may in future give to other States.

(2) Should either of the Contracting Parties intend to give such an undertaking after the coming into force of the present Agreement, the other Contracting Party shall, in order to ensure the proper functioning of the Agreement, be informed thereof.

(3) Any new undertaking which the Contracting Parties may enter into in future shall neither limit their obligations under the present Agreement nor indirectly create new obligations between the Contracting Party not participating in these undertakings and the third State concerned.

ARTICLE 7

Should the Contracting Parties be engaged in hostilities in consequence of the application of the present Agreement, they will not conclude an armistice or treaty of peace except by mutual agreement.

ARTICLE 8

(1) The present Agreement shall remain in force for a period of five years.

(2) Unless denounced six months before the expiry of this period it shall continue in force, each Contracting Party having thereafter the right to denounce it at any time by giving six months' notice to that effect.

(3) The present Agreement shall come into force on signature.

In faith whereof the above-named Plenipotentiaries have signed the present Agreement and have affixed thereto their seals.

Done in English in duplicate, at London, the 25th August, 1939. A Polish text shall subsequently be agreed upon between the Contracting Parties and both texts will then be authentic.

(L.S.) HALIFAX.

(L.S.) EDWARD RACZYNSKI.

Exhibit GB 58
Filed Dec. 6, 1945

H1151-0173

Letter from the French Prime Minister Daladier to the Führer, dated 26th August 1939.

(Translation)

Paris, 26th August 1939.

Dear Reichchancellor,

The French Ambassador in Berlin has informed me of your personal communication.

In the hours, in which you speak of the greatest responsibility which two heads of Governments can possibly take upon themselves, namely that of shedding the blood of two great nations, who long only for peace and work, I feel I owe it to you personally and to both our peoples to say that the fate of peace still rests in your hands.

You can doubt whether my own feelings towards Germany, nor France's peaceful feelings towards your nation. No Frenchman has done more than myself to strengthen between our two nations not only peace, but also sincere co-operation in their own interests as well as in those of Europe and of the whole world. Unless you credit the French People with lower sense of honour, than I credit the German Nation with, you cannot doubt that France loyally fulfils her obligations towards other powers, such as Poland, which, as I am fully convinced, wants to live in peace with Germany.

These two convictions are fully compatible.

Till now there has been nothing to prevent a peaceful solution of the international crisis, with all honour and dignity for all nations, if the same will for peace exists on all sides.

Together with the good will of France I proclaim that of all her allies. I take it upon myself to guarantee Polands readiness, which she has always shown, to submit to the mutual application of a method of open settlement, as it can be imagined between the governments of two sovereign nations. With the clearest conscience I can assure you that among the differences which have arisen between Germany and Poland over the question of Danzig, there is not one which could not be submitted to such a method with the purpose of reaching a peaceful and just solution.

Moreover, I can declare on my honour that there is nothing in France's clear and loyal solidarity with Poland and her allies, which could in any way prejudice the peaceful attitude of my country. This solidarity has never prevented us, and does not prevent us today, from keeping Poland in the same friendly state of mind.

In so serious an hour, I sincerely believe that no high minded human being could understand it, if a war of destruction was started without a last attempt being made to reach a peaceful settlement between Germany and Poland. Your desire for peace could in all certainty work for this aim, without any prejudice to German honour. I, who desire good harmony between the French and the German people, and who am on the other hand bound to Poland by bonds of friendship and by a promise, am prepared, as head of the French Government, to do everything an upright man can do, to bring this attempt to a successful conclusion.

H1151-0174

You and I were in the trenches in the last war. You know, as I do, what horror and condemnation the devastations of that war have left in the conscience of the peoples, without any regard to its outcome. The picture I can see in my mind's eye of your outstanding role as the leader of the German people on the road of peace, towards the fulfilment of its task in the common work of civilisation, leads me to ask for a reply to this suggestion.

If French and German blood should be shed again, as it was shed 25 years ago, in a still longer and more murderous war, then each of the two nations will fight believing in its own victory. But the most certain victors will be - destruction and barbarity.

(Signed) Daladier.

T C 72



YB 58

Letter from the Fuhrer to the French Prime Minister Daladier, dated 27th August, 1939.

Berlin, 27th August, 1939.

Dear Prime Minister,

I understand the qualms you express. I too have never overlooked the high responsibility which rests on those who are in a position to decide the fate of nations. As an old front line soldier, I have the horrors of war as you do. It is from this conviction and knowledge that I have made honest efforts to eliminate all the grounds of conflict between our two nations. I have assured the French people quite openly that the return of the Saar would be the prerequisite for it. After its return I immediately and solemnly confirm my renunciation of any further claims which might affect France. The German people approved my attitude. You were able to realise yourself during yourlast stay here that, proud of its own attitude, it neither felt nor feels any resentment or hatred towards the valiant foe of the past. On the contrary. The satisfactory solution of our Western frontier problem led to an increase in understanding, at least on the part of the German people. This understanding on many occasions reached the point of demonstrativeness. The building of our strong Western fortifications which cost us and are still costing us many millions of Marks proves that Germany is accepting and confirming the final frontier of the Reich. The German people have thereby given up two provinces which used to belong to the old German Reich, were later on conquered with much blood and still later defended with still more blood. Your Excellency will have to agree that the waiving of our claims is no tactical measure to impress the outer world, but a decision which has been logically confirmed by all our measures. You will be unable, my dear Prime Minister, to quote me an instance where in a single line or speech there has been any opposition to this final delineation of the Western boundary of the Reich. I believed that through this waiving of our claims and by this attitude I had eliminated any possible source of controversy between our two peoples which would lead to a repetition of the tragedy of 1914-1918. However, this voluntary limitation of Germany's vital demands in the West cannot be taken as implying total acceptance of the Versailles treaty. I have really tried year after year to obtain by agreement a revision of at least those clauses of the treaty which were most irrational and unbearable. It has been impossible. Many far-sighted people of all nations saw and knew that a revision had to come. Whatever anyone may say against my methods, whatever criticism anyone may feel himself compelled to level against them, one must not overlook or deny that they not only made it possible in many cases to find solutions satisfactory to Germany, without first shedding of blood, but also owing to the very nature of these methods, spared foreign statesmen the necessity of justifying such revisions to their own people, a necessity which they would often have been unable to face; for your Excellency will have to agree with me on one point: The revision had to come. The Versailles treaty was intolerable. No Frenchman possessing a sense of honour, not even you, Monsieur Daladier, would have acted differently from me in a similar position. I have now also tried in this sense to abolish the most unreasonable of all the Versailles treaty. I made an offer to the Polish Government, which shocked the German people. No one but I could have dared to announce such an offer in public. That is why I could only make that offer once. I am now firmly convinced that Europe would have been able to enjoy a state of peace today and for the next 25 years, if at that time the Poles had been persuaded, particularly by Great Britain, to see reason; instead a wild press-campaign against Germany was started and rumours were spread of a German mobilization. Thus Polish public opinion was first of all roused by lies about German aggression; it was made more difficult for the Polish Government to come to their own necessary clear-cut decisions and the subsequently given guarantee in particular impaired their ability to see the limits of what was possible. The Polish Government turned the offer down. Polish public opinion, firmly convinced that Britain and France would go to war on their behalf, started to make demands which could have been regarded as ridiculous lunacies, had they not been so terribly dangerous. At that time an unbearable terrorization - a physical and economic oppression of the Germans in the territories ceded by the Reich, who still amounted to over 1½ millions, began. I do not wish to discuss here the atrocities committed. Even Danzig was increasingly reminded, by the continuous encroachments of Polish authorities, that it had been surrendered, apparently without hope of salvation, to the arbitrary will of a power alien to the

H1151-0176

national character of town and population.

May I take the liberty of asking you, Daladier, how you, a Frenchman, would act if through the unlucky end of a courageous fight one of your provinces were cut off by a corridor occupied by a foreign power; if a large town, let us say Marseilles, was prevented from acknowledging her ties with France and if the Frenchmen living in that territory was persecuted, beaten, maltreated, even bestially murdered? You are a Frenchman, M.Daladier, and therefore know how you would act. Do not, M.Daladier, doubt my sense of honour and my sense of duty which tells me to act exactly as you would do! If you had suffered the misfortune which we have suffered, would you be able to understand it M.Daladier, if Germany should without provocation insist on the corridor through France being maintained, on the stolen territory not being allowed to revert, on the return of Marseilles to France being forbidden? I at least, M.Daladier, cannot imagine that Germany should fight against you for such a reason, since I and the whole world have waived the claim to Alsace-Lorraine to prevent further shedding of blood. All the less would we shed blood to uphold an injustice, which would be as intolerable to you, as it would be unimportant for us. I feel exactly as you do, M.Daladier, about the matters mentioned in your letter. Being both old front-line soldiers, perhaps we can understand each other more easily on many points; however, I must ask you to understand this too: That it is impossible for a nation with a sense of honour to waive their claim to almost two million people, and to see them maltreated on their own frontier. I have therefore formulated a clear-cut demand. Danzig and the corridor must revert to Germany. The "Macedonian" conditions on one Eastern frontier must disappear. I can see no way of inducing Poland, which now believes itself unassailable under the protection of the guarantees, to take steps towards a peaceful solution. I should however despair of the honourable future of my people, if, under such circumstances, we were not determined to solve the question in one way or another. Should fate thereby once more force our two peoples to fight, there would yet be a difference in our motives. I and my people, M.Daladier, would fight to right - and the others to maintain - a wrong which has been inflicted on us. This would be all the more tragic as many most outstanding men, including some of your own people, have recognized the folly of the 1919 solution as well as the impossibility of permanently upholding it. I am quite aware of the dire consequences which would result from such a conflict. But I believe that Poland would suffer most, for, whichever way the war about this question went, the present Polish state would be lost anyhow.

Not only for you, M.Daladier, but for me too it is most painful that our two peoples are now to embark on a new bloody war of extermination on these grounds. But as I said before, I cannot see a way for us to induce Poland by rational means to correct a situation which is intolerable for the German people and the German Reich.

(Signed) Adolf Hitler.

H1151-0177

Exhibit G.B. 59
Filed Dec. 6, 1945

TC 78, .o.1

TC 72, No.124

The following is the text of the message from President Roosevelt to Herr Hitler of 24th August, 1939.

In the message which I sent you on the 14th April, I stated that it appeared to be that the leaders of great nations had it in their power to liberate their peoples from the disaster that impended, but that, unless the effort were immediately made, with good will on all sides, to find a peaceful and constructive solution to existing controversies, the crisis which the world was confronting must end in catastrophe. Today that catastrophe appears to be very near - at hand, indeed.

To the message which I sent you last April I have received no reply, but because my confident belief that the cause of world peace - which is the cause of humanity itself - rises above all other considerations I am again addressing myself to you, with the hope that the war which impends and the consequent disaster to all peoples may yet be averted.

I therefore urge with all earnestness - and I am likewise urging the President of the Republic of Poland - that the Governments of Germany and Poland agree by common accord to refrain from any positive act of hostility for a reasonable stipulated period, and that they agree, likewise by common accord, to solve the controversies which have arisen between them by one of the three following methods:-

First, by direct negotiation;

Second, by the submission of these controversies to an impartial arbitration in which they can both have confidence; or

Third, that the agree to the solution of these controversies through the procedure of conciliation, selecting as a conciliator or moderator a national of one of the American Republics, which are all of them free from any connextion with, or participation in, European political affairs.

Both Poland and Germany being sovereign Governments, it is understood, of course, that, upon resort to any one of the alternatives I suggest, each nation will agree to accord complete respect to the independence and territorial integrity of the other.

The people of the United States are as one in their opposition to policies of military conquest and domination. They are as one in rejecting the thesis that any ruler or any people possess the right to achieve their ends or objectives through the taking of action which will plunge countless of millions into war, and which will bring distress and suffering to every nation of the world, belligerent and neutral, when such ends and objectives, so far as they are just and reasonable, can be satisfied through the processes of peaceful negotiation or by resort to judicial arbitration.

I appeal to you in the name of the people of the United States, and I believe in the name of peace-loving men and women everywhere, to agree to a solution of the controversies existing between your Government and that of Poland through the adoption of one of the alternative methods I have proposed.

I need hardly reiterate that should the Governments of Germany and Poland be willing to solve their differences in the peaceful manner suggested, the Government of the United States still stands prepared to contribute its share to the solution of the problems which are endangering world peace in the form set forth in my message of the 14th April.

Exhibit U.B. 60
Filed Dec. 6, 1945

TC 72, No.126.

The following is the text of the reply of August 25, 1939, to President Roosevelt from President Moscicki:-

I appreciate the noble message which your Excellency has been kind enough to send me. I should like to emphasise that the Polish Government have ever considered direct talks between Governments to be the most suitable method of resolving difficulties which may arise between States. We consider that this method is all the more suitable where neighbouring States are concerned. On the basis of these principles Poland concluded non-aggression pacts with Germany and Russia. We consider also that the method of conciliation through the intermediary of a disinterested and impartial third party is a just method of resolving differences which have been created between nations.

Although I clearly wish to avoid even the appearance of desiring to profit by this occasion to raise points of litigation, I deem it my duty, nevertheless, to make clear that in the present crisis it is not Poland which is formulating demands and demanding concessions of any other State. It is, therefore, perfectly natural that Poland should hold aloof from any action of this kind, direct or indirect. I would like to close by expressing my ardent wish that your message of peace may contribute to a general appeasement which is so necessary to enable the nations once more to regain the blessed path of progress and civilisation.

(1965)

H1151-0178

H1151-0179

Exhibit GB. 61
Filed Dec. 6, 1945

TC 72, No.127.

The following is the text of President Roosevelt's second appeal to Herr Hitler, dated 25 August, 1939:-

I have this hour received from the President of Poland a reply to the message which I addressed to your Excellency and to him last night.

(The text of President Moscicki's reply is then given. President Roosevelt continues as follows):-

Your Excellency has repeatedly publicly stated that the aims and objects sought by the German Reich were just and reasonable.

In his reply to my message the President of Poland has made it plain that the Polish Government is willing, upon the basis set forth in my message, to agree to solve the controversy which has arisen between the Republic of Poland and the German Reich by direct negotiation or the process of conciliation.

Countless human lives can yet be saved and hope may still be restored that the nations of the modern world may even now construct the foundation for a peaceful and happier relationship, if you and the Government of the German Reich will agree to the pacific means of settlement accepted by the Government of Poland. All the world prays that Germany, too, will accept.

H1151-0180

Exhibit Y.B. 62
Filed Dec. 6, 1945

TC 72, No.139.

Broadcast Appeal for Peace by His Holiness the Pope, August 24, 1939,

The Appeal.

(Translation)

Once again a critical hour strikes for the great human family; an hour of tremendous deliberations, towards which our heart cannot be indifferent and from which our spiritual authority, which comes to us from God to lead souls in the ways of justice and peace must not hold itself aloof.

Behold us then with all of you, who in this moment are carrying the burden of so great a responsibility, in order that through our voice you may hear the voice of that Christ from Whom the world received the most exalted example of living, and in whom millions and millions of souls repose their trust in a crisis in which His word alone is capable of mastering all the tumultuous disturbances of the earth.

Behold us with you, leaders of peoples, men of State and men of arms, writers, orators of the radio and of the public rostrum and all those others who have the power to influence the thought and action of their fellow-men for whose destiny they are responsible.

We, armed only with the word of Truth and standing above all public disputes and passions, speak to you in the name of God from "Whom all paternity in heaven and earth is named" - in the name of Jesus Christ, Our Lord, who desired that all men be brothers - in the name of the Holy Ghost, Gift of God most High, inexhaustible source of love in the hearts of men.

To-day, notwithstanding our repeated exhortations and our very particular interest, the fear of bloody international conflict becomes more excruciating; to-day, when the tension of minds seems to have arrived at such a pass as to make the outbreak of the awful scourge of war appear imminent, we direct with paternal feeling a new and more heartfelt appeal to those in power and to their peoples: to the former that, laying aside accusations, threats, causes of mutual distrust, they may attempt to resolve their present differences with the sole means suitable thereto, namely by reciprocal and trusting agreements; to the latter that in calm tranquillity, without disordered agitation they may encourage the peaceful efforts of those who govern them.

It is by force of reason and not by force of arms that Justice makes progress; and empires which are not founded on Justice are not blessed by God. Statesmanship emancipated from morality betrays those very ones who would have it so.

The danger is imminent but there is yet time.

Nothing is lost with peace; all may be with war. Let men return to mutual understanding. Let them begin negotiations anew. Conferring with goodwill and with respect for reciprocal rights they will find that to sincere and conscientious negotiators, an honourable solution is never precluded.

They will feel a sense of greatness - in the true sense of the word - if by silencing the voices of passion, be it collective or private, and by leaving to reason its rightful rule, they will have spared the blood of their fellow men and saved their country from ruin.

May the Almighty grant that the voice of this Father of the Christian family (1968) of this Servant of servants, who bears amongst men, unworthily indeed, but nevertheless really, the person, the voice and the authority of Jesus Christ, find in the minds and in the hearts of men a ready and willing reception

H1151-0181

May the Almighty grant that the voice of this Father of the Christian family, of this Servant of servants, who bears amongst men, unworthily, indeed but nevertheless really, the person, the voice and the authority of Jesus Christ find in the minds and in the hearts of men a ready and willing reception.

May the strong hear us that they may not become weak through injustice; may the powerful hear us if they desire that their power be not a destruction rather a protection for their peoples and a safeguard to tranquillity in public order and in labour.

We beseech them by the blood of Christ, whose conquering force in the world was His mildness in life and in death. And beseeching them we know and feel that we have with us all those who are upright of heart; all those who hunger and thirst after justice - all those who already suffer every sorrow through the evils of life. We have with us the heart of mothers which beats as one with ours; the fathers who would be obliged to abandon their families; lowly who labour and do not understand; the innocent upon whom weighs heavily the awful threat; the young men, generous knights of the purest and noblest ideals. And with us also is the soul of this ancient Europe which was the product of the faith and of Christian genius. With us all humanity seeks just bread, freedom; not steel which kills and destroys. With us that Christ, Who has made His one, solemn commandment - Love of One's Brother - the very substance of His religion and the promise of salvation for individuals and for nations.

Recalling finally that human efforts are of no avail without Divine assistance, we invite all to raise their eyes to Heaven and to beseech the Lord with fervent prayer that His divine grace descend in abundance upon this world in its upheaval, placate dissensions, reconcile hearts and evoke the resplendent dawn of a more serene future.

To this end and with this hope we impart to all, from the heart, our paternal Benediction.

(1965)

H1151-0182

Exhibit G.B. 63
Filed Dec. 6, 1945

TC 72, No.141

Mr.Osborne to Viscount Halifax (received 3.45 p.m.)

(Telegraphic) Holy See, August 31, 1939.

Cardinal Secretary of State has just handed me a note of which the following is a translation:-

"The Pope is unwilling to abandon hope that pending negotiations may lead to a just pacific solution such as the whole world continues to pray for.

"His Holiness therefore, in the name of God, beseeches the German and Polish Governments to do all that is in their power to avoid any incident and to abstain from taking any step that might aggravate the present tension.

"His Holiness begs the British, French and Italian Governments to support his appeal."

Copies of the above were also handed to the Ambassadors of Germany, Poland, France and Italy. His Eminence also gave a copy to the Spanish Ambassador and is causing a copy to be conveyed to the United States Ambassador to the Quirinal.

Exhibit G.B. 64
Filed Dec. 6, 1945

TC 90.

Extract from pp. 7,8 & 9 of Testimony of HERMANN GOERING, taken at Nuremberg, Germany, on 29 August 1945, by Colonel John H. Amen, IGD, OUSCC. Also present: Pfc. Richard W. Sonnenfeldt, Official Interpreter; Court Reporter, S/Sgt. William A. Weigel. 1430 to 1640.

Q. When the negotiations of the Polish foreign minister in London brought about the Anglo-Polish treaty at the end of March or beginning of April 1939, was it not fairly obvious that a peaceful solution was impossible?

A. Yes, it seemed impossible after my convictions, but not according to the convictions of the Fuehrer. When it was mentioned to the Fuehrer that England had given her guarantee to Poland, he said that England was also guaranteeing Romania, but then when the Russians took Bessarabia nothing happened, and this made a big impression on him. I made a mistake here. At this time Poland only had the promise of a guarantee. The guarantee itself was only given shortly before the beginning of the war. On the day when England gave her official guarantee to Poland the Fuehrer called me on the telephone and told me that he had stopped the planned invasion of Poland. I asked him then whether this was just temporary or for good. He said, "No, I will have to see whether we can eliminate British intervention. So then I asked him, "Do you think that it will be any different within four or five days?"

At this same time -- I don't know whether you know about that, Colonel -- I was in connection with Lord Halifax by a special courier outside the regular diplomatic channels to do everything to stop war with England.. After the guarantee I held an English declaration of war inevitable. I already told him in the Spring of 1939 after occupying Czechoslovakia, I told him that from now on if he tried to solve the Polish question he would have to count on the enmity of England. 1939, that is after the Protectorate.

Q Is it not a fact that preparations for the campaign against Poland were originally supposed to have been completed by the end of August 1939?

A Yes.

Q And that the final issuance of the order for the campaign against Poland came some time between the 15th and 20th of August 1939 after the signing of the treaty with Soviet Russia?

A Yes, that is true.

Q Is it not also a fact that the start of the campaign was ordered for 25 August, but on 24 August in the afternoon it was postponed until 1 September in order to await the results of new diplomatic maneuvers with the English Ambassador?

A Yes.

Q There was no order for a concentration at OKW?

A How am I to understand this question?

H1151-0183

H1151-0184

Q. Well, were there any orders covering the start of the campaign at OKW?

A. The OKW issued the orders for the beginning of the campaign for the Fuehrer and the time had to be chosen in such a manner that the OKW could always cancel the campaign twenty-four hours before the proposed date.

C E R T I F I C A T E.

I, Kenneth H.. Duke, Major R.A., hereby certify that the above is a true extract of the Testimony of HERMANN GOERING, taken at Nuremberg, Germany, on 29th August 1945, by Colonel John H, Amen, IGD, OUSCC. Also present : Pfc. Richard W. Sonnenfeldt, Official Interpreter; Court Reporter, S/Sgt. William A. Weigel.

Kenneth H.H. Duke,
Major R.A.

Extract from pp. 15,16,17 of Testimony of Joachim von Ribbentrop, taken at Nuremberg, Germany, on 29 August, 1945, 1400 to 1630, by Colonel Howard A. Brundage, IGD. Also present: T/5 Adolf I. Mayer, Interpreter, and S/Sgt. Horace M. Levy, Court Reporter.

Now, when England, of course, the moment England stood behind the Poles, this problem, these problems became very difficult. It was first the visit of General Ironsides, who was in Poland, which made the Poles already to take a rather stiff position. Then it was the visit of Mr. Beck in London, where there had been guarantee talks about Poland,which also made the Poles still stiffer, 'till to that moment when the official guarantee was signed, the official British guarantee was signed for the Poles. Now, just as far as Anglo-German-British was concerned, we have finished with that. I just wanted to say that the question for the Fuehrer was then, to my way of seeing it, should he renounce the solution of this vital question because England might decide to set her theory of equality of power now in function and go make war against Germany, for a solution which very probably Englishmen themselves had considered as absolutely necessary and which became ever more urgent. You perhaps remember that the Fuehrer then had already decided that he would go on when the English guarantee signature came. When I heard about this British guarantee signature, I went at once to the Fuehrer -- I heard through the press it was signed in London -- I went at once to the Fuehrer, and hearing that military steps had been taken against Poland, I asked him to withdraw it and stop the advance. The Fuehrer was at once agreed to do it. He gave orders to his military adjutant, who was Schmund -- he died as a result of the 20th of July -- he gave orders at once to the military people to stop the advance into Poland.

Q When was that?

A This was -- well, on the 25th of August -- just a moment -- I think it was the 25th of August, 1939 -- and then negotiations with Mr. Henderson in Berlin started, about which I would like to tell you in detail afterwards; and only after this last try with Great Britain did not come off, the Fuehrer made again an offer of friendship and of close collaboration with Great Britain. When this didn't come off, the Fuehrer decided to treat directly with the Poles, and that is the way. And then when the Polish intermediary didn't come, the Fuehrer acted and took military steps.

C E R T I F I C A T E

I, Kenneth H.M. Duke, Major R.A., hereby certify that the above is a true extract from pp. 15,16,17 of the Testimony of Joachim von Ribbentrop taken at Nuremberg, Germany, on 29 August 1945, 1400 to 1630, by Colonel Howard A. Brundage, IGD. Also present: T/5 Adolf I. Mayer, Interpreter, and S/Sgt. Horace M. Levy, Court Reporter.

Kenneth H.M. Duke,
Major, R.A.

H1151-0185

Exhibit GB 65
Filed Dec. 6, 1945

TC/72.

Documents concerning German-Polish relations and the outbreak of Hostilities between Great Britain and Germany on September 3, 1939.

No. 68.

Supplementary Communic tion from the German Chancellor handed to His Majesty's Ambassador on August 25, 1939.

The following is a translation of the text of a verbal communication made to Sir Neville Henderson by Herr Hitler at his interview on the 25th. August:-

"By way of introduction the Führer declared that the British Ambassador had given expression at the close of the last conversation tothe hope that, after all, an understanding between Germany and England might yet be possible. He (the Führer) had therefore turned things over in his mind once more and desired to make a move as regards England which should be as decisive as the move as regards Russia which had led to the recent agreement. Yesterday's sitting in the house of Commons and the speeches of Mr. Chamberlain and Lord Halifax had also moved the Führer to talk once more to the British Ambassador. The assertion that Germany affected to conquer the world was ridiculous. The British Empire embraced 40 million square kilometres, Russia 19 million square kilometres, America 9½ million square kilometres, whereas Germany embraced less than 600,000 square kilometres. It is quite clear who it is who desires to conquer the world.

"The Führer makesthe following communication to the British Ambassador :-

"1. Poland's actual provocations have become intolerable. It makes no difference who is responsible. If the Polish Government denies responsibility, that only goes to show that it no longer itself possesses any influence over its subordinate military authorities. In the preceding night there had been a further twenty-one new frontier incidents; on the German side the greatest discipline had been maintained. All incidents had been provoked from the Polish side. Furthermore, commercial aircraft had been shot at. If the Polish Government stated that it was not responsible, it showed that it was no longer capable of controlling its own people.

"2. Germany was in all circumstances determined to abolish these Macedonian conditions on ther eastern frontier and, what is more, to do so in the interests of quiet and order, but also in the interests of European peace.

"3. The problem of Danzig and the Corridor must be solved.- The British Prime Minister had made a speech which was not in the least calculated to induce any change in the German attitude. At the most, the result of this speech could be a bloody and incalculable war between Germany and England. Such a war would be bloodier than that of 1914 to 1918. In contrast to the last war, Germany would no longer have to fight on two fronts. Agreement with Russia was unconditional and signified a change in foreign policy of the Reich which would last a very long time.

H1151-0187

Russia and Germany would never again take up arms against each other. Apart from this, the agreements reached with Russia would also render Germany secure economically for the longest possible period of war.

"The Führer had always wanted an Anglo-German understanding. War between England and Germany could at the best bring some profit to Germany but none at all to England.

"The Führer declared that the German-Polish problem must be solved and will be solved. He is, however, prepared and determined after the solution of this problem to approach England once more with a large comprehensive offer. He is a man of great decisions, and in this case also he will be capable of being great in his action. He accepts the British Empire and is ready to pledge himself personally for its continued existence and to place the power of the German Reich at its disposal if -

"(1) His colonial demands which are limited and can be negotiated by peaceful methods are fulfilled and in this case he is prepared to fix the longest time limits.

"(2) His obligations towards Italy are not touched; in other words, he does not demand that England gives up her obligations towards France and similarly for his own part he cannot withdraw from his obligations towards Italy.

"(3) He also desires to stress the irrevocable determination of Germany never again to enter into conflict with Russia. The Führer is ready to conclude agreements with England which, as has already been emphasised, would not only guarantee the existence of the British Empire in all circumstances as far as Germany is concerned, but also if necessary an assurance to the British Empire of German assistance regardless of where such assistance should be necessary. The Führer would then also be ready to accept a reasonable limitation of armaments which corresponds to the new political situation, and which is economically tolerable. Finally, the Führer renewed his assurances that he is not interested in Western problems and that a frontier modification in the West does not enter into consideration. Western fortifications which have been constructed at a cost of milliards were final Reich frontier on the West.

"If the British Government would consider these ideas a blessing for Germany and also for the British Empire might result. If it rejects these ideas there will be war. In no case would Great Britain emerge stronger; the last war proved this.

"The Führer repeats that he is a man of ad infinitum decisions by which he himself is bound and that this is his last offer. Immediately after solution of the German-Polish question he would approach the British Government with an offer."

Exhibit U.S.A. 6
Filed Dec. 6, 1945

No. 74.

T.C. 72

D O C U M E N T S

CONCERNING

GERMAN - POLISH NEGOTIATIONS

AND THE

OUTBREAK OF HOSTILITIES BETWEEN GREAT BRITAIN AND GERMANY ON SEPTEMBER 3, 1939.

Reply of His Majesty's Government dated August 28, 1939, to the German Chancellor's Communications of August 23 and 25, 1939+.

His Majesty's Government have received the message conveyed to them from the German Chancellor by His Majesty's Ambassador in Berlin, and have considered it with the care which it demands.

They note the Chancellor's expression of his desire to make friendship the basis of the relations between Germany and the British Empire and they fully share this desire. They believe with him that if a complete and lasting understanding between the two countries could be established it would bring untold blessings to both peoples.

2. The Chancellor's message deals with two groups of questions : those which are the matters now in dispute between Germany and Poland and those affecting the ultimate relations of Germany and Great Britain. In connexion with these last, His Majesty's Government observe that the German Chancellor has indicated certain proposals which, subject to one condition, he would be prepared to make to the British Government for a general understanding. These proposals, are of course, stated in very general form and would require closer definition, but His Majesty's Government are fully prepared to take them, with some additions, as subjects for discussion and they would be ready, if the differences between Germany and Poland are peacefully composed, to proceed so soon as practicable to such discussion with a sincere desire to reach agreement.

3. The Condition which the German Chancellor lays down is that there must first be a settlement of the differences between Germany and Poland. As to that, His Majesty's Government entirely agree. Everything, however, turns upon the nature of the settlement and the method by which it is to be reached. On these points, the importance of which cannot be absent from the Chancellor's mind, his message is silent, and His Majesty's Government feel compelled to point out that an understanding upon both of these is essential to achieving further progress.

H1151-0188

H1151-0189

The German Government will be aware that His Majesty's Government have obligations to Poland by which they are bound and which they intend to honour. They could not, for any advantage offered to Great Britain, acquiesce in a settlement which put in jeopardy the independence of a State to whom they have given their guarantee.

4. In the opinion of His Majesty's Government a reasonable solution of the differences between Germany and Poland could and should be effected by agreement between the two countries on lines which would include the safeguarding of Poland's essential interests, and they recall that in his speech of the 28th April last the German Chancellor recognised the importance of these interests to Poland.

But, as was stated by the Prime Minister in his letter to the German Chancellor of the 22nd August, His Majesty's Government consider it essential for the success of the discussions which would precede the agreement that it should be understood beforehand that any settlement arrived at would be guaranteed by other Powers. His Majesty's Government would be ready if desired to make their contribution to the effective operation of such a guarantee.

In the view of His Majesty's Government it follows that the next step should be the initiation of direct discussions between the German and Polish Governments on a basis which would include the principles stated above, namely, the safeguarding of Poland's essential interests and the securing of the settlement by an international guarantee.

They have already received a definite assurance from the Polish Government that they are prepared to enter into discussions on this basis, and His Majesty's Government hope the German Government would for their part also be willing to agree to this course.

If, as His Majesty's Government hope, such discussion led to agreement the way would be open to the negotiation of that wider and more complete understanding between Great Britain and Germany which both countries desire.

5. His Majesty's Government agree with the German Chancellor that one of the principal dangers in the German Polish situation arises from the reports concerning the treatment of minorities. The present state of tension, with its concomitant frontier incidents, reports of maltreatment and inflammatory propaganda, is a constant danger to peace. It is manifestly a matter of the utmost urgency that all incidents of the kind should be promptly and rigidly suppressed and that ~~unverified reports should not be allowed to circulate~~, in order that time may be afforded, without provocation on either side, for a full examination of the possibilities of settlement. His Majesty's Government are confident that both the Governments concerned are fully alive to these considerations.

6. His Majesty's Government have said enough to make their own attitude plain in the particular matters at issue between Germany and Poland.

H1151-0190

They trust that the German Chancellor will not think that, because His Majesty's Government are scrupulous concerning their obligations to Poland, they are not anxious to use all their influence to assist the achievement of a solution which may command itself both to Germany and to Poland.

That such a settlement should be achieved seems to His Majesty's Government essential, not only for reasons directly arising in regard to the settlement itself, but also because of the wider considerations of which the German Chancellor has spoken with such conviction.

7. It is unnecessary in the present reply to stress the advantage of a peaceful settlement over a decision to settle the questions at issue by force of arms. The results of a decision to use force have been clearly set out in the Prime Minister's letter to the Chancellor of the 22nd August, and His Majesty's Government do not doubt that they are as fully recognised by the Chancellor as by themselves.

On the other hand, His Majesty's Government, noting with interest the German Chancellor's reference in the message now under consideration to a limitation of armaments, believe that, if a peaceful settlement can be obtained, the assistance of the world could confidently be anticipated for practical measures to enable the transition from preparation for war to the normal activities of peaceful trade to be safely and smoothly effected.

8. A just settlement of these questions between Germany and Poland may open the way to world peace. Failure to reach it would ruin the hopes of better understanding between Germany and Great Britain, would bring the two countries into conflict, and might well plunge the whole world into war. Such an outcome would be a calamity without parallel in history.

+ Nos. 60 and 68.

Exhibit G.B. 67
Filed Dec. 6, 1945

NO. 75. T.C. 72

D O C U M E N T S

CONCERNING

GERMAN - POLISH RELATIONS

AND THE

OUTBREAK OF HOSTILITIES BETWEEN GREAT BRITAIN AND GERMANY ON SEPTEMBER 3, 1939.

Sir N. Henderson to Viscount Halifax (received 2.35 a.m, August 29).

(Telegraphic). Berlin, August 28 1939.

I saw the Chancellor at 10.30 this evening. He asked me to come at 10 p.m., but I sent word that I could not have the translation ready before the later hour. Herr von Ribbentrop was present, also Dr. Schmidt. Interview lasted one and a quarter hours.

2. Herr Hitler began by reading the German translation. When he had finished, I said that I wished to make certain observations from notes which I had made in the conversations with the Prime Minister and His Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. In the first place I wished to say that we in England regarded it as absurd that Britain should be supposed by the German Government to consider the crushing of Germany as a settled policy. We held it to be no less astonishing that anyone in Germany should doubt for a moment that we would not fight for Poland if her independence or vital interests were menaced.

3. Our word was our word, and we had never and would never break it. In the old days Germany's word had the same value, and I quoted a passage from a German book (which Herr Hitler had rdad) about Marshal Blücher's exhortation to his troops when hurrying to the support of Wellington at Waterloo : "Foward, my children, I have given my word to my brother Wellington, and you cannot wish me to break it."

4. Herr Hitler at once intervened to observe that things were different 125 years ago. I said not so far as England was concerned. He wanted, I said, Britain's friendship. What value would he place on our friendship if we began it by disloyalty to a friend? Whatever some people might say, the British people sincerely desired an understanding with Germany, and no one more so than the Prime Minister

H1151-0191

H1151-0192

(Herr von Ribbentrop remarked that Mr. Chamberlain had once said to him that it was his dearest wish). To-day the whole British public was behind the Prime Minister. The recent vote in the House of Commons was an unmistakable proof of that fact. The Prime Minister could carry through his policy of an understanding if, but only if, Herr Hitler were prepared to co-operate. There was absolutely no truth in the idea sometimes held in Germany that the British Cabinet was disunited or that the country was not unanimous. It was now or never, and it rested with Herr Hitler. If he was prepared to sacrifice that understanding in order to make war or immoderate demands on Poland, the responsibility was his. We offered friendship but only on the basis of a peaceful and freely negotiated solution of the Polish question.

5. Herr Hitler replied that he would be willing to negotiate, if there was a Polish Government which was prepared to be reasonable and which really controlled the country. He expatiated on misdoings of the Poles, referred to his generous offer of March last, said that it could not be repeated and asserted that nothing else than the return of Danzig and the whole of the Corridor would satisfy him, together with a rectification in Silesia, where 90 per cent. of the population had voted for Germany at the post-war plebiscite but where as a result of Haller-Korfanti coup, what the Plebiscite Commission had allotted had nevertheless been grabbed by Poland.

6. I told Herr Hitler that he must choose between England and Poland. If he put forward immoderate demands there was no hope of a peaceful solution. Corridor was inhabited almost entirely by Poles. Herr Hitler interrupted me here by observing that this was only true because a million Germans had been driven out of that district since the war. I again said the choice lay with him. He had offered a Corridor over the Corridor in March, and I must honestly tell him that anything more than that, if that, would have no hope of acceptance. I begged him very earnestly to reflect before raising his price. He said his original offer had been contemptuously refused and he would not make it again. I observed that it had been made in the form of a dictate and therein lay the whole difference.

7. Herr Hitler continued to argue that Poland could never be reasonable : she had England and France behind her, and imagined that even if she were beaten she would later recover, thanks to their help, more than she might lose. He spoke of annihilating Poland. I said that reminded me of similar talk last year of annihilation of the Czechs. He retorted that we were incapable of inducing Poland to be reasonable. I said that it was just because we remembered the experience of Czechoslovakia last year that we hesitated to press Poland too far to-day. Nevertheless, we reserved to ourselves the right to form our own judgment as to what was or what was not reasonable so far as Poland or Germany was concerned. We kept our hands free in that respect.

H1151-0193

8. Generally speaking, Herr Hitler kept harping on Poland, and I kept on just as consistently telling Herr Hitler that he had to choose between friendship with England which we offered him and excessive demands on Poland which would put an end to all hope of British friendship. If we were to come to an understanding it would entail sacrifices on our part. If he was not prepared to make sacrifices on his part there was nothing to be done. Herr Hitler said that he had to satisfy the demands of his people, his army was ready and eager for battle, his people were united behind him, and he could not tolerate further ill-treatment of Germans in Poland &c.

9. It is unnecessary to recall the details of a long and earnest conversation in the course of which the only occasion in which Herr Hitler became at all excited was when I observed that it was not a question of Danzig and the Corridor, but one of our determination to resist force by force. This evoked a tirade about the Rhineland, Austria and Sudeten and their peaceful reacquisition by Germany. He also resented my reference to 15th March.

10. In the end I asked him two straight questions. Was he willing to negotiate direct with the Poles and was he ready to discuss the question of an exchange of populations? He replied in the affirmative as regards the latter (though I have no doubt that he was thinking at the same time of a rectification of frontiers). As regards the first, he said he could not give me an answer until after he had given reply of His Majesty's Government the careful consideration which such a document deserved. In this connexion he turned to Herr von Ribbentrop and said : "We must summon Field-Marshal Göring to discuss it with him."

11. I finally repeated to him very solemnly the main note of the whole conversation so far as I was concerned, namely, that it lay with him as to whether he preferred a unilateral solution which would mean war as regards Poland, or British friendship. If he were prepared to pay the price of the latter by a generous gesture as regards Poland, he could at a stroke change in his favour the whole of public opinion not only in England but in the world. I left no doubt in his mind as to what the alternative would be, nor did he dispute the point.

12. At the end Herr von Ribbentrop asked me whether I could guarantee that the Prime Minister could carry the country with him in a policy of friendship with Germany. I said there was no possible doubt whatever that he could and would, provided Germany co-operated with him. Herr Hitler asked whether England would be willing to accept an alliance with Germany. I said, speaking personally, I did not exclude such a possibility provided the developments of events justified it.

H1151-0194

13. Conversation was conducted in quite a friendly atmosphere, in spite of absolute firmness on both sides. Herr Hitler's general attitude was that he could give me no real reply until he had carefully studied the answer of His Majesty's Government. He said that he would give me a written reply to-morrow, Tuesday. I told him that I would await it, but was quite prepared to wait. Herr Hitler's answer was that there was no time to wait.

14. I did not refer to the question of a truce. I shall raise that point to-morrow if his answer affords any real ground for hope that he is prepared to abandon war for the sake of British friendship.

H1151-0195

Exhibit U.S. 68
Filed Dec 6, 1945

No.78.

T.C. 72

REPLY OF THE GERMAN CHANCELLOR TO THE COMMUNICATION OF AUGUST 28 1939, FROM HIS MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT. THIS REPLY WAS HANDED TO SIR N. HENDERSON BY HERR HITLER DURING THE EVENING OF AUGUST 29, 1939.

(Translation)

The British Ambassador in Berlin has submitted to the British Government suggestions which I felt bound to make in order -

(1) to give expression once more to the will of the Reich Government for sincere Anglo-German understanding, co-operation and friendship;

(2) to leave no room for doubt as to fact that such an understanding could not be bought at the price of renunciation of vital German interests, let alone the abandonment of demands which are based as much upon common human justice as upon the national dignity and honour of our people.

The German Government have noted with satisfaction from the reply of the British Government and from the oral explanations given by the British Ambassador that the British Government for their part are also prepared to improve relationship between Germany and England and to develop and extend it in the sense of the German suggestion.

In this connexion, the British Government are similarly convinced that the removal of the German-Polish tension, which has become unbearable, is the pre-requisite for the realisation of this hope.

Since the autumn of the past year, and on the last occasion in March, 1939, there were submitted to the Polish Government proposals, both oral and written, which, having regard to the friendship then existing between Germany and Poland, offered the possibility of a solution of the questions in dispute acceptable to both parties. The British Government are aware that the Polish Government saw fit, in March last, finally to reject these proposals. At the same time, they used this rejection as a pretext or an occasion for taking military measures which have since been continuously intensified. Already in the middle of last month Poland was in effect in a state of mobilisation. This was accompanied by numerous encroachments in the Free City of Danzig due to the instigation of the Polish authorities; threatening demands in the nature of ultimata, varying only in degree, were addressed to the City. A closing of the frontiers, at first in the form of a measure of customs policy but extended later in a military sense affecting also traffic and communications, was imposed with the object of bringing about the political exhaustion and economic destruction of this German community.

To this were added barbaric actions of maltreatment which cry to Heaven, and other kinds of persecution of the large German national group in Poland which extended even to the killing of many resident Germans or to their forcible removal under the most cruel conditions. This state of affairs is unbearable for a Great Power. It has now forced Germany, after remaining a passive onlooker for many months, in her turn to take the necessary steps for the safeguarding of justified German interests. And indeed the German Government can but assure the British Government in the most solemn manner that a condition of affairs has now been reached which can no longer be accepted or observed with indifference.

The demands of the German Government are in conformity with the revision of the Versailles Treaty in regard to this territory which has always been recognised as being necessary: viz., return of Danzig and the Corridor to Germany, the safeguarding of the existence of the German national group in the territories remaining to Poland.

The German Government note with satisfaction that the British Government also are in principle convinced that some solution must be found for the new situation which has arisen.

H1151-0196

They further feel justified in assuming that the British Government too can have no doubt that it is a question now of conditions, for the elimination of which there no longer remains days, still less weeks, but perhaps only hours. For in the disorganised state of affairs obtaining in Poland, the possibility of incidents intervening which it might be impossible for Germany to tolerate, must at any moment be reckoned with.

While the British Government may still believe that these grave differences can be resolved by way of direct negotiations, the German Government unfortunately can no longer share this view as a matter of course. For they have made the attempt to embark on such peaceful negotiations, but, instead of receiving any support from the Polish Government, they were rebuffed by the sudden introduction of measures of a military character in favour of the development alluded to above.

The British Government attach importance to two considerations: (1) that the existing danger of an imminent explosion should be eliminated as quickly as possible by direct negotiation, and (2) that the existence of the Polish State, in the form in which it would then continue to exist, should be adequately safeguarded in the economic and political sphere by means of international guarantees.

On this subject the German Government makes the following declaration:-

Though sceptical as to the prospects of a successful outcome, they are nevertheless prepared to accept the English proposal and to enter into direct discussions. They do so, as has already been emphasised, solely as the result of the impression made upon them by the written statement received from the British Government that they too desire a pact of friendship in accordance with the general lines indicated to the British Ambassador.

The German Government desire in this way to give the British Government and the British nation a proof of the sincerity of Germany's intention to enter into a lasting friendship with Great Britian.

The Government of the Reich felt, however bound to point out to the British Government that in the event of a territorial rearrangement in Poland they would no longer be able to bind themselves to give guarantees or to participate in guarantees without the U.S.S.R. being associated therewith.

For the rest, in making these proposals the German Government have never had any intention of touching Poland's vital interests or questioning the existence of an independent Polish State. The German Government, accordingly, in these circumstances agree to accept the British Government's offer of their good offices in securing the despatch to Berling of a Polish Emissary with full powers. They count on the arrival of this Emissary on Wednesday, the 30th August, 1939.

The German Government will immediately draw up proposals for a solution acceptable to themselves and will, if possible, place these at the disposal of the British Government before the arrival of the Polish negotiator

Exhibit G.B. 69
Filed Dec. 6, 1945

H1151-0197

TC 72

DOCUMENTS CONCERNING

GERMAN-POLISH RELATIONS AND THE

OUTBREAK OF HOSTILITIES BETWEEN GREAT BRITAIN AND GERMANY.

ON SEPTEMBER 3, 1939.

No.79.

Sir N. Henderson to Viscount Halifax (received 9.15 p.m.).

(Telegraphic.) Berlin, August 29, 1939.

Herr Hitler handed me German reply at 7.15 this evening. Translation of full text will follow as soon as possible.

2. In reply to two British proposals, namely, for direct German-Polish negotiations and international guarantee of any settlement, German Government declares:-

(1) That, in spite of its scepticism as to the prospect of their success, it accepts direct negotiation solely out of desire to ensure lasting friendship with Britain, and
(2) In the case of any modifications of territory German Government cannot undertake or participate in any guaranteeswithout consulting the U.S.S.R.

3. Note observes that German proposals have never had for their object any diminution of Polish vital interests, and declares that German Government accepts mediation of Great Britain with a view to visit to Berlin of some Polish plenipotentiary. German Government, note adds, counts on arrival of such plenipotentiary to-morrow, Wednesday, 30th August.

4. I remarked that this phrase sounded like an ultimatum, but after some heated remarks both Herr Hitler and Herr von Ribbentrop assured me that it was only intended to stress urgency of the moment when the two fully mobilised armies were standing face to face.

5. I said that I would transmit this suggestion immediately to His Majesty's Government, and asked whether, if such Polish plenipotentiary did come, we could assume that he would be well received and that discussions would be conducted on footing of complete equality. Herr Hitler's reply was "of course".

6. German demands are declared to be revision of Versailles Treaty; namely, return of Danzig and the Corridor to Germany, security for lives of German national minorities in the rest of Poland; note concludes with statement that the German Government will immediately elaborate proposals for an acceptable solution, and inform British Government, if possible, before arrival of Polish plenipotentiary.

Exhibit J.B.70
Filed Dec. 6, 1945

DOCUMENTS CONCERNING GERMAN POLISH RELATIONS
and the
OUTBREAK OF HOSTILITIES BETWEEN GREAT BRITAIN AND GERMANY
on September 3, 1939.

No. 89

Reply of His Majesty's Government to the German Chancellor's Communication of August 29, 1939. This reply was handed by Sir N. Henderson to Herr von Ribbentrop at Midnight on August 30, 1939.

His Majesty's Government appreciate the friendly reference in the Declaration contained in the reply of the German Government to the latter's desire for an Anglo-German understanding and to their statement of the influence which this consideration has exercised upon their policy.

2. His Majesty's Government repeat that they reciprocate the German Government's desire for improved relations, but it will be recognised that they could not sacrifice the interests of other friends in order to obtain that improvement. They fully understand that the German Government cannot sacrifice Germany's vital interests, but the Polish Government are in the same position and His Majesty's Government believe that the vital interests of the two countries are not incompatible.

3. His Majesty's Government note that the German Government accept the British proposal and are prepared to enter into direct discussions with the Polish Government.

4. His Majesty's Government understand that the German Government accept in principle the condition that any settlement should be made the subject of an international guarantee. The question of who shall participate in this guarantee will have to be discussed further, and His Majesty's Government hope that to avoid loss of time the German Government will take immediate steps to obtain the assent of the U.S.S.R., whose participation in the guarantee His Majesty's Government have always assumed.

5. His Majesty's Government also note that the German Government accept the position of the British Government as to Poland's vital interests and independence.

6. His Majesty's Government must make an express reservation in regard to the statement of the particular demands put forward by the German Government in an earlier passage in their reply. They understand that the German Government are drawing up proposals for a solution. No doubt these proposals will be fully examined during the discussions. It can then be determined how far they are compatible with the essential conditions which His Majesty's Government have stated and which in principle the German Government have expressed their willingness to accept.

7. His Majesty's Government are at once informing the Polish Government of the German Government's reply. The method of contact and arrangements for discussions must obviously be agreed with all urgency between the German and Polish Governments, but in His Majesty's Government's view it would be impracticable to establish contact so early as today.

H1151-0198

H1151-0199

8. His Majesty's Government fully recognise the need for speed in the initiation of discussion, and they share the apprehensions of the Chancellor arising from the proximity of two mobilised armies standing face to face. They would accordingly most strongly urge that both parties should undertake that, during the negotiations, no aggressive military movements will take place. His Majesty's Government feel confident that they could obtain such an undertaking from the Polish Government if the German Government would give similar assurances.

9. Further, His Majesty's Government would suggest that a temporary modus vivendi might be arranged for Danzig, which might prevent the occurrence of incidents tending to render German-Polish relations more difficult.

Exhibit G.B. 71
Filed Dec. 6, 1945

D O C U M E N T S

CONCERNING

GERMAN-POLISH RELATIONS

AND THE

OUTBREAK OF HOSTILITIES BETWEEN GREAT BRITAIN AND GERMANY ON SEPTEMBER 3, 1939.

NO. 92.

Sir N. Henderson to Viscount Halifax (received 9.30 a.m. August 31)

(Telegraphic) Berlin, August 30, 1939)

I told Herr von Ribbentrop this evening that His Majesty's Government found it difficult to advise Polish Government to accept procedure adumbrated in German reply, and suggested that he should adopt normal contact, i.e., that when German proposals were ready to invite Polish Ambassador to call and to hand him proposals for transmission to his Government with a view to immediate opening of negotiations. I added that if basis afforded prospect of settlement His Majesty's Government could be counted upon to do their best in Warsaw to temporize negotiations.

2. Herr von Ribbentrop's reply was to produce a lengthy document which he read out in German aloud at top speed. Imagining that he would eventually hand it to me I did not attempt to follow too closely the sixteen or more articles which it contained. Though I cannot therefore guarantee accuracy the main points were : restoration of Danzig to Germany; southern boundary of Corridor to be line Marienwerder, Graudenz, Bromberg, Schönlanke; plebiscite to be held in the Corridor on basis of population on 1st January 1919, a solute majority to decide international commission of British, French, Italian and Russian members to police the Corridor and guarantee reciprocal communications with Danzig and Gdynia pending result of the plebiscite; Gdynia to be reserved to Poland; Danzig to be purely commercial city and demilitarised.

3. When I asked Herr von Ribbentrop for text of these proposals in accordance with undertaking in the German reply of yesterday, he asserted that it was now too late as Polish representative had not arrived in Berlin by midnight.

4. I observed that to treat matter in this way meant that request for Polish representative to arrive in Berlin on 30th August constituted in fact, an ultimatum in spite of what he and Herr Hitler had assured me yesterday.

H1151-0200

H1151-0201

This he denied, saying that idea of an ultimatum was figment of my imagination. Why then I asked could he not adopt normal procedure and give me copy of proposals and ask Polish Ambassador to call on him, just as Herr Hitler had summoned me a few days ago, and hand them to him for communication to Polish Government? In the most violent terms Herr von Ribbentrop said that he would never ask the Ambassador to visit him. He hinted that if Polish Ambassador asked him for interview it might be different. I said that I would naturally inform my Government so at once. Whereupon he said while those were his personal views he would bring all that I had said to Herr Hitler's notice. It was for Chancellor to decide.

5. We parted on that note, but I must tell you that Herr von Ribbentrop's whole demeanour during an unpleasant interview was aping Herr Hitler at his worst. He inveighed incidentally against Polish mobolisation, but I retorted that it was hardly surprising since Germany had also mobilised as Herr Hitler himself had admitted to be yesterday.

H1151-0202

Exhibit U.B. 72
Offered ~~Filed~~ Dec. 6, 1945
vide 27

TC 74 73

"POLISH WHITE BOOK".

No.112.

M. Lipski to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

Berlin, August 31, 1939.
(Received at 10.30 p.m.)

I was received by M. von Ribbentrop at 6.30 p.m.

I carried out my instructions. M. von Ribbentrop asked if I had special plenipotentiary powers to undertake negotiations. I said no. He then asked whether I had been informed that on London's suggestion the German Government had expressed their readiness to negotiate directly with a delegate of the Polish Government, furnished with the requisite full powers, who was to have arrived on the preceding day, August 30. I replied that I had no direct information on the subject. In conclusion M. von Ribbentrop repeated that he had thought I would be empowered to negotiate. He would communicate my démarche to the Chancellor.

H1151-0203

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT C 126
OFFICE OF U.S.CHIEF OF COUNSEL

C 126

EXTRACT FROM LETTER TO THE FLEET F.O. (U/B) & B.d.P.

Berlin, August 2nd, 1939.

Attached are Operational Directions for the employment of U-Boats which are to be sent out to the Atlantic, by way of precaution, in the event of the intention to carry out"Fall Weiss" remaining unchanged. F.O. (U/B) is handing in his Operation Orders to Slk. by 12 August (Ink note - a decision on the sailings of U-Boats for the Atlantic will probably be made at the middle of August).

These directions must, if the Operations are not carried out, be destroyed by the 1 September 1939 at the latest.....

(Initialled) F.A.
Slk.
1/Slk.

Berlin 22.6.1939

Supreme Command of the Armed Forces

Re: Preparations for "Fall Weiss".
.....

The Supreme Command of the Armed Forces has submitted to the Führer and Supreme Commander a "preliminary time-table" for "Fall Weiss", based on the particulars so far available from the Navy, Army and Air Force. Details concerning the days preceding the attack and the start of the attack were not included in this time-table.

The Führer and the Supreme Commander is, in the main, in agreement with the intentions of the Navy, Army and Air Force and made the following comments on individual points:-

1. In order not to disquiet the population by calling up reserves on a larger scale than usual for the manoeuvres scheduled for 1939, as is intended, civilian establishments, employers or other private persons who make enquiries should be told that men are being called up for the autumn manoeuvres and for the exercise units it is intended to form for those manoeuvres.

It is requested that directions to this effect be issued to subordinate establishments.

2. For reasons of security the clearing of hospitals in the area of the frontier which the Supreme Command of the Army proposed should take place from the middle of July, must not be carried out.

3. It should be ascertained whether it appears to be expedient to transfer the S.S. Artillery Regiment to East Prussia and use it there for the purpose intended, in view of the fact that this regiment had only been formed a short time previously, or whether it seems more profitable to use an Army Artillery Regiment in place of an S.S. Artillery Regiment.

The result of the investigation should be communicated to the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces.

H1151-0204

4. The Führer and Supreme Commander will decide at the beginning of August whether the training ships of the Navy will put out according to plan.

Chief of the Supreme Command
of the Armed Forces.

Keitel.

SUPREME COMMANDER OF THE ARMED FORCES
OKW/WFA No. 170/39 gk Chefs. L.I.

Berlin, 31 August 1939

MOST SECRET

8 Copies
2nd. Copy

Known to Ob.d.H.

S.O. only (Stamp)
Access only through an officer.

Direction No I for the conduct of the war.

1. Now that all the political possibilities of disposing by peaceful means of a situation on the Eastern Frontier which is intolerable for Germany are exhausted, I have determined on a solution by force.

2. The attack on Poland is to be carried out in accordance with the preparations made for "Fall Weiss", with the alterations which result, where the Army is concerned, from the fact that it has in the meantime almost completed its dispositions.

Allotment of tasks and the operational target remain unchanged.

Date of attack - 1 September 1939
Time of attack - 04:45 (Inserted in red pencil)

This time also applies to the operation at Gdynia, Bay of Danzig and the Dirschau Bridge.

3. In the West it is important that the responsibility for the opening of hostilities should rest unequivocally with England and France. At first purely local action should be taken against insignificant frontier violations.

and Denmark (red pencil note) The neutrality assured by us to Holland, Belgium, Luxembourg and Switzerland should be scrupulously observed.

The German land frontier in the West is not to be crossed at any point without my express consent.

According to this Atlantic U-boats must remain in their waiting positions for The same applies to warlike actions at sea or any which may be so interpreted.

Defensive measures on the part of the Luftwaffe should at first be confined exclusively to the warding off of enemy air attacks on the frontier of the Reich. In doing so the frontier of the neutral states should be observed as long as possible when dealing with single aircraft and smaller units.

H1151-0205

Defensive operations should only be permitted over that neutral territory when, where French and English attacking squadrons are operating over neutral states against German territory in considerable force, air defence in the West is no longer assured.

the time being. (pencil note)

It is of special importance that the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces should be informed with the least possible delay of any violation of the neutrality of their States on the part of our opponents in the West.

4. If England and France open hostilities against Germany, the task of those sections of the Armed Forces which are operating in the West is to uphold, while conserving their strength as far as possible, against those conditions necessary for the successful conclusion of the operations against Poland. Within the scope of this duty, damage should be done to enemy forces and their economic sources of supply as far as resources allow. In any case I reserve to myself the order to commence attack operations.

Warfare here against Merchant Shipping (Green pencil)

(See Directions to Groups, ships and U-Boats) (red pencil note)

The Army is holding the West wall and is making preparations to prevent its being turned. - The Western Powers violating Belgian or Dutch territory in doing so. If French forces move into Luxembourg, the frontier bridges may be blown up.

(Undecipherable note in green pencil)

In its warfare on merchant shipping the Navy is concentrating on England. To intensify the effect of this, a declaration of danger zones is to be expected.
The Supreme Command of the Navy announces in which areas of sea and within what limits danger zones are considered expedient. The wording of a public declaration should be prepared in conjunction with the Foreign Office and should be submitted to me for approval through the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces.

The Baltic should be secured against penetration by the enemy. The C - C. of the Navy decides whether the approaches to the Baltic should be mined for this purposes.

Address to... (undecipherable) General Warning! (Red pencil note)

The primary task of the Luftwaffe is to prevent the French and English Air Force operating against the German Army and German "Lebensraum".

In waging war against England preparations should be made for the use of the Luftwaffe in causing damage to sea transport, the armament industry and troop transports to France. Full use should be made of favourable opportunities to make an effective attack on massed English Naval units, especially on battleships and aircraft carriers. The decisions regarding attacks on London rests with me.

Attacks on the English motherland should be prepared, bearing in mind that whatever happens, inadequate success with part forces is to be avoided.

(Sgd) A. Hitler

..... (undecipherable)

Warning ? (Note in red pencil)

H1151-0206

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

OF DOCUMENT C 126

16 November 1945

I ERNST M. COHN, PFC, 33925738, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German Languages; and that the above is a true and correct partial translation of Document C 126

ERNST M. COHN
PFC, 33925738.

H1151-0207

OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS

concerning

POLISH - GERMAN and POLISH - SOVIET RELATIONS

1933 - 1939.

- - - - - -

The Polish White Book.

No. 113.

Official German Communique broadcast by the German Wireless at 9.p.m.

August 31, 1939.

His Britannic Majesty's Government informed the German Government, in a note dated August 28, 1939, of their readiness to offer their mediation towards direct negotiations between Germany and Poland over the problems in dispute. In so doing they made it abundantly clear that they, too, were aware of the urgent need for progress in view of the continuous incidents and the general European tension. In a reply dated August 29, the German Government in spite of being sceptical as to the desire of the Polish Government to come to an understanding, declared themselves ready in the interests of peace to accept the British mediation or suggestion. After considering all the circumstances prevailing at the time, they considered it necessary in their note to point out that, if the danger of a catastrophe was to be avoided, then action must be taken readily and without delay. In this sense they declared themselves ready to receive a personage appointed by the Polish Government up to the evening of August 30, with the proviso that the latter was, in fact, empowered not only to discuss but to conduct and conclude negotiations.

Further, the German Government pointed out that they felt able to make the basic points regarding the offer of an understanding available to the British Government by the time the Polish negotiator arrived in Berlin.

Instead of a statement regarding the arrival of an authorized Polish personage, the first answer the Government of the Reich received to their readiness for an understanding was the news of the Polish mobilization, and only towards 12 o'clock on the night of August 30, 1939, did they receive a somewhat general assurance of British readiness to help towards the commencement of negotiations.

Although the fact that the Polish negotiator expected by the Government of the Reich did not arrive removed the necessary condition for informing His Majesty's Government of the views of the German Government as regards possible bases of negotiation, since His Majesty's Government themselves had pleaded for direct negotiations between Germany and Poland, the German Minister for Foreign Affairs, M. von Ribbentrop, gave the British Ambassador on the occasion of the presentation of the last British note precise information as to the text of the German proposals which would be regarded as a basis of negotiation in the event of the arrival of the Polish plenipotentiary.

H1151-0208

The Government of the German Reich considered themselves entitled to claim that in these circumstances a Polish personage would immediately be nominated, at any rate retroactively.

For the Reich Government cannot be expected for their part continually not only to emphasize their willingness to start negotiations, but actually to be ready to do so, while being from the Polish side merely put off with empty subterfuges and meaningless declarations.

It has once more been made clear as a result of a démarche which has meanwhile been made by the Polish Ambassador that the latter himself has no plenary powers either to enter into any discussion, or even to negotiate.

The Fuehrer and the German Government have thus waited two days in vain for the arrival of a Polish negotiator with plenary powers.

In these circumstances the German Government regard their proposals as having this time too been to all intents and purposes rejected, although they considered that these proposals, in the form in which they were made known to the British Government also, were more than loyal, fair and practicable.

The Reich Government consider it timely to inform the public of the bases for negotiation which were communicated to the British Ambassador by the Minister for Foreign Affairs, M. von Ribbentrop.

The situation existing between the German Reich and Poland is at the moment of such a kind that any further incident can lead to an explosion on the part of the military forces which have taken up their position on both sides. Any peaceful solution must be framed in such a way as to ensure that the events which lie at the root of this situation cannot be repeated on the next occasion offered, and that thus not only the East of Europe, but also other territories shall not be brought into such a state of tension. The causes of this development lie in: (1) the impossible delineation of frontiers, as fixed by the Versailles dictate; (2) the impossible treatment of the minority in the ceded territories.

In making these proposals, the Reich Government are, therefore, actuated by the idea of finding a lasting solution which will remove the impossible situation created by frontier delineation, which may assure to both parties their vitally important line of communication, which may - as far as it is at all possible - remove the minority problem and, in so far as this is not possible, may give the minorities the assurance of a tolerable future by means of a reliable guarantee of their rights.

The Reich Government are content that in so doing it is essential that economic and physical damage done since 1918 should be exposed and repaired in its entirety. They, of course, regard this obligation as being binding for both parties.

These considerations lead to the following practical proposals: -

(1) The Free City of Danzig shall return to the German Reich in view of its purely German character, as well as of the unanimous will of its population;

(2) The territory of the so-called Corridor which extends from the Baltic Sea to the line Marienwerder-Graudenz-Kulm-Bromberg (inclusive) and thence may run in a westerly direction to Schönlanke, shall itself decide as to whether it shall belong to Germany or Poland;

H1151-0209

(3) For this purpose a plebiscite shall take place in this territory. The following shall be entitled to vote: all Germans who were either domiciled in this territory on January 1, 1918, or who by that date have been born there, and similarly of Poles, Kashubes, etc., domiciled in this territory on the above day (January 1, 1918) or born there up to that date. The Germans who have been driven from this territory shall return to it in order to exercise their vote with a view to ensuring an objective plebiscite, and also with a view to ensuring the extensive preparation necessary therefor. The above territory shall, as in the case of the Saar territory, be placed under the supervision of an international commission to be formed immediately, on which shall be represented for four Great Powers - Italy, the Soviet Union, France and England. This commission shall exercise all the rights of sovereignty in this territory. With this end in view, the territory shall be evacuated within a period of the utmost brevity, still to be agreed upon by the Polish armed forces, the Polish police, and the Polish authorities;

(4) The Polish port of Gdynia, which fundamentally constitutes Polish sovereign territory so far as it is confined territorially to the Polish settlement, shall be excluded from the above territory. The exact frontiers of this Polish port should be determined between Germany and Poland, and, if necessary, delimited by an international committee of arbitration;

(5) With a view to assuring the necessary time for the execution of the extensive work involved in the carrying out of a just plebiscite, this plebiscite shall not take place before the expiry of twelve months;

(6) In order to guarantee unrestricted communication between Germany and East Prussia and between Poland and the sea during this period, roads and railways shall be established to render free transit traffic possible. In this connection only such taxes as are necessary for the maintenance of the means of communication and for the provision of transport may be levied;

(7) The Question as to the party to which the area belongs is to be decided by simple majority of the votes recorded;

(8) In order to guarantee to Germany free communication with her province of Danzig-East Prussia, and to Poland her connection with the sea after the execution of the plebiscite - regardless of the results thereof - Germany shall, in the event of the plebiscite area going to Poland, receive an extra-territorial traffic zone, approximately in a line from Bütow to Danzig or Dirschau, in which to lay down a Motor Road and a 4-track railway line. The road and the railway shall be so constructed that the Polish lines of communication are not affected, i.e. they shall pass either over or under the latter. The breadth of this zone shall be fixed at 1 kilometre, and it is to be German sovereign territory. Should the plebiscite be favourable to Germany, Poland is to obtain rights, analogous to those accorded to Germany, to a similar extra-territorial communication by road and railway for the purpose of free and unrestricted communication with her port of Gdynia;

(9) In the event of the Corridor returning to the German Reich, the latter declares its right to proceed to an exchange of population with Poland to the extent to which the nature of the Corridor lends itself thereto;

(10) Any special right desired by Poland in the port of Danzig would ne negotiated on a basis of territory against similar rights to be granted to Germany in the port of Gdynia;

H1151-0210

(11) In order to remove any feeling in this area that either side was being threatened, Danzig and Gdynia would have the character of exclusively mercantile towns, that is to say, without military installations and military fortifications;

(12) The peninsula of Hela, which as a result of the plebiscite might go either to Poland or to Germany, would in either case have similarly to be demilitarized;

(13) Since the Government of the German Reich has the most vehement complaints to make against the Polish treatment of minorities, and since the Polish Government for their part feel obliged to make complaints against Germany, both parties declare their agreements to have these complaints laid before an international committee of enquiry, whose task would be to examine all complaints as regards economic or physical damage, and any other acts of terrorism. Germany and Poland undertake to make good economic or other damage done to minorities on either side since the year 1918, or to cancel expropriation as the case may be, or to provide complete compensation to the persons affected for this and any other encroachments on their economic life;

(14) In order to free the Germans who may be left in Poland and the Poles who may be left in Germany from the feeling of being outlawed by all nations, and in order to render them secure against being called upon to perform action or to render services incompatible with their national sentiments, Germany and Poland agree to guarantee the rights of both minorities by means of the most comprehensive and binding agreement, in order to guarantee to these minorities the preservation, the free development and practical application of their nationality (Volkstum) and in particular to permit for this purpose such organization as they may consider necessary. Both parties undertake not to call upon members of the minority for military service;

(15) In the event of agreement on the basis of these proposals, Germany and Poland declare themselves ready to decree and to carry out the immediate demobilization of their armed forces;

(16) The further measures necessary for the more rapid execution of the above arrangement shall be agreed upon by both Germany and Poland conjointly.

H1151-0211

TC 72 No. 113.

VISCOUNT HALIFAX TO SIR H. KENNARD (WARSAW)

Foreign Office, September 1, 1939.

Sir,

The Polish Ambassador called to see me at his request at 10.30 this morning. Count Raczynski said that he had been officially informed from Paris that German forces had crossed the frontier at four points. He added that the towns of Vilno, Grodno, Brest-Litovsk, Lodz, Katowice and Cracow were being bombed and that at 9 a.m. an air attack had been made on Warsaw, as a result of which there were many civilian victims, including women and children. As regards the German attack, he understood, although he had no official information, that the points at the frontier which had been crossed were near Danzig, in East Prussia and Upper Silesia. His Excellency said that he had few words to add, except that it was a plain case as provided for by the treaty. I said that I had no doubt on the facts as he had reported them that we should take the same view.

I am, etc.

HALIFAX.

(2226)

Exhibit G.B. 73
Filed Dec. 6, 1945

TC 54

(English Translation)

PROCLAMATION OF THE FUEHRER

TO THE

GERMAN ARMED FORCES

1st September, 1939.

To the Armed Forces -

The Polish Government unwilling to establish good neighbourly relations as aimed at by me wants to force the issue by way of arms.

The Germans in Poland are being persecuted with bloody terror and driven from their homes. Several acts of frontier violation which cannot be tolerated by a great power show that Poland is no longer prepared to respect the Reich's frontiers. To put an end to these mad acts I can see no other way but from now onwards to meet force with force.

The German Armed Forces will with firm determination take up the struggle for the honour and the vital rights of the German people.

I expect every soldier to be conscious of the high tradition of the eternal German soldierly qualities and to do his duty to the last.

Remember always and in any circumstances that you are the representatives of National Socialist Greater Germany.

Long live our people and Reich!

Berlin, 1st September 1939.

(Signed) ADOLF HITLER.

(1288)

H1151-0212

H1151-0213

Exhibit G. B. 74
Filed Dec. 6, 1945

T.C. 72.

No.110.

VISCOUNT HALIFAX TO SIR N. HENDERSON (BERLIN)

(Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, September 1, 1939. 5.45P.M.

Following is text referred to in my immediately preceding telegram:-

On the instructions of His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, I have the honour to make the following communication:-

Early this morning the German Chancellor issued a proclamation to the German army which indicated clearly that he was about to attack Poland.

Information which has reached His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom and the French Government indicates that German troops have crossed the Polish frontier and that attacks upon Polish towns are proceeding.

In these circumstances, it appears to the Governments of the United Kingdom and France that by their action the German Government have created conditions (viz., an aggressive act of force against Poland threatening the independence of Poland) which call for the implementation by the Governments of the United Kingdom and France of the undertaking to Poland to come to her assistance.

I am accordingly to inform your Excellency that unless the German Government are prepared to give His Majesty's Government satisfactory assurances that the German Government have suspended all aggressive action against Poland and are prepared promptly to withdraw their forces from Polish territory, His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom will without hesitation fulfil their obligations to Poland

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No.118. T.C. 72.

VISCOUNT HALIFAX TO SIR N. HENDERSON (BERLIN).

(Telegraphic) Foreign Office, September 3, 1939, 5 A.M.

Please seek interview with Minister for Foreign Affairs at 9 A.M. to-day, Sunday or, if he cannot see you then, arrange to convey at that time to representative of German Government the following communication:-

"In the communication which I had the honour to make to you on 1st September I informed you, on the instructions of His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, that, unless the German Government were prepared to give His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom satisfactory assurances that the German Government had suspended all aggressive action against Poland and were prepared promptly to withdraw their forces from Polish territory, His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom would, without hesitation, fulfil their obligations to Poland.

"Although this communication was made more than twenty-four hours ago, no reply has been received but German attacks upon Poland have been continued and intensified. I have accordingly the honour to inform you that, unless not later than 11 A.M., British Summer Time, to-day 3rd September, satisfactory assurances to the above effect have been given by the German Government, and have reached His Majesty's Government in London, a state of war will exist between the two countries as from that hour".

If the assurances referred to in the above communication are received, you should inform me by any means at your disposal before 11 A.M. to-day, 3rd September. If no such assurance is received here by 11 A.M., we shall inform the German representative that a state of war exists as from that hour.

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H1151-0214

H1151-0215

part I U.S. 75

Translation

PS 1831

Telegram Heading in Italian

773 S Berlin AW 977 630/626
3/9 2051 Etat - 459

For the Ambassador

I request that the following message from the Fuehrer be forwarded to the Duce personally:

Duce

I first want to thank you for your last attempt at a mediation. I would have been ready to accept, but only under condition that there would be a possibility to give me certain guarantees that the conference would be successful. Because, for the last two days the German troops are engaged in an extraordinarily rapid advance in Poland. It would have been impossible to devaluate the bloody sacrifices made thereby by diplomatic intrigues. Nevertheless, I believe that a way could have been found, if England would not have been determined to wage war under all circumstances. I have not given in to the English, because, Duce, I do not believe that peace could have been maintained for more than ½ year or 1 year. Under these circumstances, I thought that, in spite of everything, the present moment was better for resistance. At present, the superiority of the German armed forces in Poland is so overwhelming in all fields that the Polish Army will collapse in a very short time. I doubt whether this fast success could be achieved in one or two years. England and France would have armed their allies to such an extent that the crushing technical superiority of the German armed forces could not have become so apparent anymore. I am aware, Duce, that the fight which I enter is one for life and death. My own fate does not play any role in it at all. But I am also aware that one cannot avoid such a struggle permanently and that one has to choose after cold deliberation the moment for resistance in such a way that the probability of the success is guaranteed and I believe in this success, Duce, with the firmness of a rock. Recently you have given me the kind assurance that you think you will be able to help me in a few fields. I acknowledge this in advance with sincere thanks. But I believe also - even if we march now over different roads - that fate will finally join us. If the National Socialistic Germany were destroyed by the Western democracies, the Fascist Italy would also have to face a grave future. I was personally always aware of this community of the future of our two governments and I know that you, Duce, think the same way. To the situation in Poland, I would like to make the brief remark that we lay aside, of course, all unimportant things, that we do not waste any man on unimportant tasks, but direct all on acts in the light of great operational considerations. The Northern Polish Army which is the Corridor, has already been completely encircled by our action. It will be either wiped out or will surrender. Otherwise, all operations proceed according to plan. The daily achievements of the troops are far beyond all expectations. The superiority of our air force is complete, although scarcely one third of it is in Poland. In the West I will be on the defensive. France can here sacrifice its blood first. Then the moment will come when we can confront the enemy also there with the full power of the nation. Accept my thanks, Duce, for all your assistance which you have given to me in the past and I ask you not to deny it to me in the future.

(Signed) Adolf Hitler

End of message. Cable report is requested
Ribbentrop.

Exhibit U.S. 75
Filed Dec. 6, 1945

Coded Telegram (Copy)

From Berlin:	3 Sept. 1939	2.50 hours
Arr. Rome:	3 Sept. 1939	3.00 hours
Arr. Embassy:	3 Sept. 1939	6.30 hours

Decoding

No. 450 dated 2 September 1939.
For High Officials or their representatives in person.
Top Secret. To be decoded in person.
Top Secret.

For the Chief of the Mission for personal and confidential information.

The Italian Ambassador handed to the State Secretary at the Duce's order following copy for the Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor and for the Reich Minister for Foreign Affairs:

Italy sends the information, leaving, of course, every decision to the Fuehrer, that it still has a chance to call a conference with France, England and Poland on following basis: 1. Armistice which would leave the Army Corps where they are at present. 2. Calling the conference within 2-3 days. 3. Solution of the Polish-German controversy which would be certainly favourable for Germany as matters stand today.

This idea which originated from the Duce has its foremost exponent in France.

Danzig is already German and Germany is holding already securities which guarantee most of her demands. Besides, Germany has had already its "moral satisfaction". If it would accept the plan for a conference, it will achieve all her aims and at the same time prevent a war which already today has the aspect of being universal and of extremely long duration.

Duce does not insist on it, but he lays particular emphasis that above should be brought to the immediate attention of von Ribbentrop and of the Fuehrer.

End of Copy

The answer to the Italian Ambassador was promised by 3 September.

Woermann.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION
OF DOCUMENT NO. 1831 PS

21 November 1945

I, WILLARD E. SKIDMORE. Lt. (jg), 391590, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages; and that the above is a true and correct translation of Document no. 1831 PS.

WILLARD E. SKIDMORE
Lt. (jg) USNR. 391590

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H1151-0217

H-1151

BRITISH DOCUMENT BOOK

No. 2 (ENGLISH)

British Document Book No. 2

Filed Dec. 5, 1945
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